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Abstract 
 
In recent years, remittances have been hailed as potential drivers of economic 
development in migrant-sending countries. Over four million Colombians (around 10% 
of Colombia‘s population) reside abroad and the UK is their second most favoured 
destination in Europe. Approximately 100,000 Colombians live and work in London 
and, in turn, the UK is the fourth biggest source of remittances to Colombia. In recent 
years, the Colombian Government has introduced policies to make their citizens 
abroad an integral part of a reconstituted definition of the Colombian nation. It has 
sought to render migrants as agents of economic development by channelling their 
remittances towards ‗productive investment‘. The main component of this investment is 
mortgage-financed housing. To this end, the government has promoted ‗Mi casa con 
remesas‘, a model of housing finance for people who receive remittances periodically 
from their family members abroad, and sponsored housing/property fairs for Colombian 
migrants in their main cities of destination in the global north: Madrid, London, New 
York and Miami. 
 
This thesis situates the Colombian government‘s narratives around the use of 
remittances to finance housing investment within broader discourses of development 
and neoliberalism and the strategies and experiences of accessing housing articulated 
by Colombian migrants in London and their households in the Coffee Region of 
Colombia. Based on empirical data collected at both ends of the migration network, it 
argues that the conception of migrants as agents of development – and hence as 
transnational financial subjects – is tightly linked to wider attempts at the 
institutionalisation of the transnational social field. These attempts are embedded in 
ideologically-driven discourses of citizenship that privilege financial markets as the 
medium for individuals‘ and households‘ socioeconomic reproduction. Furthermore, 
they displace the responsibility for economic development from the state to its citizens 
(at home and abroad) and bring to the fore investment as the preferred mechanism for 
the ‗proper‘ use of remittances and through which migrant households‘ connection to 
broader circuits of capital and finance can be exploited.  Although housing is a growing 
component of remittances expenditure, for the most part, Colombians in London are 
not embracing their newly-assigned financial subjectivities but are instead using 
alternative channels for housing acquisition and financing. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
1.1. Introduction 
Since the 1970s, the dominance of neoliberal development economics as a discourse 
has opened new avenues for the construction of economic subjects while at the same 
time it has placed financial markets at the centre of the process of capital 
accumulation. Growing financialisation has translated into a deepening and expansion 
of the reach of finance capital over all other areas of the economy as well as into all 
aspects of social life. Although financialised capitalism is a trait often associated with 
the Anglo-American mode of development, developing countries are increasingly being 
drawn, albeit unevenly, into global circuits of capital and finance. The power of the 
state and other powerful transnational actors such as the international financial and 
development institutions has been mobilised for the expansion and consolidation of 
finance‘s process of capital accumulation and its penetration into processes of social 
reproduction. In the process, the centrality of financial markets for individuals‘ and 
households‘ socioeconomic reproduction has progressively been incorporated into old 
and new forms of economic and social policies, as well as into discourses around 
poverty-alleviation and development. 
 
Given that workers‘ remittances have become one of the main sources of finance for 
developing countries in recent years, migrant workers have emerged as one of the 
most important agents to be incorporated into the dynamics of the global financial 
system. This has translated into a coordinated effort on the part of international 
financial institutions and governments in the north and south to establish a discourse 
that links migration, remittances and development. This migration-development 
discourse has been one of the most prominent features of the global development 
agenda in the last decade and is based on the idea that (financial) remittances have 
the potential to act as drivers of economic development in migrant-sending countries 
(this will be explored in chapters 2 and 3). This has been accompanied by the 
establishment of a range of programmes that seek to spur economic development 
based on the ‗proper‘ use of remittances by channelling them towards ‗productive 
investment‘. Although the World Bank has been in charge of coordinating these efforts, 
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these programmes are being pushed at a global scale by a range of different 
institutions such as the European Union, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and 
the German Agency for International Cooperation (GTZ). In this context, migrant-
sending governments around the world are taking bold steps to establish (and 
maintain) links with their citizens abroad while financial institutions have been driven 
into a fierce competition to capture a greater portion of global remittances flows. 
 
The increased outflow of people and the increased influx of material (and cultural) 
goods have not only produced important socioeconomic transformations in thousands 
of households and communities in the global south but have in effect, turned migrant 
workers into one of the main intermediaries in charge of facilitating the flow of money, 
ideas and subjectivities within and between the global south and north. Against this 
backdrop, there has been a considerable amount of research detailing the prominence 
of migrants‘ transnational socio-economic and cultural practices and the multiple social, 
economic, political and cultural transformations they have produced at the family and 
community levels (cf. Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002; Glick Schiller, 1997; Glick Schiller 
and Fouron, 1998; Herrera Lima, 2001; Itzigsohn et al., 1999; Levitt, 2001a, 2001b; 
Mas Giralt and Bailey, 2010; Portes 2003; Vertovec, 1999). However, much more 
research is needed in order to understand the complex implications that migrants 
multifaceted links with their countries of origin have had at the household, city and 
community levels as well as the country and global levels. In particular, the link 
between migration and development has rarely been framed in terms of a systematic 
analysis of the process of financialisation of economic and sociospatial relations, its 
uneven geographical development and the role of the state in the construction of 
migrants as consumer-investors-citizens.  
 
This thesis is an attempt to fill this void. In particular, it aims to elucidate the multiple 
political, financial and social linkages that are generated by migrants‘ transnational 
practices while contextualising the connections between state policy, economic 
development, global financial flows, family livelihood strategies and migration 
experiences and aspirations. It does so by tracing migrants‘ socioeconomic practices 
along the geography of the migration network and exploring how migrants are being 
constructed as transnational financial subjects and how these subjectivities are being 
incorporated into neoliberal development discourses that link north-south economic 
and sociospatial relations through remittances. In a broader sense, this thesis aims to 
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answer the call made by Pollard et al. (2009) for ‗crossing disciplinary boundaries‘ to 
create an arena for analysis that emphasises the mutual constitution of the global north 
and south and ‗de-compartmentalises space‘. It is also an attempt at ‗bridging the 
divide‘ (Vira and James, 2011) between economic geography and development 
studies. 
 
The analysis is grounded in an examination of Colombian migration to the United 
Kingdom and the Colombian government‘s attempts to make their citizens abroad an 
integral part of a reconstituted definition of the Colombian nation. Having recognised 
migrants as a current and potential economic and political force, the Colombian 
government has actively embraced the migration-for-development discourse emanating 
from the international development and aid agencies. It has engaged in a dynamic 
campaign to redefine its relationship with its diaspora in an attempt to institutionalise 
remittances flows and the transnational economic practices that derive from it such as 
their use for consumption or investment. In particular, the Colombian government has 
sought to construct migrants as consumers-investors-citizens abroad and thus render 
them as agents of development by designing specific programmes to channel 
remittances to key sectors such as housing and finance. Under the umbrella of the 
‗ColombiaNosUne‘ (Colombia Unites Us) programme established in 2003, the 
government has promoted a programme designed and financed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank, based on the use of remittances for mortgage-financed housing. 
The government has also put its weight behind the institutionalisation of transnational 
housing investments by promoting and facilitating the expansion of the national 
property (and financial) markets to include Colombians abroad through the international 
property/housing fairs. Hence, on the one hand, this thesis examines the ways in which 
Colombian migrants are being constructed as consumers-investors-citizens by 
exploring the government‘s remittances for housing programmes. On the other hand, it 
explores the socioeconomic transnational practices of Colombian migrants at both 
ends of the migration network, London and Colombia, in particular with reference to 
their strategies and experiences of accessing housing.  
 
The significance of this research emanates from the fact that the UK is the second 
most favoured destination of Colombians in Europe. Approximately 100,000 
Colombians live and work in London and, in turn, the UK is the fourth biggest source of 
remittances to Colombia. However, most research on the transnational practices of 
Colombians abroad has been conducted either at the point of departure or destination 
and has mainly focused on the transnational connections established by Colombians in 
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the United States and more recently, in Spain (cf. Bermúdez Torres, 2006; Cock, 2008; 
Echeverri, 2010; García, 2008; Gimeno Collado et al., 2009; Guarnizo, 2006b; 
Guarnizo and Diaz, 1999; McIlwaine, 2005; Portes, 2003; Puyana Villamizar et al., 
2009; Sørensen and Guarnizo, 2007). In addition, no empirical studies to date have 
documented these new transnational initiatives on the part of the Colombian state and 
migrants‘ level of engagement with them. 
 
1.2. Research Questions  
This thesis will answer the following questions:  
1) How are Colombian migrants being constructed as transnational financial 
subjects? And what role is the state playing in shaping the construction of these 
new financial subjectivities through housing?  
2) How are Colombian migrants in London and their households in the Coffee 
Region of Colombia realising their dream of homeownership? And what 
implications do their transnational housing investments have for our 
understanding of the link between migration and development? 
 
The thesis is based on multi-sited empirical data collected at both ends of the migration 
network, London and Colombia, between 2008 and 2009. It employs a multi-method 
approach that includes semi-structured interviews, participant observation and the 
collection of secondary qualitative and quantitative data.  
 
1.3. Thesis Overview  
Chapter 2 presents the cross-disciplinary theoretical framework that informs the critical 
analytical approach taken in this thesis. The chapter is structured in three sections. The 
first section situates the Colombian government‘s promotion of the use of migrant 
remittances to finance housing investment within broader discourses of development 
and neoliberalism. The second section draws on the transnationalism literature to 
frame the practices that link the flows of people and resources along the geography of 
the migration network. The last section explores why the housing and financial sectors 
have been chosen by migrant sending states to render migrants as agents of 
development and how development discourses have been incorporated into the realm 
of Latin America‘s housing policy. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a context for framing the empirical findings of this thesis. In 
particular, it presents detailed contextual information about the transnational flows of 
people and resources between the UK and Colombia and how they fit into the wider 
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Latin American and global contexts. Chapter 4 discusses my motivations to pursue this 
research, a justification for the methodological approach and research methods 
employed and a detailed description of the research sample. It also includes a reflexive 
account of the research process and the methodological contribution that is 
researching both ends of the migration network. 
 
Chapter 5 unpacks the ways in which the Colombian government is constructing 
migrants as transnational financial subjects, how these financial subjectivities have 
progressively been incorporated into the national policy discourse and practice and the 
degree to which it has succeeded in trying to extend the national housing and financial 
markets to Colombians abroad. It does so by exploring the two main remittances for 
housing programmes the government is currently promoting.  
 
Chapter 6 charts the alternative strategies and experiences of accessing housing 
articulated by Colombian migrants in London and their households in the Coffee 
Region of Colombia. In particular, the motivations behind using remittances to finance 
housing investments and the different ways in which these activities take place over the 
transnational space. Chapter 7 questions the premises that underpin the migration-
development discourse promoted by the international development and aid agencies 
by providing a more nuanced interpretation of development to account for the 
socioeconomic spinoffs that occur in the process of migrant households‘ attempts to 
produce and reproduce their livelihoods over the transnational social field.  
 
Finally, chapter 8 revisits the research questions and outlines the main findings of this 
research. It also highlights the theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions 
of this research to current debates on migration and development. The chapter ends 
with a summary of the policy implications that derive from this study and highlights the 
avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Migrants as Agents of Development: Financial Subjectivities, 
Transnational Processes and the Political Economy of Housing 
 
This chapter brings together different theoretical perspectives from a range of 
disciplines in the social sciences such as, Human Geography, Sociology, Anthropology 
and Economics and creates a cross-disciplinary conceptual framework that allows for 
an understanding of the interactions between the political, financial and social 
geographies of transnational migration in the context of housing. A key aim is to 
produce a framework that brings geography back into the transnational discourse by 
tracing migrants‘ transnational practices along the geography of the migration network 
and thus, connecting subjects to multiple sites and geographical scales. Thus, this 
chapter contextualises the link between state policy, economic development, global 
financial flows, family livelihood strategies and migration experiences and aspirations. 
 
This chapter informs the empirical chapters of this thesis and is thematically structured 
in three sections. The first section situates the Colombian government‘s narratives 
around the use of remittances to finance housing investment within broader discourses 
of development and neoliberalism. It argues that the conception of migrants as financial 
subjects abroad and hence as agents of development is tightly linked to wider attempts 
at the institutionalisation of the transnational social field. These attempts are embedded 
in ideologically-driven neoliberal discourses of citizenship that privilege financial 
markets as the medium for individuals‘ and households‘ socioeconomic reproduction 
and displace the responsibility for economic development from the state to its citizens 
(at home and abroad).  
 
The second section draws on recent scholarship on the processes of transnationalism 
in order to frame the diverse practices that link the flows of people and resources along 
the geography of the migration network and how these articulate with the state‘s efforts 
to institutionalise migrants‘ practices in the transnational field. It argues that migrants‘ 
locally grounded transnational practices provide a window for understanding the 
broader structures and processes that frame their lives across borders and the way 
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they shape and are shaped by these processes. In particular, it highlights the crucial 
role that the nation-state continues to play in framing the terms under which 
transnational practices take place and the ways in which it is being pushed to redefine 
its domain of action in an attempt to capture the resources of the population beyond its 
borders.  
 
Finally, the third section explores the reasons why migrant sending states have 
focused on rendering migrants as agents of development through the housing and 
financial sectors and how development discourses have been incorporated into the 
realm of Latin America‘s housing policy. Specifically, it revisits the existing literatures 
that highlight the political economy of housing policy in the region, with the aim to 
provide a historical and political background against which a diasporic dimension can 
be added. It argues that the singling out of these sectors is not a coincidence, rather it 
is based in a belief in the neoliberal orthodoxy of development economics and a 
recognition of the potential that migrant households‘ links with global circuits of capital 
and finance have for countries‘ incorporation into the global capitalist system.  
 
2.1. Construction of subjectivities under neoliberalism  
This section draws on recent debates on the political economy of neoliberalism to 
explore the role of the state in producing consumer-investors-citizens in an era of 
growing financialisation of the process of capital accumulation. It then turns to explore 
how migrants are being constructed as financial subjects abroad and how these 
subjectivities are being incorporated into neoliberal development discourses that link 
north-south economic and sociospatial relations through remittances.  
 
The dominance of neoliberal development economics as a discourse has opened new 
fields for the construction of economic subjects (Cooke, 2004; Escobar, 1989, 1995; 
Kothari, 2005). Neoliberal economic forms have become the norm and have been 
expanded through deregulation to allow for the penetration of the private sector into all 
spheres of the socioeconomic landscape. However, at the same time, there has been a 
new wave of regulation (though somewhat disguised) to guarantee that the new 
policies and practices adopted take the desired and expected form. 
 
As Peck and Tickell (2002) have argued, although markets constructed under the 
model of neoliberal economic globalisation are considered highly unregulated, they 
implicitly follow a set of rules and standards, a sort of ‗metaregulation‘.  These 
dynamics are a signal of what these authors have termed, ‗roll-back‘ and ‗roll-out‘ 
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neoliberalism, respectively, the mobilisation of state power for the dismantling of the 
Keynesian welfare apparatus and the creation of new forms of technocratic economic 
management and invasive social policies (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 388-389). 
 
This reading of the socioeconomic and political implications of neoliberalism is useful 
because it points to recent transformations in the political economy of the state (the 
reconfiguration of the relationship between state and society) and the way in which the 
state exercises its ideology through the market. In the global north, as well as in many 
parts of the developing world, this has translated into the state taking an active role in 
the creation/production of consumers-investors-citizens. As Paul Langley (2007: 74) 
has argued: „the neoliberal state plays not only a supervisory role in relation to the 
market but also stimulates, promotes, and shapes subjects who, self-consciously and 
responsibly, further their own freedom and security through the market in general and 
the financial market in particular‟1. In other words, the state has not only allowed the 
involvement of the private sector into areas previously reserved for itself but has also 
sought to shape the socioeconomic practices of its people according to a narrowly-
defined, market-promoting notion of citizenship.  
 
Langley‘s argument is of particular importance here because it highlights the pre-
eminent place that financial markets occupy in this market-centred notion of citizenship. 
Since the turn towards neoliberal political-economic practices in the 1970s, the 
financial system has been essential to the process of capital accumulation. In effect, 
David Harvey (2005: 33) has suggested that, at the global scale, „neoliberalization has 
meant the financialization of everything‟.  
 
In practice, this growing financialisation has translated into a deepening and widening 
of financial capital and the array of services that are extended to individuals, 
households and businesses alike (Pike and Pollard, 2010), and in the penetration of 
monetary relations into every corner of the world and every aspect of social life 
(Harvey, 1982). As Langley (2006b: 284) has eloquently explained, ‗contemporary 
finance, and ultimately the changing place of finance within Anglo-American capitalism, 
is constituted in important ways in the realm of everyday life‟. Randy Martin (2002) has 
further argued that the financialisation of daily life has translated into a deepening of 
the linkages between economics, politics and culture, „making global movements of 
finance intimate with daily life and animating the rules that order human affairs‟ (page 
                                                 
1
 A similar conceptualisation of the neoliberal state has also been put forward by Peck (2004) 
and Mitchell et al. (2004). 
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191). Moreover, financial markets, officially endorsed by the state, punish those who 
refuse or are unable to take up the new social contract that is forged between state and 
society (in the developed world) and/or those developing countries that do not adopt a 
financialised mode of development. Although widespread financialisation has meant a 
growing entanglement of people‘s everyday lives with global circuits of capital and 
finance, the thesis will show that the unfolding of this financialisation has been 
geographically uneven and it has meant different things to different people in different 
places. Thus, although by definition, globalisation has meant that „local happenings are 
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa‟ (Giddens, 1990: 64), the 
outcomes of this global financialisation in different localities (and for different actors) 
are quite varied.  
 
Although growing financialisation has been more clearly observed in Anglo-America, 
the implications of this important transformation have not been limited to its confines. 
As Pike and Pollard (2010: 37) have pointed out: ‗The growing social and geographic 
scope and extent of financialization has drawn existing and new agents and sites into 
often reconfigured roles and relationships within the financial system,  broadening and 
deepening the reach of finance capital‘ (emphasis added).  
 
These developments have had wider implications for the political-economic 
organisation of institutions around the world. In this sense, Saskia Sassen (1996) has 
argued that as a result of the transformations brought about by economic globalisation, 
global financial markets embody a new sort of ‗economic citizenship‘ that gives them 
the power to hold governments accountable the world over and influence national 
public policies. In a similar vein, Pike and Pollard (2010) have suggested that this 
growing financialisation has not only become a powerful force in shaping the 
sociospatial relations of economic actors but has the potential to intensify existing 
global economic, social and political unevenness. Likewise, French, Leyshon and 
Wainwright (2012) have argued that the process of financialisation of economy and 
society and their complex uneven geographies can only be understood by considering 
the  geographically embedded nature of the networks and flows of international 
finance. In other words, given the growing influence of the financial system over social 
life, a proper analysis of the recent process of financialisation and its uneven 
geographical development must trace and connect the flows of resources that underpin 
the process of capital accumulation. This thesis uses this approach to analyse how 
migrants are being constructed as financial subjects abroad and how their transnational 
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relations are shaping, and being shaped by, the economic, political and sociospatial 
nature of international finance.  
 
In summary, the most recent bout of financialisation of the economy that has taken 
place since the 1970s has positioned financial markets at the centre of individuals‘ and 
households‘ socioeconomic reproduction, albeit in a geographically uneven manner. 
The rise of finance capital has had two important consequences. On the one hand, the 
growing importance of finance has meant that the productive sectors of the economy 
are being held to more exacting standards in terms of profitability. On the other hand, 
given the pervasive nature of its power, the state has become an instrument for the 
expansion and consolidation of finance‘s process of capital accumulation and its 
penetration into processes of social reproduction.  
 
Given that the neoliberal project has been about the commoditisation of more and more 
aspects of social life, inevitably, the centrality of financial markets for the 
socioeconomic reproduction of individuals‘ and households‘ has progressively been 
incorporated into old and new forms of economic and social policies, as well as into 
discourses around poverty-alleviation and development. Economists from the World 
Bank and the IMF have argued that this globalisation of finance would provide more 
choice and widespread market access (financial and otherwise) to consumers the 
world over and this has materialised in a number of programmes that seek to promote 
‗financial inclusion‘ (Dymski, 2007). However, the integration of individuals and 
households to these circuits of capital and finance has, by no means, been 
homogeneous. Instead of promoting the notion of ‗financial citizenship2‘ (Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1995), under the current configuration of the global financial system, the poor 
and socially vulnerable groups, often members of minorities or migrant communities, 
continue to be ‗financially excluded‘ and/or are usually unfairly targeted (i.e. charged 
higher interest and/or fees) because of their geographical location and perceived 
higher risk3. Thus, financial globalisation is producing new forms of market 
segmentation and creating new spaces for the financial exploitation of low income 
populations (Dymski, 2007). One of the prime examples of these new forms of financial 
exploitation is what Ananya Roy (2010) has termed, ‗poverty capital4‘: the recent 
                                                 
2
 Financial citizenship, as it applies to individuals, denotes an all inclusive, rights-based 
approach to formal financial services. 
3
 This exploitative form of lending is known as ‗redlining‘. 
4
 This ‗poverty capital‘ is part of a ‗Washington consensus on poverty‘ promoted by the World 
Bank‘s Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and whose main purpose is the 
integration of the poor into financial markets as the key to development (Roy 2010). 
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reconfiguration of microfinance from a non-profit model of financial services with a 
social purpose to an ‗asset class‘, a ‗resilient subprime market‘, subjected to financial 
sustainability and exploited by finance capital.  
 
In this context, migrant workers have emerged as one of the most important agents to 
be incorporated into the dynamics of the global financial system. In recent years, the 
prominence gained by the vast amount of remittances they send home has driven 
sending governments around the world to take bold steps to establish (and maintain) 
links with their citizens abroad. At the same time, it has driven banks and other 
financial institutions into a fierce competition to capture a greater portion of the 
remittances market in order to control the global flow of money as well as to offer an 
increased number of financial services to migrant households at origin and destination. 
The control of cross border flows which connect global financial centres such as 
London and New York, as opposed to merely financial territories, is indeed one of the 
most important mechanisms through which finance capital exerts its influence and 
power on the world stage (Agnew, 2009). There is no doubt that financial globalisation 
is fuelling this fierce competition and that this sudden interest in promoting ‗financial 
inclusion‘ (democratising finance) is part of a wider strategy of capital accumulation on 
the part of the financial sector, often in collusion with the state. As Harvey (2005: 73) 
has asserted: „Neoliberal states typically facilitate the diffusion of influence of financial 
institutions...and they also guarantee the integrity and solvency of financial institutions 
at no matter what cost‟. 
 
These readings of the political economy of neoliberalism, in particular with regards to 
the process of financialisation of spatial socio-economic relations and the construction 
of new economic subjectivities that has accompanied it, are relevant to this research as 
they contextualise recent trends in the political economy of the state and its efforts to 
capitalise on migrants‘ transnational practices. Hence, these readings provide the first 
building block in our efforts to link transnational flows along the geography of the 
migration network, that is, the movement of people from the global south (Colombia to 
the United Kingdom) with the flows of money from the global north (United Kingdom to 
Colombia). The next section explores the ways in which migrants are being constructed 
as new financial subjects abroad and how they are being incorporated into the 
dynamics of the global financial system through development discourses.  
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2.2. Subjectivities, financialisation and transnational migrant flows 
As mentioned previously, widespread financialisation is not exclusive to the global 
north but has become an important feature of socio-economic relations in societies 
throughout the world. In recent years, there have been rapid and systemic changes in 
global financial markets and institutions and the increasing visibility and economic 
importance of remittances mean that more and more households in the global south 
are also being directly or indirectly connected with global circuits of capital and finance.  
 
Although migrant households may not necessarily be fully integrated into the formal 
financial system, despite the aggressive efforts on the part of financial institutions to 
‗bank‘ them, they may have a partial relationship with the banking sector, for example 
through the sending of remittances, the importance of this new reality cannot be 
underestimated. As Katharyne Mitchell (2002a: 77) reminds us: „transnational migrants 
are important agents of economic transformation in themselves, and their activities and 
practices in numerous spheres have had a major economic impact on local, regional 
and global arenas‟.  
 
Indeed, one of the most important transformations that has taken place in the last two 
decades is the fact that workers‘ remittances have become one of the main sources of 
finance for developing countries. Nowadays, remittances constitute the fastest growing 
capital inflow to the global south, exceed the flows of Official Development Aid (ODA) 
and, in many countries, have surpassed Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows 
(Adams Jr and Page, 2005; Datta et al., 2007; Fajnzylber and López, 2007; Garcia and 
Palewonsky, 2006; Orozco, 2002). As Portes (2003) has rightly pointed out, migrants 
have become a „key export‟ and „one of the primary means [of sending nations] of 
maintaining their integration into the world economy‟ (page 878).  
 
Mitchell and Portes‘ arguments are particularly relevant here because they reveal the 
vital place that migrants have come to occupy in the workings of the global economic 
system and incorporate labour migration as a factor of global integration for countries 
of the south. In recent years, the increased outflow of people and the increased influx 
of material (and cultural) goods have not only produced important socioeconomic 
transformations in thousands of households and communities in the global south but 
have in effect, turned migrant workers into one of the main intermediaries in charge of 
facilitating the flow of money, ideas and subjectivities within and between the global 
south and north. Thus, at the time that states are restructuring welfare provision, the 
affluent invest and those who cannot are left to the residue of any state services, it is 
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clear that it is precisely this connection of migrants and migrant households to global 
circuits of capital and finance that governments with sizeable migrant populations and 
international financial institutions are seeking to tap into.  
 
The most evident effort in this regard has been the establishment of a discourse that 
links migration, remittances and development. These discourses have translated into 
specific policies and practices that have sought to render migrants as financial subjects 
abroad and hence as active agents of economic development. In turn, these 
discourses tend to ignore structural constraints and allocate to individuals an unlimited 
capacity to overcome them (De Hass, 2010; Glick Schiller and Faist, 2010). 
Furthermore, given that only a small percentage of migrants‘ income is sent back home 
in the form of remittances, these discourses ignore the fact that migrants contribute 
more to the development of the host society, via higher productivity and consumption, 
and the cost of training and reproduction of the migrant labour force that is borne by the 
sending-country (Delgado-Wise et al., 2009). In addition, most studies have concluded 
that migration, remittances and investment by migrants do not produce development 
but instead, good institutional conditions and development are a precondition for 
migrants to invest (Faist, 2007; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011). However, the 
insistence of the nexus between migration and development persists and continues to 
gain ground and some have even hailed the potential of remittances as a panacea for 
development (see Ratha, 2003)5. This migration-for-development discourse therefore 
seems to obscure the underlying power relations that underpin uneven development 
processes, which expel a great mass of workers from their countries of origin into a 
precarious and restricted labour market abroad (Delgado-Wise et al., 2009).  
 
At the same time that financial markets have been positioned as the main vehicle for 
individuals‘ and households‘ socioeconomic reproduction, these discourses have 
become mainstreamed and have been incorporated into the poverty-alleviation and 
development programmes emanating from the main international development aid and 
lending institutions. Spivak (1996: 257) has eloquently summarised this situation: „the 
word Development covers over the economics and epistemics of transnationality‟ – the 
fact that the so-called developing world could not escape being subjected to the 
neoliberal economic system, the financialization of the world – which „in the name of 
                                                 
5
 This call is widespread in policy circles (governments and IFIs) in the global north and south. 
In academic circles, some have suggested that reinforcing the image of migrants as a 
development resource is a ‗pressing need‘ (see Sørensen et. al. 2002).  
 14 
 
Development, removes all barriers between itself and fragile national economies‟ (page 
245).  
 
For instance, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) through its Multilateral 
Investment Fund (MIF)6 has clearly stated its views in the numerous publications it 
produces, with regards to the role of remittances. Its premise is that a significant 
portion of the money that is sent by migrants to their families back home bypasses the 
formal banking system, hence these flows have to be controlled so that the challenge 
of ‗financial democracy‘ can be met. As established in a landmark paper published in 
2006, entitled ‗remittances as a tool for development‘: „These remittances can be 
considered as financial flows in search of financial products‟ (page 9, my translation). 
Thus, the cornerstone for economic development is the improvement, expansion and 
deepening of the sort of financial services that are offered to remitters and their families 
and the establishment of the necessary channels for the release of the investment 
potential of remittances (BID, 2006). 
 
In summary, the articulation of this discourse reveals important features of the political 
economy of neoliberalism and the reconfiguration of the relationship between the state 
and its citizens. A close examination of this discourse reveals that they are ideologically 
driven and grounded in neoliberal development economics. I would argue that they 
elucidate three important features. Firstly, they reproduce the centrality of financial 
markets for individuals‘ socioeconomic reproduction and explicitly tie economic 
development to the expansion of the financial sector. Secondly, they displace the 
responsibility for economic development from the state to its citizens (at home and 
abroad) and thirdly, they bring to the fore investment as the preferred mechanism for 
the ‗proper‘ use of remittances and through which migrant households‘ connection to 
broader circuits of capital and finance can be exploited.   
 
It is against this backdrop that states have begun designing and implementing 
programmes that exploit migrants‘ loyalty to their households and communities of 
origin, usually veiled under discourses of expanded rights and citizenship. Thus, I 
would argue that the primary reason behind sending country governments‘ newly-found 
interest in their migrant populations is an attempt at the institutionalisation of 
remittances flows. This includes in some sense, gaining control over the transnational 
                                                 
6
 The MIF is a fund administered by the IADB. It provides technical assistance and promotes 
private sector growth through grants and investments.  
(http://www.iadb.org/mif/home/index.cfm?language=English). 
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socio-economic activities that derive from it, such as their use for consumption or 
investment, education, health and private enterprise. Accordingly, migrants‘ linkages 
are being manipulated through ideologically-driven discourses of citizenship that 
privilege financial markets as the main medium for individuals‘ and households‘ 
socioeconomic reproduction. The importance of this argument can not be 
underestimated. As James Scott (1998) reminds us, historically the state‘s attempt to 
compile, standardise and classify civil society‘s social action has been linked to the 
need to control and exercise power over the population through taxation and direct 
rule.   
 
Following the lead of the World Bank and other international development and aid 
agencies, various Latin American governments have, in recent years, attempted to re-
incorporate migrants into their polity and render them as financial subject abroad who 
can act as agents of development. In the form of a critical genealogy, the next section 
will show that these efforts have broader historical connections to the political economy 
of development discourses in the region. Tracing these historical connections is 
important because it opens a window to understand the political and intellectual 
arrangements that underpin the different programmes that are being developed by 
sending states. This approach allows us to identify the old continuities and disruptions 
present in the current articulation of this particular development discourse. 
 
2.3. Migrants as agents of development: a critical genealogy 
The World Bank and other international development and aid agencies have had a long 
history of influencing (sometimes directly assisting and drafting) the social, economic 
and political agendas of countries in Latin America. The socio-political reorganisation of 
the world that took place after the Second World War saw the consolidation of the 
discourse of development economics and planning as a solution to the problems of 
poverty and lack of development throughout Latin America (Escobar, 1989, 1995). This 
particular discourse of development7 (henceforth ‗the development discourse‘) was 
grounded in neoclassical economic growth theory and treated ‗underdevelopment‘ as a 
process of capital accumulation and technical progress which ignored social, political 
and cultural differences. Adhering to this development paradigm meant putting an 
emphasis on savings, capital investment and productivity increases as the main 
vehicles for economic growth and employing the appropriate techniques and methods 
                                                 
7
 Saldaña-Portillo (2003) has argued that this development discourse emerged as a response to 
the looming crisis in US capitalist expansion brought about by the end of WWII. As such, 
development emerged as a ‗supplementary discourse‘ to replace the colonial ‗civilizing mission‘ 
in the then recently decolonised economies.  
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developed in the north (Escobar, 1995).  Following this paradigm also meant opening 
up the doors to foreign aid and investment. In short, as Escobar (1995: 88) has pointed 
out, „the overall goal was dictated by development economics: to promote growth 
through certain types of investment projects, resorting to foreign financing when 
possible or necessary. This goal required the rationalization of the productive 
apparatus, according to the methods developed in industrialized nations‟. The main 
mechanisms for the production and reproduction of this particular discourse relied on 
the power at the behest of the international financial and development institutions such 
as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  
 
In the post war era, a process of professionalisation and institutionalisation of the 
development discourse and practice has taken place, particularly in terms of the 
production and circulation of knowledge and the systems of power that reproduce the 
development apparatus. Institutionalisation has been achieved through the 
establishment and encroachment of planning institutions in charge of designing policies 
for all social and economic aspects of society. Professionalisation has been achieved 
through the articulation of a set of mechanisms and disciplinary practices that legitimise 
and privilege the development discourse and the formation and deployment of local 
and foreign ‗experts‘ (Escobar, 1989).  
 
In this vein, Timothy Mitchell (2002b) has argued that it is through these experts and a 
sort of ‗monopoly of expertise‘ that international development agencies reproduce and 
expand the reach of the development discourse. They do so by recasting a country‘s 
economic, social and political problems as internally produced (never in light of their 
global interconnections and associated structural inequalities), and hence as objects of 
development to be modernised through external (rational and impartial) technocratic 
and managerial fixes.  Similarly, Uma Kothari (2005) has argued that the increasing 
professionalisation of the development discourse in recent years has not only enabled 
the mainstreaming of the neoliberal agenda and the „unilinear notions of modernising 
progress‟ (page 426) embodied by international development agencies, but has also 
ascribed a political neutrality to the development discourse. Moreover, Bondi and 
Laurie (2005: 394) have argued that, „processes of professionalisation form an integral 
part of the production of the globalised spaces of neoliberal governance‟. In summary, 
the professionalisation of the development discourse and practice has taken place at a 
global scale, and is part and parcel of the rise of neoliberalism as a hegemonic 
economic discourse in the 1980s. This professionalisation has entrenched technocratic 
processes and has entailed the entrusting of development to external ‗experts‘.  
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In practice, the institutionalisation and professionalisation of the development discourse 
has meant that in Latin America, as well as other parts of the ‗developing world‘,  
„Development was – and continues to be for the most part – a top down, ethnocentric, 
and technocratic approach, which treated people and cultures as abstract concepts. 
Development was conceived…as a system of more or less universally applicable 
technical interventions intended to deliver some “badly needed” goods to a “target” 
population‟ (Escobar, 1995: 44). As Sheppard and Leitner (2010) have more recently 
argued, despite the confidence crisis in the Washington consensus in the aftermath of 
the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, a new phase of development economics, a 
new global governance discourse for the third world, has emerged. This new 
development discourse is not entirely new but a ‗supplement of capitalism‘ (page 193) 
that is globalised „as a sequential trajectory to be followed by all countries, as flattening 
the world to enable catch-up by backward countries‟ that reaffirms a developmentalist 
socio-spatial divide that renders ‗legitimate expertise located in the first world, and 
global capitalist governance, irrespective of serial policy failures‟ (page 185).  
 
In essence, the mechanisms and procedures of development are designed so that 
countries fit a pre-fabricated model which is conceived and designed in, and after the 
historical experience of, the modern north (Escobar, 1997; Frank 1995: [1966]). This 
narrow, a-historical, one-size-fits-all approach to policy-making has been one of the 
most important features of the application of neoliberal economic policies pushed by 
the major international lending and aid agencies in the last forty years. This has 
facilitated the transfer of policies from place to place while ignoring the specificities of 
the social, economic and political environment of the locations where they are 
implemented (Bondi and Laurie, 2005).  Or as James Scott (1998: 6) has suggested, 
there is „an imperial or hegemonic planning mentality that excludes the necessary role 
of local knowledge and know-how‟.  
 
The most recent example of this one-size-fits-all approach to development is the World 
Bank‘s 2009 World Development Report. As Rigg et. al. (2009) have suggested, 
although one of the main objectives of the report is to render the geographical issues of 
space and scale critical for development policy interventions, the report is riddled with 
the old neoclassical/orthodox economic recipes that have failed to bring about the 
growth and human welfare that the bank professes to promote8. The report‘s policy 
messages continue to privilege easily quantifiable general measures of development 
                                                 
8
 A similar argument has been made by Peck and Sheppard (2010).  
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while ignoring the historical lessons learned in terms of the specificity and 
embeddedness of spatial and power relations and the intrinsic linkages that exist 
between geography, political economy and society and spatial economic and 
development processes. Other authors have suggested that the contemporary 
development discourse emanating from the north articulates new forms of control and 
domination through innovative methods and techniques in the name of noble causes 
such as poverty alleviation and by ‗co-opting‘ forms of alternative and participatory 
development (Kothari, 2005).  
 
In this context, new critical policy studies9 have emerged to suggest that in the current 
process of the globalisation and transnationalisation of neoliberal policy norms and 
practices, policies are not simply travelling intact from place to place but are instead 
‗mutating‘, being reconstituted during the process. Furthermore, these mobile policies 
are reconstituting the power relations between their places of production and 
experimentation (Peck and Theodore, 2010). This is not to say, however, that the 
power of the traditional multilateral agencies such as the World Bank has been 
lessened. Rather, these agencies have simply changed their modus operandi so that, 
global development discourses, for instance, are no longer enforced through the 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes but are disseminated through 
„favored models of development and socio-technical fixes, like micro credit programs, 
arrangements to regularize property ownership in informal settlements and conditional 
cash transfer schemes‟ (Peck and Theodore, 2010: 171). These global development 
discourses are disseminated by ‗travelling technocrats‘, whose embodied multiple and 
shifting expert subjectivities may alter the policy transfer process and produce diverse 
political-economic geographies of neoliberal globalisation (Larner and Laurie, 2010). 
 
These different critical readings of the political economy of neoliberal development are 
relevant here because they highlight the technocratic and Anglo/Western-centred 
nature of development policies and the high degree of influence that multilateral 
organisations still exert in the production and implementation of public policy 
throughout the global south. Furthermore, they highlight the fact that, in contrast to the 
previously held view in much of the globalisation literature that the power of the state 
had been diminished in this era of globalisation, the state continues to be central to the 
production and reproduction of specific discourses and practices and it is a key actor in 
                                                 
9
 A compilation of these studies can be found in Geoforum 41 (2010), themed issue on 
Mobilizing Policy. 
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the configuration and reconfiguration of national and global socioeconomic processes 
(cf. Dicken, 2003; Porter, 1998; Wade, 1996).  
 
These two distinct but interrelated trends can be appreciated in many Latin American 
governments‘ current policy articulations towards their citizens abroad. The 
governments of Mexico, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, among others, have actively sought ways 
to attract more of the funds that migrants send to their families back home (Goldring, 
2001; Jones-Correa, 2001; Ratha, 2003). They have done so through a variety of 
political, social, cultural and economic outreach initiatives such as extending political 
rights to migrants, in order to incorporate them into the polity and make them the 
subject of public policy, sponsoring formal migrant associations, creating cultural 
centres abroad, addressing the cost of remittance transfers and channelling 
remittances to development projects and ‗productive‘ investment schemes (these 
initiatives are discussed in detail in chapter 3). However, the programmes designed to 
achieve these goals tend to be based on a set of narrow, prescriptive and economistic 
practices that exult migrants‘ role as consumers and producers of wealth. These 
initiatives ignore their condition as citizens with social rights and the social, cultural, 
political and historical factors that pushed them to leave their countries of origin and the 
conditions in which most of them enter (and remain in) their societies of destination in 
the global north. In addition, these practices and their associated discourses also tend 
to ignore the country‘s inherent structural and institutional constraints which may 
ultimately determine the success or failure of these migrant-led ‗development‘ 
programmes. The next section draws on recent scholarship on the processes of 
transnationalism to frame the diverse practices that link the flows of people and 
resources along the geography of the migration network. It examines how these flows 
articulate with the state‘s efforts to institutionalise migrant transnational practices. 
 
2.4. Framing migrants’ transnational practices 
One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the conception of migrants as financial-
investor subjects abroad and hence as agents of development is tightly linked to wider 
attempts at the institutionalisation of the transnational social field. So what is 
understood here as the transnational social field? Who are the main actors of this 
transnational arena? What is the role of the nation-state in shaping the processes that 
take place in this transnational field? And how do these migrant transnational practices 
link to wider global processes?  
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2.4.1. Migrant Transnationalism: current scholarship 
To date, the literature on migrant transnationalism has sought to answer questions 
related to whether transnational migration produces social and political change or has 
focused on the construction (or reconstruction) of migrants‘ racial, ethnic, class, 
national and gender identities (Glick Schiller, 1997; Levitt, 2001b). In this sense, there 
has been a considerable amount of research detailing the prominence of transnational 
socio-economic and cultural practices within the family and the multiple social 
transformations that they have produced (cf.  Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002; Herrera 
Lima, 2001; Itzigsohn et al., 1999; Levitt, 2001a; Mas Giralt and Bailey, 2010; Vertovec, 
1999).  
 
In recent years, it has become evident that examining both ends of the migration 
network is crucial for understanding contemporary migration processes (Levitt, 2001a, 
2001b; Portes et al., 1999) and calls have been made to include those who are left 
behind on the research and policy agenda (Henry and Mohan, 2003; Kothari, 2003a, 
2003b). Hence, numerous scholars have called for the sort of research exposed in this 
thesis, that is, multi-sited empirical research that follows the transnational flows and 
connections of people, money and information across space (Faist, 2007; Glick 
Schiller, 1997; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011; Ong and Nonini, 1997; M. P. Smith, 
2001).  
 
In this context, the transnational practices that institutional actors such as the state, 
political parties and religious organisations have promoted in recent years have began 
to be documented. For example, Glick-Schiller and Fouron (1998) have documented 
the ways in which Haitian leaders, since the time of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, have 
attempted to build Haiti as a transnational nation-state and how the state‘s efforts to 
shape national culture have been confronted by migrants‘ multiple identities as they 
incorporate into their societies of destination. Using a broad range of examples - from 
the Non-Resident Indian Division created in the Gujarat state of India and Ireland‘s 
efforts to incorporate Irish emigrants and their descendants into the national polity to 
the Brazilian Business Network created by the Brazilian Consul in Massachusetts to 
foster business links between entrepreneurs at both ends - Levitt (2001b) has 
highlighted the political and economic factors motivating states to systematically offer 
social and political membership to their citizens abroad. Portes (2003) has also drawn 
our attention to the fact that governments‘ actions to promote and sustain migrants‘ 
transnational links only emerged as a reaction to the transnational activities that had 
been consolidated by migrants‘ popular initiative and not the other way around.  
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Currently, however, there are not enough empirical studies to suggest what type of 
people are engaging with these governments‘ initiatives and the socioeconomic impact 
they may have on households and home and host-country communities (Levitt, 2001b). 
Against this backdrop, the field of geography is especially suited to unpack the complex 
processes that are produced and reproduced by these transnational flows of people 
and resources. As some scholars have pointed out, transnationality is an inherently 
geographical term (Jackson et al., 2004) and „transnationalism necessitates a crossing 
of borders, both literal and epistemological‟ (Mitchell, 1997: 101). A key aim here then 
is to provide an empirically grounded theoretical framework that brings geography back 
into transnational discourses by tracing migrants‘ transnational practices along the 
geography of the migration network thus, connecting subjects to multiple sites and 
geographical scales.  
 
2.4.2. Defining migrant transnationalism  
Although initially developed by Anthropologists in the early 1990s (see Glick Schiller et 
al., 1992; Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; Rouse, 1991), this theoretical concept is now 
widely used in the social sciences for understanding contemporary migration processes 
(Sørensen, 2005; Vertovec, 2009). Broadly speaking, transnationalism refers to the 
multiple ties and interconnections that link people or institutions across national borders 
(see Foner, 1997; Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Portes et al., 
1999; Vertovec, 1999). This definition is used here as a starting point because it leaves 
the door open for an understanding of a broad range of processes – political, 
economic, social and cultural – that extend beyond borders.  
 
This thesis is only concerned with one of the subsets10 that form the vast field of 
transnationalism: transnational migration and its impacts on both ends of the network. 
The concepts of transnationalism from below and above11 are called upon here to 
distinguish between the actions of individual migrants and their families from those of 
state actors and other macro-level institutions. Thus, transnationalism from below puts 
                                                 
10
 Other subsets include, among others, transnational capital flows, trade, inter-governmental 
agencies, identities, global communications and public culture (Vertovec 1999). In addition, 
other authors have argued that although transnational migration is not the only force at work in 
the emergent transnational social spaces, it is indeed one of the most important ones (Pries 
2001b). 
11
 In practice though, distinguishing between these two forms of transnationalism is a difficult 
task because they are quite interrelated (Mahler 1998). Smith (2001) has spoken of a 
‗transnationalism from between‘ which transcends the binary of above and below, traces and re-
traces people and resources across national boundaries and grounds globalisation in people‘s 
everyday social practices. Uma Kothari (2008) has introduced the concept of ‗cosmopolitanism 
from below‘ to refer to the non-elite openness to difference that is developed and/or reworked 
by migrants in the context of transnational migration.  
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an emphasis on the actions of non-elite actors who are less organised (than a ‗social 
movement‘), tend to act out of self-interest and have no collective purpose (even if they 
ultimately influence policy changes at the national and international level) (Paul, Malher 
and Schwartz 1997). Transnationalism from above refers to macro-level structures and 
processes of transnational capital, global media and other supra-national political 
institutions (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). As several migration scholars have pointed 
out, transnationalism is not a new phenomenon rather, the speed and extent of 
transnational connections have intensified due to advances in transportation and 
information and communication technologies that allow (almost) instant travel and 
communication. Although early waves of migrants engaged in some transnational 
economic and political practices, these lacked the regularity and critical mass that 
characterises contemporary migration flows (Guarnizo et al., 1999; Guarnizo and 
Smith, 1998; Hannertz, 1996; Kearney, 1995; Levitt et al., 2003; Portes and DeWind 
2004; Portes 1999; Smith, 2003; Vertovec 1999; 2009).  
 
One of the main advantages of using transnationalism as a theoretical lens to study 
migration processes is that it allows for placing the agency of individual non-state 
actors within broader socioeconomic and institutional structures across time and 
space12 (Kofman, 2004; Levitt et al., 2003). In addition, an important feature of 
transnationalism is that it recognises the importance that geography has in explaining 
connections between distant places and takes into account the role that the nation-
state continues to play in framing the terms under which transnational processes take 
place (Glick Schiller, 1997; Jackson et al., 2004; Levitt et al., 2003). These two 
characteristics of transnationalism are relevant for this research. As is explored in detail 
in the empirical chapters of this thesis (5-7), structural constraints on individual 
decisions such as state policies in home and host countries, regional and supra-
national contexts such as immigration and banking legislation, and political and 
economic contexts are as important as individuals‘ and families‘ agency in 
understanding migrants‘ socioeconomic transnational practices. In this sense, this 
thesis aims to answer the call made by Pollard et al. (2009) for ‗crossing disciplinary 
boundaries‘ to create an arena for analysis that emphasises the mutual constitution of 
the global north and south and ‗de-compartmentalises space‘. It does so by articulating 
the local-to-global connections of the transnational practices that flow, between the 
north and the south, through both ends of the migration network, privileging embodied 
                                                 
12
 Baillie Smith and Jenkins (2011) have argued that this is particularly relevant to understand 
notions of cosmopolitan citizenship and the political transformations that are taking place in the 
spaces of global civil society.   
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accounts of migrant households‘ livelihoods and challenging the boundaries between 
economic geography and development studies13. So where do these transnational 
practices take place?  
 
2.4.3. Transnational social field: geographical scale 
Different metaphors have been employed to describe the arena in which transnational 
activities take place: transnational social field (Glick Schiller et al., 1992); transnational 
migrant circuit (Rouse, 1991); translocalities (Goldring, 1998; Smith, 1998); 
transnational community (Georges, 1990) and transnational social space (Pries, 
2001a). In their groundbreaking article, Transnationalism: A New Analytical Framework 
for Understanding Migration, Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc (1992) 
established the transnational social field as a key element to the conceptualisation of 
transnationalism. Transnationalism was then defined as „the processes by which 
immigrants build social fields that link together their county of origin and their country of 
settlement‟. Immigrants who build such social fields are designated “transmigrants”. 
Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations – familial, economic, social, 
organizational, religious, and political that span borders‟ (page 1). A few years later, 
these authors went further to suggest that this transnational social field constituted a 
new ‗de-territorialised‘ social phenomenon, that is, migrants‘ transnational practices 
were not bounded by the old conceptualisations of race, ethnicity and nation (Basch et 
al., 1994).  
 
The relevance of these conceptualisations for the purpose of this thesis is that they 
emphasise the fact that migrants no longer solely live their lives within the boundaries 
of their host societies and highlight the dual context in which migrants‘ everyday lives 
take place. However these early conceptualisations have been criticised for 
exaggerating the scope of migrants‘ transnational activities and assuming that all 
migrants live transnationally (see Guarnizo, 2003; Portes 2003) and because they do 
not clearly define the location of this transnational space and thus give the impression 
of migrants who are socially, politically and culturally unbounded (Guarnizo and Smith, 
1998). In this sense, Pries (2001b) attempts to pinpoint a more explicit location for the 
transnational field by focusing on the spatial nature of transnational practices. Thus, he 
defines transnational social spaces as „pluri-local frames of reference which structure 
everyday practices, social positions, biographical employment projects, and human 
                                                 
13
 This is in line with Vira and James‘ (2011) call for ‗bridging‘ the divide between these two sub-
disciplines and creating an interdisciplinary development-economic geography ‗trading zone‘ 
and Murphy‘s (2008) call for stretching economic geography‘s research to the confines of the 
global south. 
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identities, and simultaneously exist above and beyond the social contexts of national 
societies‟ (page 23). In contrast to Basch et al. (1994), this definition argues for social 
practices that span different geographical spaces in at least two nation states without 
constituting a new ‗deterritorialised‘ social space. Thus, the usefulness of Pries‘ 
definition for the context of this thesis comes from the links it establishes between the 
social and material with the geographical. Specifically, the fact that migrants‘ 
socioeconomic and cultural terms of reference operate simultaneously in the society of 
origin and destination and this simultaneity shapes their practices in the transnational 
field14.  
 
Although these different conceptualisations of the transnational social field shed light 
on the multiple aspects that are involved in living transnationally, and their relevance to 
this research has been explained, the understanding of the transnational social field 
used throughout this thesis is more in line with that provided by Guarnizo and Smith 
(1998). Their definition grounds transnational practices in the localities in which they 
take place, so that „…the context in which transnational actions take place is not just 
local, but also “trans-local” (i.e., local to local). Translocal relations are constituted 
within historically and geographically specific points of origin and migration…such 
relations are dynamic…they form a triadic connection that links transmigrants, the 
localities to which they migrate and, their locality of origin‟ (page 13). 
 
This conceptualisation of a transnational social field is employed here because it 
emphasises the simultaneity of transnational flows while at the same time allows for 
context-specific understandings of the different socioeconomic, political and cultural 
practices that take place in the transnational arena. This is important because although 
the flow of people and resources (material and otherwise) span across one or more 
borders, people ultimately sit in place and their practices materialise in specific 
localities. As King (1995) has suggested, migrants‘ personal experiences of mobility 
are always place-specific. Similarly, commenting on recent debates about the fluidity of 
contemporary economy and society, Ray Hudson (2004: 463) has rightly pointed out 
that „there is undeniably evidence of greater mobility, albeit unevenly, across a wide 
range of activities and spatial scales yet, for social life to be possible, for the economy 
to be performable, fluid sociospatial relations and flows require a degree of 
permanence, of fixity of form‟. Therefore, the transnational social field that is referred to 
throughout this thesis consists of the multiple interactions and socioeconomic practices 
                                                 
14
 This argument is brought to light in chapter 7. 
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that flow through both ends of the migration network, that is, between migrants and 
their households of origin across the transnational field. This transnational social field is 
constituted mainly through the sending of remittances, phone calls, email exchanges, 
gifts and occasional visits by actors at both ends. This social field also takes into 
consideration migrants‘ occasional contact with other relatives and country people at 
destination as well as consuming ‗nostalgic‘ products and culture (usually through 
socialising in local ethnic focal points). So, what is the importance of this transnational 
social field and its actors for understanding global migration processes? 
 
2.4.4. Transnational family: social unit of analysis 
Several scholars have pointed out the importance of focusing on migrant households 
as the unit of analysis, although the ‗house‘ has not been the central focus of much of 
these analyses. In this vein, Vertovec (2009: 61) has suggested that „the provenance of 
most everyday migrant transnationalism is within families‟. Similarly, Herrera Lima 
(2001: 78) has argued that the transnational family is „one of the most important social 
institutions that makes possible the operation and persistence of transnational social 
spaces‟. Given that the focus here is to examine the interactions between the political, 
financial and social geographies of transnational migration, this thesis takes the 
migrant and her/his family/household as the methodological starting point15 but places 
an emphasis in the articulations of these geographies in the context of housing.  
 
Several definitions have been put forward to identify the transnational family. For 
instance, Bryceson and Vuorela (2002: 3) define transnational families as „families that 
live some or most of the time separated from each other, yet hold together and create 
something that can be seen as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely 
„familyhood‟, even across national borders‟. They focus on the fluidity of transnational 
family relations by advancing the concept of ‗relativizing‘ which „involves the selective 
formation of familial emotional or material attachments on the basis of temporal, spatial 
and need-related considerations‟ (page 14).  Similarly, Mas Giralt and Bailey (2010) 
have advanced the concept of liquid life paths to explain the nature of the transnational 
family. That is, fluid interdependent life paths shape the material and symbolic identities 
of transnational families at multiple geographical scales by reproducing spatial and 
temporal imaginaries that structure the everyday material, social and cultural 
experiences and transnational practices of migrants. 
                                                 
15
 The terms family and household are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. The 
positioning of households as targets of social policy has made equating family with household a 
common practice, especially in Western societies (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002). 
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Although these definitions provide useful insights into how transnational families may 
constitute and reconstitute themselves as social units, they over-emphasise the fluidity 
of familial social ties and fall short on providing clues as to which mechanisms are 
employed for their maintenance and reproduction across the transnational space. In 
other words, for most people, the notion of family is not based on some utilitarian use 
of social relations rather, as will be explored in chapters 6 and 7, familial attachment 
continues to be structured around existing nuclear and extended kinship ties that pre-
date migration.  
 
Hence, the definition of transnational family used throughout this thesis, is that 
generally used in migration studies which favours the use of the term household to 
identify such formation as ‗the group of people that, although separated by migration, 
are nevertheless linked by direct economic ties, such as those associated with the flow 
of remittances‟ (Zlotnik, 2000: 254). Because the purpose here is to study both ends of 
the migration network, the understanding of transnational household employed here 
includes those members of the unit (nuclear and extended) who have stayed behind 
and remain connected with the migrant through kinship, economic and social ties. 
 
So, taking migrants and their households as the unit of analysis is also important 
because it brings their agency to the fore and recognises the fact that migrants‘ 
transnational activities were not initiated by governments‘ actions or policies but 
emerged mostly as mechanisms through which they could aid in the socioeconomic 
reproduction of their families from a distance. In addition, migrants‘ locally grounded 
transnational practices provide a window for understanding the broader structures and 
processes that frame their lives across borders and the way they shape and are 
shaped by these very practices. As Portes et al. (1999) have advocated, studying the 
migrant and her/his ‗support networks‘ is „the most efficient way of learning about the 
institutional underpinnings of transnationalism and its structural effects‟ (page 220).   
 
In this context, Guarnizo and Smith (1998) have called for ‗grounding transnationalism‘, 
that is, placing transnational practices within the larger constraints and opportunities 
(e.g. labour market conditions, immigration laws, perception of migrant group) present 
in the particular localities where these practices occur. Furthermore, they argued that 
these local contexts, „shape not only the likelihood of generating, maintaining or 
forsaking transnational ties but also the very nature of the ties that migrants can forge‟ 
(page13). Thus, it is important to note here that although migrants‘ agency is the 
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driving force behind their transnational practices, these are inevitably conditioned by 
the different opportunities and constraints afforded to migrants in both their locality of 
origin and destination. In addition, these opportunities and constraints are, in turn, 
embedded in global macro-structural processes.  
 
Various scholars have emphasised the importance of the latter point. While some have 
stressed that migrants‘ lives take place at the interplay of a broad range of complex 
phenomena such as historical experience, structural conditions and home and host 
societies socio-cultural ideologies (Glick Schiller et al., 1992); others have emphasised 
that transnational migration and the social spaces that emerge from it shape and are 
shaped by the changing conditions of global capitalism and so must be analysed in the 
context of global capital-labour relations (Basch et al., 1994; Levitt, 2001b; Portes et al. 
1999; Sassen, 2003; Vertovec 2009). In this respect, Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 6) 
have further argued that transnational practices „are embedded [in] and they 
sometimes even perpetuate enduring asymmetries of domination, inequality, racism, 
sexism, class conflict, and uneven development‟.  
 
These readings on the linkages between capitalist global processes and 
transnationalism are of particular interest here because they point to the political 
economy of transnational migration and its practices. In particular, they call our 
attention to the micro-macro (local-global) connections that exist between migrants‘ 
social and economic relations within and across national boundaries and aspects of the 
global capitalist system such as the international spatial division of labour and the 
changing dynamics in the production and reproduction of the process of capital 
accumulation. After all, as Giddens (1990) has pointed out, one of the consequences of 
globalisation in the modern era is that social relations have become ‗stretched‘ across 
time and space. So, how do these migrant transnational practices link to wider global 
processes? And what role is the state playing in the constitution and maintenance of 
these local-global linkages?  
 
2.5. Institutionalising the transnational field 
In recent years, it has become evident that the individual practices of transnational 
households encompass all aspects of social life and have had much broader 
institutional, economic, social and cultural effects in communities, regions and nations 
at both ends of the migration network. In this vein, a wealth of research investigating 
the effects of remittances in multiple arenas of social life has been produced. While 
some have investigated particular issues such as improvements in migrant households 
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in terms of human capital formation (López-Córdova, 2006; Rapoport and Docquier, 
2005), school attendance (Cox and Ureta, 2002; López-Córdova, 2006) and lower 
infant mortality rates (Frank and Hummer 2002; Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005); 
others have focused on broader issues such as poverty alleviation (Adams Jr and 
Page, 2005; López-Córdova, 2006). Certainly, even when purely economic in its 
origins, various scholars have documented how transnational migration and its 
practices across the transnational space have had broader implications for socio-
cultural value systems such as reconfigurations of gender and family relations and 
identities at home and abroad (Levitt, 2001a; Ley and Waters, 2004; Mitchell 2001; 
Yeoh and Willis, 2004).  
 
Alejandro Portes (2003: 877-878) has aptly summarised the importance of migrants‘ 
transnational practices: „While from an individual perspective the act of sending a 
remittance, buying a house in the migrant‟s hometown16, or travelling there on occasion 
have purely personal consequences, in the aggregate they can modify the fortunes and 
cultures of these towns and even of the countries of which they are part‟. Furthermore, 
some scholars have suggested that important microsocial structures are created when 
a large influx of people from the same town, city, region or country converges into a 
particular place of destination. And these microsocial structures have important 
implications not only for attracting future migration flows but also influence the sort of 
links that these migrants maintain with their places of origin (Rumbaut, 2002).  
 
In this sense, Itzigsohn et al. (1999) have distinguished between ‗narrow‘ and ‗broad‘ 
transnational practices17. They define narrow transnationality as the socio-economic, 
cultural and political practices in which there is a high degree of institutionalisation, 
constant participation and regular movement among the actors involved. Broad 
transnational practices can be material or symbolic and involve a low level of 
institutionalisation, occasional participation and sporadic movement among the actors. 
Following this line of thinking, Levitt (2001b: 197) has argued that „the more diverse 
and thick a transnational social field is, the greater the number of ways it offers 
migrants to remain active in their homelands. The more institutionalized these 
relationships become, the more likely it is that transnational membership will persist‟.  
 
                                                 
16
 The process of incorporation of migrants into wider development discourses through the 
housing sector is spelled out in section 2.6. 
17
 Similar distinctions have been put forward by other authors. Portes (2003) distinguishes 
between ‗strict‘ and ‗broad‘ transnational practices and Levitt (2001a) has spoken of ‗core‘ and 
‗expanded‘ transnational activities.  
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I argue that it is precisely the institutionalisation of this transnational field and/or the 
promotion of ‗narrow‘ transnationalism that seems to be driving the radical changes in 
the discourse towards migrants that have taken place, primarily in the last two 
decades, in a diverse set of sending countries around the world from Colombia and 
Mexico to the Philippines and the Dominican Republic. In particular, as is argued in 
section 2.2, this institutionalisation is being sought by articulating and reproducing a 
discourse that renders migrants as financial-investor subjects abroad and hence as 
agents of development. In effect, in recent years, migrant-sending states the world over 
have attempted to capture migrants and their economic resources by designing and 
implementing programmes that exploit migrants‘ loyalty to their households and 
communities of origin, privilege financial markets as the medium for households‘ 
socioeconomic reproduction and bring to the fore investment as the preferred 
mechanism for the ‗proper‘ use of remittances.  
 
And so, in the arena of migration and transnationalism, the nation-state not only 
continues to play a crucial role in framing the terms under which transnational practices 
take place (because of its monopoly on power), but it is also being pushed to redefine 
its territorial domain of action in its attempts to control the population beyond its 
borders (Basch et al., 1994). Thus, it seems that now, as  Katharyne Mitchell (1997) 
has put it, „state practices and the rights and responsibilities of state citizenship expand 
and contract with prevailing transmigration currents and capital flows‟ (page 106). 
Examples of these developments can be seen throughout the world. One classic 
example of a government‘s attempt to institutionalise the transnational field by 
rendering migrants as agents of development is that of the Indian Government. After 
failing to attract a high flow of capital by lifting restrictions to foreign investment in the 
1980s, as part of the country‘s industrialisation and development strategy, the Indian 
government (using a nationalistic discourse) turned to Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). 
NRIs, especially those residing in the United States and Europe and employed as 
professionals in scientific, industrial and financial institutions, were given special tax 
incentives and logistical and planning assistance in setting up new businesses, 
partnering with local firms and investing in a wide range of private ventures (Lessinger, 
1992).  
 
Attempts by governments of the global north have also been documented, although 
these efforts have mostly focused on attracting specific kinds of migrants with specific 
resources and exploiting their transnational connections as opposed to institutionalising 
the transnational practices of migrants already residing within their borders. The classic 
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example here is that of the Canadian Business Immigration Programme, which 
encouraged the entry and settlement of wealthy investors and entrepreneurs (mostly 
from Hong Kong) into the country. However, analyses of this programme have 
questioned the idea of the footloose migrant entrepreneur and exposed the 
weaknesses of assumptions of portability and smooth transferability of skills by 
migrants that dominate globalisation theory. In addition, they have highlighted the 
geographically bounded nature of transnationalism and questioned ideas of the 
‗spacelessness‘ of neoliberalism (Ley and Waters, 2004; Mitchell 2004).  
 
As mentioned in section 2.3, many Latin American governments have followed suit in 
designing a range of programmes that aim to establish and reproduce a discourse that 
links migration, remittances and development. One of the ways in which many Latin 
American states have sought to construct migrants as consumers-investors-citizens 
subjects abroad and thus render them as agents of development is through the 
housing and financial sectors. The next section explores why these specific sectors 
have been chosen over others and how development discourses have become 
incorporated into the realm of Latin America‘s housing policy. These discourses are 
then framed into the political economy of housing policy in the region. As will be 
demonstrated, the singling out of these sectors is not a coincidence but is based in a 
belief in the neoliberal orthodoxy of development economics. This belief is in turn 
compounded by a recognition of the increasing significance of migrant remittances for 
alleviating internal social and economic pressures and the potential that migrant 
households‘ links with global circuits of capital and finance have for countries‘ 
incorporation into the global capitalist system.  
 
2.6. Remittances, housing policy and development  
This section revisits the existing literatures that highlight the role of the state 
(articulated through housing policy) in shaping housing markets in Latin America, while 
drawing attention to the ideological foundations of the changes that have taken place 
since the mid twentieth century. Despite sending governments‘ growing interest in 
incorporating migrant workers into development policies by channelling remittances to 
the housing sector, these literatures have yet to articulate how these new 
developments are reconfiguring the political economy of housing policy and markets in 
Latin America. Thus, revisiting these literatures is important because they provide the 
historical and political background against which this new diasporic dimension can be 
added. The aim here then is to extend the political economy of housing policy to 
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include the growing number of Latin Americans living abroad whose states are now 
attempting to render as agents of development through the housing market.  
 
2.6.1. Development discourses and the political economy of housing policy in Latin 
America  
The process of industrialization in Latin America in the post war era was the result of 
the state‘s recognition of increased production as a means to progress at a time when 
a process of consolidation of the development economics discourse, emanating from 
the United Nations and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World 
Bank, was taking place. This discourse translated into specific economic development 
strategies that were conceived and modelled in the social and economic context of the 
industrialised / developed north18 and provided the means for capital accumulation and 
modernisation of ‗underdeveloped areas‘ (Escobar, 1995). ()Under the lead of the 
United States, the consolidation of the development discourse meant that the IFIs had 
a strong degree of influence in the affairs of Latin America and in effect were 
establishing the parameters under which the social and economic policy of the region 
was to be defined. For the most part, housing policy has been modelled in the 
framework of this broader political economy of development and as will be shown, it 
has not only ignored the particular features of the social, economic and political 
apparatus of the region but has also left very little room for the articulation of alternative 
approaches.  
 
The rapid pace of industrialization in the major cities of Latin America caused an 
increased demand for jobs in a wide range of sectors from manufacturing to commerce 
and finance and as a result, an exodus from rural to urban areas19.  However, structural 
problems such as low wages, a highly unequal distribution of wealth, a monopolised 
land market and a construction sector that favoured the better off, meant that this new 
class of workers could not afford a home (Gilbert, 1998). Because the focus was then 
on industrial production, housing was not seen as a propeller of growth but as a 
consumption item. Although this would radically change with the move towards a 
neoliberal approach to development problems centred around finance and investment, 
around this time, Latin American governments were not encouraged by the IFIs to 
invest in the sector (Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Jones and Datta 1999). Consequently, in 
                                                 
18
 According to Gilbert Rist (1997), development has historically been a preoccupation of the 
industrialised north and the first important manifestations of the discourse can be traced to the 
Industrial Revolution.  
19
 Gilbert (1998) and Gilbert and Ward (1982) have argued that this exodus had more to do with 
the gap between urban and rural living conditions and less to do with poverty per se. 
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the major cities of Latin America the urban poor had to resort to the construction of 
‗illegal‘ (self-help) settlements to meet their housing needs (Gilbert, 1987; Gilbert and 
Ward, 1985; Varley, 1998).  
 
Between the middle of the 1960s and the late 1980s, governments throughout the 
region maintained a mixed approach to housing policy that consisted mainly of poorly 
funded public housing projects, that failed to meet the enormous demand and a 
politically-driven changing stance on squatter-upgrading (improvement projects through 
provision of infrastructure) and sites-and-services projects (settlements where the state 
provided cheap sites and a basic range of services and house construction was left to 
the residents) (Gilbert, 1997; Gough, 1999). ()By the late 80s, the negative effects of 
the debt crisis were widespread and the previous trend of increasing rates of home-
ownership, mostly in the form of self-help homes, seemed to be reversing due to a 
combination of factors such as decreasing wages, lack of accessible land for low-
income housing, not-so-favourable state policies, growing commercialization of land 
and subsequently rising land prices (Gilbert and Varley, 1991). 
 
2.6.2. Housing: from consumption item to driver of economic growth  
The dreadful state of public finances in most of the region as a consequence of the 
debt crisis in the 1980s provided a perfect excuse for the introduction of market-friendly 
housing policies in the 1990s. This approach was in line with the new ideology of 
limited government and the promotion of market-based solutions to development 
problems and was built upon the neoliberal orthodoxy emerging from the World Bank 
and the major development agencies.  
 
The new housing policy (known as the Capital Housing Subsidy Model) placed a 
greater emphasis on housing finance and urban management. It aimed to incorporate 
the private sector into the social housing market, promote transparency and explicitly 
target the poor.  More broadly, the policy aimed to reform the economic and financial 
structure of the countries that adopted it and promote economic growth (Gilbert, 2004; 
Jones and Datta 1999; Jones and Ward 1994a; 1994b). On one hand, the policy meant 
that the provision of social housing would be transferred to the private sector which 
would be more efficient in providing the poor with more ‗choice‘. On the other hand, it 
would give subsidies to the poor to buy privately supplied housing.  This form of 
housing policy had been pioneered by the Pinochet government in 1977 and was 
adopted (fully or partially) by other Latin American countries such as Colombia, Costa 
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Rica, Ecuador and Panama as part of the process of structural adjustment reforms in 
the 1990s (Gilbert, 2004; UN-Habitat, 2005; Winchester, 2005).  
 
I would argue that the introduction of this housing policy meant much more than simply 
a transfer of responsibility from the state to the private sector. Two radical and 
important changes were introduced to the functioning of the housing market: obtaining 
credit became the only way for the poor to get on the housing ladder and the status of 
housing changed from being considered a consumption item to an investment vehicle 
and key driver of economic growth and employment. However, as is explained in detail 
in chapter 5, doubts should be cast on the reliance on a housing policy that exclusively 
favours the market and emphasises a neoliberal macroeconomic style of management. 
As is illustrated by the Colombian case, the great mismatch between supply and 
demand has meant that the ‗logic‘ of the market has proven inadequate to provide 
housing solutions to the most vulnerable populations, the very people it intended to 
help.  
 
2.6.3. Political and economic significance of the housing sector  
Even though housing did not explicitly become a driver of economic growth until the 
introduction of structural macroeconomic reforms, the housing sector has historically 
had a great deal of political and economic significance for governments throughout 
Latin America, even if this has not always been explicitly articulated. The use of 
housing policy as a political tool20 is a trait shared by many governments in Latin 
America. As Gilbert and Varley (1991: 10) have pointed out, „the housing issue can 
hardly be divorced from the wider political arena in Latin America where the state has 
manipulated low-income populations for political purposes‟. In addition, governments 
throughout the region have realised the benefits that increased rates of 
homeownership could bring in terms of social and political stability and thus have 
actively fostered the ideology of home-ownership21.  This strategy seems to be the 
reason behind Latin American governments‘ implicit acceptance of ‗self-help‘ 
                                                 
20
 Gilbert and Varley (1991) and Varley (1998) provide a compelling account of the political uses 
of housing policy in Mexico. For example, Varley (1998) concluded that in the early 1970s and 
the late 1980s, national housing policy in the form of land tenure legalization was used by the 
Mexican government to bring about the political integration of the urban poor (settlements with 
active independent political organizations were targeted) with the aim of maintaining political 
stability in the cities. 
21
 Fostering this ideology is not unique to Latin American governments.  Many other 
governments in developing and developed countries have made the promotion of home-
ownership central to their national housing policies (see Gilbert (2008) for a worldwide overview; 
Smith (1988) for the case of the US; Smith (2008) and Smith et al. (2004) for the case of the 
UK). 
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settlements and the establishment of housing subsidy programmes in recent years 
(Gilbert and Varley 1991).  
 
In addition, given the macroeconomic context of Latin America, the construction 
sector‘s relative importance to the economy, especially in terms of employment 
generation, has been significant. It should not be surprising then that the government 
has actively intervened to favour this specific sector, especially in times of economic 
downturns. According to Gilbert and Ward (1985), the use of public housing policy to 
create jobs and sustain the private construction industry is one of the many instances 
in which the government may appear to be intervening on behalf of the poor22.   
 
Another important issue that has to be considered in this politically-driven use of 
housing policy is the expressed desire of most people to own their homes. Previous 
studies have found that the majority of people in the cities of Latin America have a 
strong desire for home-ownership (Gilbert, 1987; Gilbert and Varley, 1991).  According 
to Gilbert (1987: 47), this desire goes beyond common aspirations and „is partly a 
recognition of economic realities, partly a consequence of the wish to be 
independent….but it is also an attitude stimulated by the whole ideology of capitalism, 
reinforced continuously by television advertising and soap operas‟. In this context, it is 
perhaps reasonable to argue that governments‘ promotion of home-ownership as an 
integral part of national housing policies is both influencing and being influenced by 
people‘s desire for home-ownership and it is difficult to assess where one begins to be 
imposed on the other. Although the state‘s housing policy is a critical determinant of 
housing tenure, there are many other factors that influence tenure choice. Several 
studies of urban housing markets in Latin America have concluded that households‘ 
decision to buy or rent a house is also determined by the different kinds of choices and 
constraints they are faced with in terms of their socio-economic structures.  Land 
prices, cost of building materials, income, cost and availability of transport and the 
trade-off between renting and owning appear to be important ingredients in this mix 
(Gilbert, 1987; Gilbert and Varley, 1991; Gilbert and Ward, 1985).   
                                                 
22
 Gilbert and Varley (1991) illustrated how, during the recession of the 1980s, the Mexican 
government gave a boost to the national employment rate by effectively increasing the 
production of low-income housing. 
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This brief historical overview of housing policy and its political uses in Latin America 
illustrate the vital importance that non-economic factors play in the definition of public 
policy in the region. It also illustrates some of the political calculations and ideological 
underpinnings that have shaped housing policy in Latin America. In particular, the fact 
that housing policy is not primarily determined by the state of affairs of a country‘s 
housing market but rather it is heavily influenced by other factors such as the socio-
political ideology of the government in power, the degree of influence exerted by 
international agencies in the country‘s public policy, the perceived centrality of the 
housing sector to a country‘s social and political stability and the capacity of interest 
groups to influence housing policy.  
 
Thus, the recasting of housing as a driver of economic growth and development 
provides a clear example of the ways in which financial-investor subjects are 
constructed under neoliberalism. These efforts have, no doubt, been aided by the 
media‘s reproduction of a capitalist discourse that equates home-ownership with 
responsibility, independence and the exercise of citizenship. Having recognised 
migrants as a current and potential economic and political force, sending governments 
are trying to exploit migrant households‘ connections to broader circuits of capital and 
finance by attempting to institutionalise remittances flows and the transnational socio-
economic activities that derive from it such as their use for consumption or investment, 
education, health and private enterprise. They are doing so by reproducing 
ideologically driven discourses that shift the responsibility of development from the 
state to its citizens, insist on the centrality of financial markets for households‘ 
socioeconomic reproduction and promote ‗productive‘ investment (i.e. housing) as the 
preferred mechanism for the ‗proper‘ use of remittances. As Smith (2008) and Smith et 
al. (2006) have pointed out, markets are made not given and the housing market 
(especially the segment of owner-occupation) has an explicit non-monetary element 
that makes it deeply embedded in a network of social relations; thus its dynamics can 
only be understood in light of the wider political economy. Yet, there has been a 
tendency in the literature to analyse housing markets from a purely economistic 
perspective. This thesis, especially chapters 5-7, aims to move beyond economic 
considerations by exposing the links between the political, financial and social 
geographies of housing in the context of transnational migration. 
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2.7. Concluding remarks 
This chapter has brought geography back into the transnational discourse by tracing 
migrants‘ transnational practices along the geography of the migration network while 
engaging with development issues surrounding the processes and practices that link 
north-south economic and sociospatial relations. Specifically, it has articulated the 
local-to-global connections of the transnational practices that flow through both ends of 
the migration network and how they shape and are shaped by the wider socioeconomic 
and political-economic processes of capitalist development.  
 
In this context, it has put forward three main arguments. Firstly, the conception of 
migrants as financial subjects abroad and hence as agents of development is tightly 
linked to wider attempts at the institutionalisation of the transnational social field. These 
attempts are embedded in ideologically-driven neoliberal discourses of citizenship that 
privilege financial markets as the medium for individuals‘ and households‘ 
socioeconomic reproduction and displace the responsibility for economic development 
from the state to its citizens (at home and abroad). Secondly, the nation-state 
continues to play a crucial role not only in framing the terms under which transnational 
practices take place but it is also being pushed to redefine its domain of action in an 
attempt to capture the resources of the population beyond its borders. Finally, the 
singling out of the housing and financial sectors for migrants‘ incorporation into the 
polity as agents of development is not a coincidence, rather it is based in a belief in the 
neoliberal orthodoxy of development economics, which renders investment central to 
the production and reproduction of individual security and freedom. It is also a 
recognition of the potential that migrant households‘ links with global circuits of capital 
and finance have for countries‘ incorporation into the global capitalist system. 
Furthermore, this migration-for-development discourse and its programmes tend to be 
based on a set of narrow, prescriptive and economistic practices that exult migrants‘ 
role as consumers and producers of wealth. Conversely, it ignores their condition as 
citizens with social rights and the social, cultural, political and historical factors that 
pushed them to leave the country and the conditions in which most of them enter (and 
remain in) their societies of destination in the global north. 
 
The next chapter provides a context for framing the empirical findings of this thesis. 
Specifically, it provides detailed contextual information relevant to the issues and 
countries at the centre of this thesis: migration, remittances, the role of the state and 
the transnational flows of people and resources between the United Kingdom and 
Colombia. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Migration, Remittances and the State: Situating Colombia in the 
Latin American and Global Contexts 
 
This chapter draws primarily on secondary qualitative and quantitative data and studies 
to provide detailed contextual information relevant to the issues and the countries at 
the centre of this thesis. The chapter is divided in four parts. It begins by providing an 
overview of the historical and recent developments in terms of Colombian migration 
and the socioeconomic and political context that underpin these developments. Section 
3.2 unpacks the significance of the flows of Colombian migrants to the UK and the 
socioeconomic characteristics and transnational practices of this group. Section 3.3 
presents an overview of the global, regional and national remittances markets. Lastly, 
the chapter frames the Colombian government‘s response to the recent developments 
in the arenas of migration and remittances within the wider regional and global context.  
 
3.1. Brief history of migration from Colombia  
Colombia has one of the highest rates of emigration in the world (Guarnizo, 2008). The 
official statistics suggest that approximately 10% of Colombia‘s population, over four 
million people, live and work abroad (MRE, 2008).  However, some authors estimate 
that the real number of Colombian émigrés is double the official figure or around nine 
million Colombians (Cardona Arias, 2010).  
 
Unlike many other countries in Latin America such as Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and 
Mexico, Colombia never received a significant number of immigrants from Europe in 
the period between the time of the Spanish colonisation and the Second World War 
(Durand 2009). Colombians began to emigrate in significant numbers in the 1960s in 
the context of the end of ‗La Violencia23‘, the subsequent socio-political instability that 
                                                 
23
 ‗La Violencia‘ or ‗The Violence‘ was a period of bi-partisan civil conflict, especially in the 
Colombian countryside. La Violencia was triggered by the death of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán in 
1948, the charismatic and popular presidential candidate of the Liberal party. It ended in 1958 
with an agreement of power sharing between the Liberal and Conservative parties known as the 
‗Frente Nacional‘ or ‗National Front‘.  
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has ensued until today and the relatively weak performance of the Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI) Model that had been implemented in the post war period. In the 
decades of the 1960s and 1970s, Colombians emigrated primarily to the United States 
and Venezuela, mainly as a consequence of the high labour demand of these 
economies.  While the former was determined by economic factors and the geo-
political context of the Cold War and attracted mostly the professional middle class, the 
latter was the result of an oil boom that attracted workers of all types and from all 
socioeconomic strata (Guarnizo, 2006a; Pellegrino, 2004). In the 1980s, the adverse 
effects of Latin America‘s ‗Década Perdida‘ (Lost Decade), huge public debt, inflation 
and political instability, discouraged inter-regional migration but provoked a sizable 
migration to the US (Pellegrino 2000). These waves of emigration would lay the 
foundation for the unprecedented waves of transnational migration that took place 
beginning in the 1990s.  
 
International migration from Colombia has grown rapidly since the 1990s. Colombian 
migrants have not only searched for new destinations in recent years, but they have 
also become more heterogeneous in terms of their social composition and regions of 
origin. These developments have been mainly associated with the worsening of the 
economy, which has been attributed to the implementation of neoliberal structural 
reforms and the expansion and encroachment of the socio-political conflict throughout 
the country (Garay and Rodriguez, 2005a; Guarnizo, 2006a; Khoudour-Castéras, 
2007a). 
  
Other reasons have also been cited to explain the rapid growth of emigration of a wider 
segment of the Colombian population to new and farther destinations since the 1990s. 
On the one hand, although the proportion of Colombian migrants connected to the illicit 
business is quite small, the expansion of the global drug business has meant increased 
demand for labour at home and abroad. Thus, the strengthening of the drug trade has 
provided an opportunity to migrate for a segment of the population who otherwise 
would have not been able to leave the country due to their marginal socioeconomic 
conditions. On the other hand, the recent wave of migration has been reinforced by the 
family and community social networks that had been established in the past (Guarnizo, 
2006a). Potential migrants usually rely on these networks for the provision of 
information, resources, and insertion into the economic fabric of the country of 
destination.  
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Certainly, another important aspect to consider in order to understand the high rates of 
emigration from Colombia is its highly unequal distribution of wealth. Colombia has one 
of the most polarised income distributions in Latin America. Recent data suggests that 
Colombia has the fourth most unequal society in Latin America24, only after Bolivia, 
Haiti and Brazil (PNUD, 2010). So, how did the co-existing factors of inequality and 
drug-trafficking combine with emerging socioeconomic and political conditions in the 
country to provoke such a significant wave of emigration?  
 
3.1.1. The great wave of migration of the 1990s: socioeconomic and political context 
Following the debt crisis of the 1980s, the Colombian government implemented a 
series of neoliberal economic policies that aimed to integrate Colombia into the global 
capitalist system.  To achieve this, the government of César Gaviria implemented a 
process of structural reform, known as ‗Apertura Económica‘. Between 1990 and 1994, 
‗La Revolución Pacífica‘ (the Pacific Revolution), Gaviria‘s national development plan, 
liberalised trade (virtually eliminating all import controls), liberalised foreign exchange 
transactions, eliminated all restrictions to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and reformed 
the labour code (in order to make labour more flexible) and the social security system, 
to allow private investment in an area traditionally reserved for the state. In addition, in 
1991 the government adopted a new constitution that redefined the functions of the 
state. As a result of these changes, the economy‘s ability to generate employment 
weakened, especially in the sectors that were directly and rapidly exposed to foreign 
competition such as agriculture and manufacturing25. Indeed, the contribution of these 
sectors to the country‘s GDP rapidly diminished. In terms of production, manufacturing 
industries‘ contribution to GDP fell from an average of 21.2% before 1990 to around 
13% at the end of the decade. In terms of employment, both sectors showed negative 
or very small rates of growth in the decade of the 1990s. Moreover, the drop in job 
creation in these sectors (particularly for low skilled workers) did not translate in 
increases in other sectors of the economy and provoked a sharp deterioration in the 
country‘s income distribution index (Gómez Ramírez et al., 2006). 
 
Although similar reforms were implemented in other Latin American countries, unique 
socio-political conditions in the country, especially following the death of Pablo 
                                                 
24
 Despite recent improvements in some Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Mexico and 
Chile, mainly as a result of targeted public policy interventions, Latin American societies remain 
highly unequal. In terms of per capita income, Latin America is still 18% more unequal than 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 36% more unequal than East Asia and 65% more unequal than developed 
countries taken as a whole (PNUD 2010).  
25
 Unable to compete with a flood of low-cost products, thousands of small and medium private 
enterprises in these sectors were driven into bankruptcy (Guarnizo 2006a). 
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Escobar26, meant that the adverse effects of these reforms were much more acute. 
Portes and Hoffman (2003: :41) have put this into perspective: “the contraction of 
public sector employment and the stagnation of formal sector labour demand in most 
[Latin American] countries have led to a series of adaptive solutions by the middle and 
lower classes…including the rise of informal self-employment and micro-
entrepreneurialism, the rise of violent crime in the cities and migration abroad by an 
increasingly diversified cross-section of the population”.  
 
External factors also played a role in the deterioration of the country‘s overall state of 
affairs. The dissolution of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989, produced a 
series of economic and institutional changes that had a profound impact in the lives of 
thousands of coffee producers in Colombia27 (Montenegro, 1993). These changes 
would have dire socioeconomic consequences for the country in the years to come. 
The coffee crisis hit the region at the heart of the production of the grain the hardest28 
and also triggered one of the worst economic slumps in Colombian history. Coffee has 
been the backbone of the Colombian economy since the beginning of the 19th century 
and has played a critical role in the development of Colombia‘s infrastructure and 
internal consumer market and as a stable source of foreign currency throughout the 
20th century. As Nieto Arteta (1992: 25) has aptly put it, ‗up until the emergence of 
coffee, the history of the Colombian economy is quite peculiar. It is precarious, in a 
state of contingency and trial‘ (my translation).  
 
Thus, for many decades, the boom in the production of coffee and the high prices in 
the international market, allowed the Eje Cafetero, where around 50% of the grain is 
produced, to enjoy the highest levels of economic and human development in the 
country29. The sudden collapse of the coffee economy and the earthquake that hit the 
                                                 
26
 Pablo Escobar was a notorious Colombian drug lord. After a long and bloody manhunt, 
Escobar was killed in Medellin on December 2
nd
, 1993. The void left by Escobar continues to be 
disputed by the multiple drug factions that operate in Colombia (guerrillas, paramilitaries and 
drug cartels).  
27
 The production of coffee in the country is in the hands of small land owners. Around 62% of 
the cultivated area is owned by farmers with less than 1 hectare of land (Toro Zuluaga 2005).  
28
 During the decade of the 1990s, the coffee region‘s employment rate fell faster than the 
national rate and showed negative growth during a great part of the decade (Gómez Ramírez et 
al. 2006). 
29
 The Colombian National Coffee Federation (Federacafe) through the National Coffee Fund 
(FNC) collects and administers the contributions of coffee producers to the exchequer. In the 
coffee region, these contributions have historically provided much of the funds needed for basic 
infrastructure projects in health, education, housing and electricity.  
 41 
 
coffee region in 199930, brought to light many of the complex socioeconomic problems 
that had been developing under the surface during the boom years: a deterioration of 
the living standards of some sectors of the population, high rates of violence and crime 
(mostly linked to drug trafficking, guerrillas and paramilitarism) and the displacement 
and migration of people to (the internally displaced31) and from the region (Toro 
Zuluaga, 2005). Moreover, in 1999, in the midst of a profound economic crisis32, 
Colombia negotiated an aid package with the United States, ‗Plan Colombia‘. The 
plan‘s main objectives were to establish state authority and security for anti-drug 
missions and a development strategy that emphasized market solutions to the 
problems of poverty and inequality in Colombia (Avilés, 2008). However, in practice, 
the implementation of Plan Colombia has been linked to out-migration and internal 
displacement. On the one hand, market solutions in the form of mega-development 
projects such as the dramatic expansion in African palm cultivation, has provoked 
displacement among indigenous and afro-descendant communities in the country‘s 
pacific coast (Escobar, 2003). On the other hand, the spread of illicit crops in different 
rural areas and the aggressive military campaign funded by the US to eradicate drug 
production and trafficking have pushed the conflict farther and farther into remote areas 
of the country. This situation has forced millions of farmers and local residents, often 
caught in the cross-fire, to out-migrate33.  
 
In summary, in Colombia, increased trade and market liberalisation, privatisation and 
sharp cuts in health and education not only increased the gap between the rich and the 
poor, but also destroyed the livelihoods of millions of rural and urban people employed 
in the manufacturing, agricultural and public sectors throughout the country. The 
interweaving of this economic reality and the worsening of the socio-political situation in 
the country in the 1990s pushed millions of Colombians, from all socioeconomic 
backgrounds, to seek social, political and economic refuge abroad. The sudden 
collapse of the coffee economy in conjunction with an earthquake meant that the 
                                                 
30
 The city of Armenia, capital of the state of Quindío (at the heart of the coffee region) was 
almost completely destroyed. Around 2000 people died in the earthquake and its social and 
economic costs are still being felt today. 
31
 The non-governmental Observatory on Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES) has 
estimated Colombia‘s internally displaced population to be around 5 million people (close to 
11% of the total population) (IDMC 2010). 
32
 Multiple factors contributed to this crisis: the international coffee crisis, the adverse effects of 
the neoliberal reforms implemented at the beginning of the decade, a national mortgage crisis 
that spilled onto the housing and financial markets, a decline in world commodity prices and the 
spillover from the Russian (1998) and Brazilian (1999) financial crisis. The country‘s rate of 
unemployment in 1999 was 20% (Ahumada and Andrews 1998).  
33
 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC 2009) has documented a high incidence 
of cross-border migration to Ecuador from the border departments of Nariño and Putumayo. 
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adverse effects of these multiple crises were felt more acutely in the country‘s coffee 
region, where an estimated one-fifth of the total population has been displaced (Toro 
Zuluaga, 2005). Thus, in the coffee region, as in much of the rest of the country, the 
armed conflict, high levels of poverty, marginalisation and social and economic 
exclusion have intertwined in such a way that it is particularly difficult to categorise 
migrants as solely political and/or economic.   
 
3.1.2. Migration from Colombia: current trends 
For the first time in the history of Colombia, questions related to migration were 
introduced in the General Census of 2005. Not surprisingly, the results showed that 
almost 40% of Colombian migrants (approximately 1.5 million people) come from the 
central western area of the country: Eje Cafetero (the states of Caldas, Risaralda and 
Quindío) and the state of Valle del Cauca34 (see figure 3.1). The other areas with a 
considerable proportion of households with family members abroad are Bogotá 
(Cundinamarca), with 18.7%, the state of Antioquia, with almost 12%, and the state of 
Atlántico, in the Caribbean coast of Colombia, with 6.6%. In addition, two of the three 
states with the highest rates of emigration are located in the Eje Cafetero: Risaralda 
and Quindío (Khoudour-Castéras, 2007a).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Geographically, the greater Colombian coffee region or Ecoregion is composed by the states 
of Caldas, Risaralda and Quindío, the northern part of the state of Valle del Cauca and the 
north-western part of the state of Tolima (Toro Zuluaga 2005). 
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Figure 3.1: Map of Colombia’s Eje Cafetero 
 
Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas (2008) 
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One important characteristic of Colombian migration is that it is primarily urban. Indeed, 
the main sources of migrants are the capital cities or metropolitan areas of the localities 
with high proportions of migrant households (Guarnizo, 2006a; Khoudour-Castéras, 
2007a). This finding should not be surprising given that 78% of the country‘s population 
live in the cities (CEPAL, 1999). In addition, migration from Colombia is primarily 
female. Data from 2003 suggests that 53% of all Colombians abroad are women. 
However, women are unevenly distributed around the world: while 65% of Colombian 
migrants in Europe are women, only 57% of those residing in North America and 44% 
of those residing in South America are female (Guarnizo, 2006a).  
The three main countries of destination for Colombian migrants are the United States, 
Spain and Venezuela with, respectively, 35.4%, 23.3% and 18.5% of Colombians 
abroad. Other important destinations include Ecuador and Canada where, respectively, 
around 2.4% and 2.2% of Colombians have settled (Khoudour-Castéras, 2007a). One 
important finding that emerged from the census was the fact that, in recent years, 
Colombian migrants have increasingly searched for new destinations. As mentioned in 
section 3.1, Colombians began migrating in significant numbers to the United States 
and Venezuela in the 1960s and 1970s. These traditional destinations have been 
losing ground to ‗other‘ countries, which now account for approximately 14% of total 
migrants (Khoudour-Castéras, 2007a). Although the census failed to capture the 
specific destination of these migrants, data from other sources suggests that the 
Colombian presence in Europe has grown rapidly, especially since the 1990s35. For 
example, the Colombian Ministry of External Relations estimates that 11% of 
Colombian migrants live and work in Europe (MRE, 2008). Also, a study conducted in 
2005 found that 87% of migrants from the coffee growing region left the country in the 
previous 10 years (Garay and Rodriguez, 2005a). So, how significant are these 
emerging flows of migrants to the UK?  
3.2. Colombian migration to the UK  
The Colombian presence in the UK 
The Colombian Ministry of External Relations estimates that 19% of Colombian 
migrants in Europe (around 90,000), reside in the United Kingdom36 (MRE, 2008), thus 
the UK has the second largest population of Colombians in Europe, after Spain 
(Bermúdez Torres, 2006).  London is a key destination for Colombians. Although, the 
actual numbers of Colombians in the UK is unknown, some migration scholars have 
                                                 
35
 It is worth noting here that during this decade, it also became increasingly difficult for 
Colombians to obtain tourist visas to enter the United States. 
36
 This would mean that around 2% of all Colombians abroad reside in the UK.  
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estimated the size of the Colombian community in London to be around 150,00037 
(McIlwaine, 2005). So, based on a central estimate of around 70,000, Colombians 
constitute the largest group of Latin American immigrants in the city38 and one of the 
ten largest migrant groups settled in the English capital39 (Guarnizo, 2006b). In turn, 
the UK is the fourth biggest source of remittances to Colombia40.   
 
As is the case for the general Colombian migrant population (see section 3.1.3), 
migration from Colombia to London is regionally concentrated. The Latin American 
Migration in Europe Survey (LatMES)41 found that around 50% of Colombians in 
London come from the central western area of the country: the Eje Cafetero and the 
state of Valle del Cauca42. In addition, there is a high concentration of migrants from 
some municipalities such as Anserma (Caldas); Tulúa and Palmira (Valle del Cauca). 
So, this central-western region is overrepresented in terms of its migrant population: 
while only 7% of the Colombian population resides in the Eje Cafetero, 20% of 
Colombians in London are native to this region. Similarly, the state of Valle del Cauca 
houses 10% of the Colombian population43 but its citizens in London account for 30% 
of the total.  
 
The socio-demographic composition of the Colombian community in London also 
reflects the pattern seen in the total Colombian population abroad: close to 54% of 
Colombians in London are women and come from the country‘s urban areas (76%) 
(LatMES cited in Guarnizo 2008). Colombians are scattered in and around London, 
with pockets concentrated mostly in four boroughs: Camden, Islington, Lambeth and 
                                                 
37
 The 2001 British Census only recorded 12,039 Colombians in the UK, 75% of whom lived in 
London (Guarnizo 2008:12). However, a more recent and comprehensive study estimated the 
Latin American community in London to be around 113,500. This estimate is based on a variety 
of data sources and includes regular and irregular migrants and the second generation 
(McIlwaine et al. 2011). 
38
 Given the problems with under-reporting, it is not clear whether the number of Brazilians in 
London (estimated between 100,000 and 200,000) is greater than the number of Colombians.  
39
 This estimate would place the number of Colombians in London to be comparable to those 
coming from countries of the old British Empire such as Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan and 
Kenya (Guarnizo 2008:12).  
40
 This will be shown in section 3.3.2. 
41
 The LatMES was conducted in London in 2005. It was part of a bigger project entitled New 
Landscapes of Migration: a comparative study of mobility and transnational practices between 
Latin America and Europe. The project was led by Luis Guarnizo (UC Davis) and Ninna Nyberg 
Sørensen (DIIS) and investigated the experiences of Colombian and Dominican migrants in four 
European countries: UK, Spain, Italy and Denmark. The survey is the most up-to-date and 
reliable source of information about the Colombian community in London.  
42
 A smaller study conducted in 2004 found similar results (McIlwaine 2005).   
43
 Population data in Colombia extracted from the National Department of Statistics (DANE). 
http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=16&id=496&I
temid=996. Population in London extracted from Guarnizo (2008).  
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Southwark (Bermúdez Torres, 2006; Open Channels, 2000). There also small 
concentrations of Colombians in the boroughs of Tottenham, Hackney and Newham 
(McIlwaine, 2005). Also, there are some areas in London that are the locus of the 
Colombian community such as the Seven Sisters Market (also known to Latin 
Americans in London as ‗El Pueblito Paisa44‘) and Tiendas del Norte, in North London; 
and the Elephant and Castle and Tiendas del Sur shopping centres, in South East 
London. These places house a significant number of Colombian businesses from 
cafés, restaurants and groceries to clothing and music stores, beauty salons and 
remittance and parcel services (see figures 3.2 and 3.3). In these areas, the socio-
cultural life of the country is recreated: people speak Spanish (mostly with a ‗paisa‘ 
accent), eat typical Colombian foods, listen to traditional rhythms (salsa, merengue, 
vallenato) and discuss the country‘s news. 
 
Figure 3.2: Colombian businesses in North London 
Photographs by author 
                                                 
44
 There is also a ‗Pueblito Paisa‘ in Colombia.  It is one of the landmarks of Medellin, the 
second biggest city in Colombia. El Pueblito Paisa is a replica of a typical small town in 
Antioquia at the beginning of the twentieth century. It has a church, a school, a barber shop, a 
pharmacy, shops and a typical town square.  
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Figure 3.3: Colombian businesses in South London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photographs by author 
 
The vibrancy of the Colombian community in London can also be appreciated in the 
many different newspapers in Spanish that circulate in the city. They are produced for 
and by Latin Americans, though Colombia-related news and editorials tend to dominate 
them. Two of the main free circulations are the weekly Express News – Latin American 
News and the monthly, Noticias Latin America. However, despite their growing 
visibility, and compared with other more numerous migrant groups, Colombian 
migration has only recently started to attract the attention of scholars, local authorities 
and political parties in the UK45.  So how did the first Colombians arrive in the UK? How 
did the community in London grow to this present size? 
 
Colombian migration to the UK: brief history 
Up until the 1970s, Colombian migration to the UK was largely made up of the upper 
class, intellectuals, artists, refugees and some students (Bermúdez Torres, 2006; 
Guarnizo, 2006a). As a consequence of the Immigration Act of 1971, which ended the 
right to free immigration of the citizens of the commonwealth and ended almost all 
forms of economic migration into the UK, the government introduced a work permit 
scheme for low paid, menial jobs in the commercial services sector, mainly in industrial 
and commercial cleaning, hotels and restaurants (Guarnizo, 2008). This work permit 
system allowed employers to easily hire foreign workers without having to undergo a 
lengthy process and its introduction coincided with the consolidation of the UK as a 
services-based economy (Guarnizo, 2008). Although it is not clear exactly how 
Colombians became involved in this process, it is estimated that between 4,000 and 
10,000 people, mainly women from the Eje Cafetero (coffee region) and the state of 
                                                 
45
 During the 2008 election campaign for Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, then candidate for 
the conservative party, visited the Seven Sisters Market. It was the first time that such a high 
level politician campaigned in an area predominantly occupied by Latin Americans. 
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Valle del Cauca filled these vacancies (Guarnizo, 2006a; Open Channels, 2000). This 
first wave of labour migration would set the stage for the subsequent diversification of 
the segments of the Colombian population that have migrated to the UK in recent 
years. 
 
Although the permit system was significantly reduced in 1979, many of these pioneers 
stayed in the UK and sought a way to obtain Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) in the UK 
(legal permanent residence). Because Colombians did not need a visa to enter the UK 
prior to 1997, many wishing to work continue to arrive in the UK, albeit in smaller 
numbers, mainly as tourists (Bermúdez Torres, 2003; Guarnizo, 2008).  
 
Migration from Colombia increased dramatically in the 1990s and peaked at the 
beginning of the new millennium. Recent data suggests that 79% of Colombians 
arrived in London between 1990 and 2004 (Guarnizo, 2008). As mentioned in section 
3.1.2, this dramatic increase was the result of the confluence of multiple factors. On the 
one hand, during the decade of the 1990s, the country suffered from a combination of 
high rates of unemployment, slow economic growth and a deterioration of the internal 
social and political climate. On the other hand, the strong demand for labour (low and 
highly skilled) of a booming UK economy and the pre-existing transnational social 
networks (whose seeds had been sown in the 1970s) accelerated the rate of 
emigration from Colombia, especially from the coffee region, to new destinations, 
particularly in Europe. So, what is the socioeconomic profile of the Colombian 
population in London? What position do they occupy in London‘s socioeconomic and 
occupational structure?  
 
3.2.1. Colombians in London: socioeconomic profile 
The majority of Colombians in London are employed in low-skilled service sector jobs. 
In particular, around 37% are employed as cleaners (domestic and commercial) and/or 
manual labourers, 13% work as administrative and sales support and around 14% 
claim to be ‗out of the labour force‘46. However, a considerable amount of Colombians, 
27%, are employed in a mid-level and/or professional occupation (LatMES cited in 
Guarnizo 2008).  
 
This employment trajectory more or less reflects their level of education. Data from the 
Latin American Migration in Europe Survey suggests that while around 42% of 
Colombian migrants in London have only attained a lower level of qualification (high 
                                                 
46
 This category includes students, military and religious personnel and homemakers.  
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school degree, technical education and/or some university courses); 45% have a 
higher level of qualification (university and/or postgraduate degree) and only a small 
minority, 12%, have no formal qualifications. However, the employment trajectory of 
Colombians in London is in stark contrast with the level of qualification of the people 
who entered the UK between 2000 and 2004. The survey found that 79% of those 
individuals had a higher level of qualification (LatMES cited in Guarnizo 2008).  
 
A closer look at the dynamics of London‘s labour market helps us put these findings 
into perspective. In particular, the rise of global cities such as London, New York and 
Paris has not only produced great demand for highly skilled professionals but also low-
skilled service workers such as janitors, repairmen, maids and nannies, to support 
them and the corporations where they work. In general, this labour market is 
characterized by low-paid jobs, with limited advancement opportunities and job security 
where subcontracting, employment agencies and temporary jobs are widespread 
(Datta et al., 2006a; Datta et al., 2007; Sassen, 2003). Due to the nature of these jobs, 
they are primarily being filled by documented and undocumented migrant workers 
(Sassen, 2003). Thus, it can be said that the migration wave from Colombia to London 
at the beginning of the new millennium is an indication of the dynamics of the new 
international division of labour, which has triggered an increased demand for labour at 
both ends of the occupational spectrum.  
 
Consequently, for many Colombians the move to a global city such as London has 
meant experiencing downward social mobility. Recent data suggests that while only 
46% of Colombians in London belonged to the lower and lower middle income strata 
while they lived in Colombia, now a much higher proportion, 76%, report doing so in 
London47. Furthermore, while almost 20% of Colombian migrants reported belonging to 
the upper and upper middle income strata in Colombia48, a mere 5% were able to 
maintain that status in London (LatMES cited in Guarnizo 2008). 
 
This reality is then an indication of the position of liminality that migrants from the global 
south tend to occupy in the socioeconomic structure of the cities in the global north 
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 Colombia has a socio-economic stratification system, commonly referred to as ‗estrato‘.  
Although the system of stratification was designed with the intention to establish rates for utility 
services according to household incomes, society in general uses it to determine a person‘s 
social position. Estratos vary from 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest). The lower and lower-middle income 
households belong to estratos 1, 2 and 3. For migrants‘ social position in London, the LatMES 
survey employed the same social stratification used in Colombia and the answer reflects 
migrants‘ own perception of their social mobility.  
48
 These correspond to estratos 5 and 6.  
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where they reside. In the case of Colombians in London, this position of liminality may 
be partially explained by the fact that, although, on average, they have lived and 
worked in London for a decade, a significant proportion, 44%, does not have the 
necessary language skills needed to thrive in London‘s competitive labour market 
(LatMES cited in Guarnizo 2008).  
 
Certainly, migrants‘ marginal position in London‘s social and economic life may also be 
related to their legal status in the UK. Although a significant portion of Colombians, 
59%, had no legal right to live and work in the UK when they entered the country49, a 
much smaller proportion, 22%, was in that situation in 2005. Hence, although the legal 
situation has improved for many Colombians since they arrived in the UK, it is 
important to note here that around one in every five Colombians residing in London still 
live and work at the margins of the law (LatMES cited in Guarnizo 2008). In this vein, it 
is worth noting that migrants‘ social position has to be understood as operating 
simultaneously in both the society of origin and destination. While the majority of 
Colombian migrants are found at the margins of the socioeconomic and occupational 
structure of London society; living and working in London (a global city) still represents 
an improvement in migrants‘ position vis-à-vis their equals in Colombia (Guarnizo, 
2008). 
 
In short, the socioeconomic background of Colombians in London, from professionals 
to manual labourers to people in the shadows of society, is quite diverse. Although 
most Colombians are found at the lower end of the occupational and socioeconomic 
structure of London society, people from all walks of life and from all the different 
income brackets are represented in the community. This diversity reflects the complex 
social, economic and cultural demographics of the country. So what sort of links do 
these Colombians maintain with their homeland? 
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 This refers to the people who entered the UK only with a Colombian passport (before 1997), 
with a tourist visa (after 1997) or without any proper documentation.  
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3.2.2. Colombians in London: transnational practices 
In recent years, it has become evident that migrants engage in a range of transnational 
practices50 that encompass all aspects of social life. These practices have had broader 
institutional, economic, social and cultural effects in communities, regions and nations 
at both ends of the migration network. The transnational practices of Colombians 
abroad have not yet been widely documented and most research has been conducted 
either at the point of departure or destination. The limited research available has, for 
the most part, focused on the now-established flows of migrants to the United States 
and more recently, on the transnational connections established by migrants in Spain. 
Nonetheless, the research available suggests that besides remittances, there are a 
multiple set of activities connecting Colombians abroad and their places of origin.  
 
The biggest study of the transnational dimensions of US-bound Colombian migration 
concluded that there is a ‗dense web of economic, political and socio-cultural 
transnational relations connecting migrants and their places of origin‘ (Guarnizo and 
Diaz, 1999: 397). However, these relations tend to be fragmented by class, region of 
origin and racial group and so, there are no formal migrant organizations operating 
between origin and destination. The study also identified a set of after-migration 
changes in the urban structure of the cities of origin (Pereira and Cali) of US-bound 
migrants such as an increase in the number of small businesses (usually financed with 
remittances money), a significant increase in the amount of upgraded houses and in 
the consumption of household appliances.  Also, Portes (2003) found that only a very 
small percentage of Colombians in the US, 10%, engage in regular cross-border 
political and socio-cultural activities and an even smaller portion, less than 5%, have 
engaged in transnational business ventures.   
 
In Europe, the great majority of studies have focused on documenting the transnational 
practices of Colombians in Spain. These have, for the most part, focused on the spatial 
reconstitution and reproduction of the family in the transnational space (e.g. Echeverri, 
2010; Gimeno Collado et al., 2009; Puyana Villamizar et al., 2009; Sørensen and 
Guarnizo, 2007) on migrants‘ political practices from afar (Bermúdez Torres, 2006) or 
on the gender dimensions of remittances and its impact on development (García, 
2008). 
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 As is extensively detailed in chapter 2, transnational practices refer to those activities that link 
flows, of people and resources, along the geography of the migration network. 
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Few scholars have touched upon the transnational connections of Colombians in the 
UK. In terms of political transnationalism, Bermúdez-Torres (2006) and Guarnizo 
(2006b) found that the transnational political activities of Colombians in the UK are 
small and dispersed51. Gaviria and Mejía (2005) found that 71% of Colombian migrants 
in the UK send money home on a regular basis and 98% of remitters still have family 
members living in Colombia. Guarnizo (2006b) found that Colombians in London 
maintain economic and socio-cultural links with their homeland while at the same time 
try to integrate into the host society. These links are mostly maintained with family 
members back home and take the form of supporting relatives, sending remittances, 
investing in the country or closely following the country‘s news. In this sense, the 
nature of these migrants‘ transnational relations tends to be individual and private 
rather than collective and for the public good. In addition, Cock (2008) has argued that 
the commercial spaces and the media outlets created by Colombians in London have 
helped them to simultaneously maintain socio-cultural and economic links with 
Colombia and create a sense of group ‗ethnicity‘ in the city.  
 
In summary, high rates of emigration from Colombia have, no doubt, produced 
profound transformations in the social, economic, political and cultural structures of the 
country.  Luis Guarnizo (2006a) has further argued that migration has transformed the 
country into a „transnational social formation‟ in which the production, re-production and 
transformation of the political, cultural and socioeconomic structure of the residents of 
the national territory (non-migrants) interact with, influence and are influenced by 
residents in multiple foreign territories (migrants). However, much more research is 
needed in order to understand the complex implications that migrants multifaceted links 
with Colombia have had at the household, city, community, country and global levels. 
This thesis is an attempt to fill part of this void. In particular, it aims to elucidate the 
multiple political, financial and social linkages that are generated along the geography 
of the migration network while contextualising the connections between state policy, 
economic development, global financial flows, family reproduction/livelihood strategies 
and migration experiences and aspirations. 
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 A large comparative study of the transnational voting practices of Colombian migrants in the 
UK, Spain, France and the US will be published in 2011. The study is being coordinated by 
Cristina Escobar from Princeton University. Dr. Cathy McIlwaine, QMUL, is responsible for the 
study in the UK and Spain.  
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3.3. The remittances market: an overview 
3.3.1. Remittances: the global context 
In recent years, remittances have been hailed for their potential as drivers of economic 
development in migrant-sending countries. The establishment of a discourse that links 
migration-remittances-development has been one of the most prominent features of the 
global development agenda in the last decade. It is this kind of discourse that is 
constantly repeated by governments in the south and north as the answer to the 
‗development problem‘ of the south (Faist, 2007). 
 
A concerted effort to articulate this discourse and the diverse range of programmes that 
seek to spur economic development based on the ‗proper‘ use of remittances 
throughout the developing world, can be traced to the Summit of the Group of Eight 
(G8) in 200452. In this meeting, representatives of the G8 nations drafted a Global 
Poverty Action Plan with the goal of ‗attracting remittance flows into formal channels‘ so 
that they can be effectively managed in order to strengthen the global financial system 
and providing ‗families more options and incentives for productively investing 
remittance flows‘. The plan was based on the premise that remittances ‗can play a key 
role in private-sector development efforts‘ (Global Poverty Action Plan, 2004). These 
goals were to be achieved by establishing strategic alliances with financial sector 
institutions, civil society, NGOs and other institutions close to remitters and their 
families.  Although the World Bank has been in charge of coordinating these efforts, 
these projects are being pushed at a global scale by a range of different institutions 
such as the UK Department of International Development (DFID), the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), the German Agency for International Cooperation (GTZ) 
and the Ford Foundation, among others (BID, 2006). 
 
In practice, the migration-development discourse has translated into specific policies 
and practices directed at exploiting migrant households‘ connection to broader circuits 
of capital and finance. In this vein, the efforts have been channelled towards the 
financialisation of remitters and their families and the establishment of the necessary 
channels for the release of the investment potential of remittances. But several 
governments have also found other more subtle ways to exploit the fruits of their 
migrant labour: the use of future remittances flows as a tool to access credit in 
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American Development Bank‘s Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) in 2000 (Hall 2010).  
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international markets by banks and governments in the developing world is now 
widespread53. The magnitude of migrants‘ remittances is such that international rating 
agencies rank their credit worthiness on the same level as that of credit card, telephone 
and airline receivables54. Countries such as Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Peru, Mexico, Panamá and Turkey have offered bonds backed by remittances from the 
US (Ratha, 2003, 2010a).  
 
Also, in 2010, the government of Nepal issued a diaspora bond, the ―Foreign 
Employment Bond‖, to raise funds of around $100 million US dollars for infrastructure 
development from Nepali workers in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Malaysia (Ratha, 
2010b). In the past, the governments of India and Israel have raised billions of dollars 
by offering similar bonds, often in times of liquidity crisis. Given their sizable migrant 
populations, it is estimated that countries such as Bangladesh, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco and the Philippines can potentially consider 
offering diaspora bonds (Ratha, 2010c). So how has this migration-for-development 
discourse played out in Latin America? And what kinds of dynamics are being created 
in the process? 
 
3.3.2. Remittances: the Latin American context 
In the last three decades, increasing rates of emigration from Latin America have been 
accompanied by a significant increase in the amount of money that migrants send to 
their families back home. In 2004, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) received 
US$42.4 billions, about 25% of total world remittances, which makes it the first 
recipient region in the world. These remittances represented around 70% of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) inflows (US$60.9 billions) and exceeded the flows of official 
development assistance (ODA) by 500% (US$6.9 billions) (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Remittances constitute the fastest growing capital inflow to the LAC region. Between 
2002 and 2008, the volume of remittances to Latin America passed from US$31.2 
billions to US$69.2, with an average annual growth rate of 17%. In 2009, for the first 
time on record, and as a consequence of the global financial crisis, the volume of 
remittances to the region decreased to US$57 billion, a 15% drop. These worker 
remittances represented, on average, 1.5% of the region‘s Gross Domestic Product 
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 The bundling of these flows is known as ‗securitisation‘.  
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 Only oil exports are ranked higher by international rating agencies.  
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Millions of 
US dollars 
(GDP)55(World Bank, 2011). Remittances to Latin America remained virtually 
unchanged in 2010 and are expected to grow in 2011, although not at the double-digit 
rates seen in the years prior to the global crisis (IADB, 2011). 
 
Despite the crisis, the distribution of remittances per country remained unchanged. In 
absolute terms, the top five remittance recipient countries in 2009 were Mexico, Brazil, 
Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador (see figure 3.4). In contrast, the distribution of 
remittances according to their significance to the national economy does not follow the 
same pattern56. As a percentage of GDP, the top five recipients in 2009 were Honduras 
(19.3%), Guyana (17.3%), El Salvador (15.7%), Haiti (15.4%) and Jamaica (13.8%). It 
is important to note here that remittances represent less than 3% of the national 
economies of Mexico, Brazil and Colombia (Khoudour-Castéras, 2007b) and close to 
10% of the GDP of Guatemala (World Bank, 2011). Thus, the impact of remittances is 
greater in the smaller and poorer countries of the region, primarily those located in the 
Central and the Caribbean areas.  
 
Figure 3.4: Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source: Maldonado et al. (2010) 
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 Because this figure only takes into account the money sent through formal channels, this 
statistic is thought to be an underestimation of the actual amount of remittances sent to the 
region (World Bank 2011).  
56
 Except for Guatemala, the countries that send the most migrants (in absolute numbers) are 
also the ones that receive the greater amounts of remittances (World Bank 2011).  
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Although intra-regional migration flows have gained ground in recent years (today they 
represent around 13% of the total) and migrants have increasingly searched for other 
destinations, especially in Europe, the vast majority of these remittances still originate 
in the United States (World Bank, 2011). 
 
In addition to family remittances, hundreds of stories abound of migrant groups in the 
global north that have united with the aim to sponsor projects in their communities of 
origin in Latin America. These are known as Hometown Associations (HTAs) and are 
particularly popular among Mexican and Salvadoran migrants in the US. Although 
HTAs have become more common in recent years, the collective remittances that 
these migrant organisations send back home are estimated to be only around 1% of 
total family remittances. These collective remittances are usually sent to sponsor 
charities (usually churches), infrastructure projects (parks, street construction, fire 
trucks, ambulances), human development (scholarships, libraries) and/or other income 
generating programmes (Orozco, 2002).   
 
Remittances for development 
In Latin America, the Inter-American Development Bank – Multilateral Investment Fund 
(IADB-MIF) has been in charge of pushing for the recognition of a link between 
migration, remittances and development. By 2009, the bank had financed numerous 
studies, surveys and conferences and 45 national and regional technical assistance 
projects to promote remittances as a tool for development (Hall, 2010). These projects 
ranged from channelling remittances through micro-finance institutions, banks and 
credit unions to creating incentives for the ‗productive‘ investment of remittances and 
their securitisation (BID, 2006).  
 
In light of these recent developments, the empirical evidence for LAC suggests that, for 
all their human and emotional costs, remittances have improved welfare and living 
conditions among migrant families, specifically in terms of better access to food, 
housing, education and health (Fajnzylber and López, 2007). In addition, migrants‘ 
relations with their families back home have had indirect multiplying effects on local, 
regional and national economies through what has been termed the 5Ts: 
transportation, tourism, telecommunications, trade and (remittances) transfers (Orozco, 
2008).  
 
Thus, migrants (and their remittances) have become one of the most important 
features of sending-countries‘ incorporation into the global economy and their individual 
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(and collective) transnational practices have had significant economic effects at 
multiple geographical scales. In this sense, Guarnizo (2003) has rightly argued that the 
economics of transnational living go far beyond their impact on migrants‘ localities and 
countries of origin and are driving global macroeconomic processes such as 
international financial arrangements and international trade, among others.  
 
These dynamics can be appreciated in the recent developments that have taken place 
in Latin America‘s remittances market, specifically in terms of the significant efforts on 
the part of the private and public sector to capture these flows of money. One of the 
most important developments in this regard is the entry of financial institutions (national 
and transnational) into the remittances business and their alliance with government for 
the financialisation of migrant activities in an attempt to leverage remittances for 
development57. Many examples abound in this regard. As part of the drive to 
‗democratise finance‘, the Mexican government partnered with major US banks to allow 
undocumented migrants the use of Matrículas Consulares (Mexican ID cards) as proof 
of identity to open bank accounts in the United States. Following the Mexican model, 
the Guatemalan government has partnered with Wells Fargo and other Central 
American governments are considering such a move (Ratha, 2003). Ecuador‘s Banco 
Solidario has partnered with remittance-sending institutions in Spain to allow migrants 
to send remittances to their families, free of charge, if they open a bank account in 
Ecuador (Hall, 2010). Although countless efforts have been put in place to ‗bank‘ 
migrant households, mainly to make them the subject of credit, in the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru, among others; these have had 
limited success58 (Hall, 2010).  
 
However, recent evidence suggests that the impact of remittances on financial 
development is weaker in Latin America than in the rest of the developing world. The 
reasons for this limited success have been attributed to greater distrust of financial 
institutions in the region, the (still) small share of banks in the business of remittance-
channelling and the higher costs of banking (Fajnzylber and López, 2007). It is perhaps 
not surprising that aggressive measures are being pushed to foster financial access for 
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 There has also been a wave of mergers and acquisitions between banks, money transfer 
companies, currency exchange houses and non-financial institutions, which are all fighting for a 
bigger share of this profitable market. Today, the remittances market in Latin America is 
dominated by two multinational corporations: Western Union and MoneyGram (Orozco 2002)  
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 A study conducted in 2002 revealed that in only 26% of the cases, both the sender and 
recipient of the remittance in Latin America had a bank account (Fajnzylber and López 2007). 
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migrants and remittance-recipients through banking institutions, minimize regulatory 
obstacles and allow non-traditional methods of delivering banking services.  
 
In addition, the IADB has also financed programmes throughout the region that 
specifically aim to channel remittances to ‗productive‘ investment, provide financial 
education and even promote the voluntary return of migrants based on business 
development in their places of origin. These programmes are run by a multiplicity of 
development and commercial banks and NGOs such as the Peruvian-Japanese 
Association (APJ) in Peru, the Crea Empresa Foundation in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Uruguay and the Caixa Econômica Federal in Brazil (Hall, 2010).  
 
These efforts are part of the wider shift in development policy and practice - from state-
led to market-led - that has taken place in the last two decades. The institutionalisation 
of market-driven approaches to development has often meant poverty-alleviating 
interventions that favour the deepening of financial markets by tying resources to small-
scale economic activities based on credit. The best example of such development 
interventions is the widespread promotion of microfinance in the global south, 
especially among women59. These interventions seemed to be based on the 
construction of an idealised financial subject on the part of donors (Rankin, 2001). As 
Katherine Rankin (2001: 28) has argued, „as entrepreneurial subjects, the poor are 
identified in ways consistent with the financial sustainability of lenders and an ideal of 
self-regulating markets‟. Yet, donor‘s promotion of rational financial entrepreneurs in 
the global south seems to contradict the development approach of the global north 
based on growth fuelled by debt-financed consumption.  
 
In this context, other novel business strategies have also emerged in an attempt to 
control the flow of remittances. These seem to be related to the prevailing idea among 
the IFIs and the people involved in the remittances business that they have to be 
channelled towards ‗productive use‘ because they are being ‗wasted in consumption‘. 
Instead of sending the money for the purchases, migrants in the United States are 
being encouraged, by transnational money transfer companies in alliance with home 
appliances and furniture chains, to directly buy durable goods and business equipment 
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 Based on ethnographic work in Bolivia, Maclean (2010) has argued that women are 
particularly targeted as subjects of microfinance because of the effectiveness of their social 
capital as collateral for microfinance loans.   
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that are then delivered to their relatives back home in countries such as Mexico, El 
Salvador and the Dominican Republic60 (Guarnizo, 2003).  
 
Although the overall impact of these recent attempts at the leveraging of remittances 
for development throughout the region is still unknown, the experience of countries with 
a long tradition of migration should serve as a guide in this regard. As Durand (2009) 
has pointed out, Mexico and the Dominican Republic have received remittances for 
more than 100 and 50 years respectively, however, there is no empirical proof that 
these flows of money have aided the development process of either country. Also, 
Delgado-Wise and Guarnizo (2007) have rightly pointed out that although Mexico is 
usually cited as a successful example of the positive relationship between migration 
and development, the bases for such assessment reflect a very narrow notion of 
development that ignores the underlying structural factors that underpin both 
phenomena. So, in light of the recent migration wave from Colombia, how important is 
the flow of remittances for the country‘s social and economic stability? Is the 
Colombian remittances market going in the same direction as the rest of Latin 
America? 
 
3.3.3. Remittances: a view from Colombia  
As a consequence of increased migration, remittances to Colombia have grown at a 
steady pace since the 1990s.  The amount of remittances sent to Colombia increased 
three-fold between 1990 and 2000, from 488 to 1,578 millions of US dollars (Khoudour-
Castéras, 2007b).  Official remittances also increased three-fold between 2000 and 
2008, from 1,578 to 4,842 millions of US dollars. After a long period of consistent 
growth, the volume of remittances to Colombia decreased by almost 15% in 2009, 
primarily as a consequence of the adverse effects that the global financial crisis had on 
migrants‘ employment stability (see figure 3.5). In 2006, remittances provided the 
second largest source of foreign currency to the Colombian economy, only after oil 
exports, and almost three times the income from coffee exports (Khoudour-Castéras, 
2007b).  
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 Contrary to the ‗remittances-for-productive-investment‘ approach predicated by IFIs, María 
Esther Pozo (2010) has documented that in countries such as Bolivia, where the exercise of 
citizenship is based on the notion of ‗vivir bien‘ (living well), migrant women send remittances for 
their children‘s consumption as a democratic practice that goes beyond satisfying their family‘s 
basic needs and allows them (and their children) to ‗enter modernity‘. For these migrant women, 
the use of remittances to finance consumption (essential or otherwise) is thus perceived as a 
mechanism for social and economic incorporation and mobility rather than the simple utilitarian 
act of buying.  
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Figure 3.5: Remittances to Colombia, 2000-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 Foreign currency sent by Colombian workers overseas.  
Data source: Serie mensual de remesas de trabajadores,  
Banco de la República (2010). Graph by author. 
 
In Colombia, the remittances market was traditionally in the hands of money exchange 
houses (casas de cambio), which controlled up to 70% of the market. However, given 
its sheer size and profitability other players entered the business about 10 years ago61. 
The market is now shared between commercial finance companies (CFCs62), banks 
and money exchange houses. CFCs have business alliances with MNCs such as 
Moneygram and Western Union and control around 64% of the market. The remaining 
36% is shared between banks (close to 30%) and a few money exchange houses (6%) 
(Superfinanciera, 2010). 
 
The evolution of remittances per country of origin can be appreciated in figure 3.6. In 
2008, Spain overtook the United States as the main source of remittances to Colombia, 
accounting for 37% of the total money received. In that same year, Venezuela 
contributed with around 9% of the total remittances income while flows from the UK 
represented almost 3% (USD$134 million), the fourth largest source.  
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 This statement is based on the information compiled by Superfinanciera (2010), the 
government‘s body responsible for the regulation and oversight of the financial sector.   
62
 CFCs are financial institutions that specialise in the distribution of remittances, foreign 
exchange operations and commercial lending and leasing.  
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Figure 3.6: Remittances to Colombia per country of origin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(p): provisional data; (pr): preliminary data until the third quarter, subject to revision.  
Data source: Encuesta trimestral de remesas, Banco de la República de  
Colombia (2010). Graph by author. 
 
The changes seen in the distribution of remittances over the last few years reflect the 
fact that Colombian migrants have increasingly searched for new destinations in recent 
years. Other important sources of remittances to Colombia are Italy, Panama and 
Ecuador which in 2008 contributed, respectively, 2.2%, 1.4% and 0.7% of the total 
flows63. The regions that receive the most remittances are also the regions that 
generate the most migrants: the Eje Cafetero (coffee region) and the states of Valle del 
Cauca, Cundinamarca and Antioquia, which respectively receive, 22%, 29%, 15% and 
16% of the total flows (Banco de la República, 2010).  
 
In the last decade, the average remittance to Colombia stood at US$320 
(COL$640.000) per month (Banco de la República, 2008). In 2009, when the effects of 
the global financial crisis began to be felt, the average remittance fell to around 
US$272 (COL$544.000) per month, both because the amount sent and the number of 
transactions decreased64. In any case, because the average remittance is greater than 
the current national minimum monthly wage of US$248 (COL$496.90065), these 
monies have become a lifeline for millions of Colombians. Indeed, the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations estimates that around three million households (about a third of the 
total population) receive remittances (Guarnizo, 2006a). In addition, 76% of remittance 
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 Data source: Encuesta trimestral de remesas, Banco de la República de Colombia (2010). 
Calculations by author. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 Minimum wage in 2009. The average exchange rate in 2009 was COP$2,000 per dollar. 
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recipients are women and around 66% receive remittances from their immediate 
relatives abroad (siblings, children, parents or spouse) (Garay and Rodriguez, 2005a).  
In addition, at the national level, a big proportion of remittances (62%) is used to cover 
basic living expenses such as food, clothing and utility bills; 33% is spent in education 
and 18% is used to pay for housing (mortgage/rent) (Garay and Rodriguez, 2005a).   
 
In summary, there is little doubt that this great influx of money has improved the living 
conditions of millions of people in Colombia.  In a country with little provision of social 
services, remittances constitute an important source of income for a great number of 
families and provide social protection for the people at or near the bottom of the income 
distribution. So, how has the Colombian government responded to this latest (and 
largest) wave of migration and the corresponding increase in remittances? 
 
3.4. Migration and remittances: framing the state response 
As was the case in Mexico66, Colombia went from an approach of having no policy 
towards its citizens abroad to making them an integral part of a reconstituted definition 
of the Colombian nation. In effect, in recent years the Colombian government has 
radically changed its policies towards its citizens abroad. Since the introduction of the 
new Constitution in 1991, Colombians living abroad have acquired the rights to dual 
citizenship, voting from abroad, representation in the National Congress and the right 
to being elected to Congress67 (Guarnizo, 2006a; Guarnizo et al., 1999).These radical 
political changes are, of course, not the exclusive domain of the Colombian state. The 
extension of special political rights and protections by governments to their citizens 
abroad have, no doubt, been triggered by political as well as economic reasons. As the 
number of migrants worldwide increases along with the monetary contributions to their 
countries of origin and scholars and international organizations push for the 
establishment of a link between migration and development, governments the world 
over (especially those in the south) have recognised the importance of establishing and 
maintaining links with their diasporas. Nowadays, around seventy nations, including the 
UK, Canada, Italy, Israel, South Africa and New Zealand allow their citizens to have 
dual nationality (Levitt, 2001b).  
 
                                                 
66
 For an extensive account of the Mexican experience, see Goldring (2001) 
67
 However, there seems to be a big gap between the political privileges afforded to Colombians 
abroad and their actual engagement with them. For example, Jones-Correa (1998), found that 
fewer than 4% of the estimated 100,000 Colombians in the metropolitan area of NYC, voted in 
the presidential elections held before 1998.  
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In the case of Latin America, only four countries allowed dual citizenship prior to 1991: 
Uruguay, Panama, Peru and El Salvador. In the 1990s, laws that amount to de facto 
dual nationality were passed in Colombia, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Brazil and Mexico68 (Jones-Correa, 2001). Similarly, the Brazilian state allows its 
citizens to vote while residing abroad and the Senate is debating an amendment to the 
constitution to create at least four congressional seats to represent them. Other 
countries such as the Dominican Republic and Mexico, have approved voter legislation 
although they have yet to be implemented (Levitt, 2001b). 
 
More recently, the Colombian government has embraced the migration-for-
development discourse emanating from the international development and aid 
agencies. It has engaged in a dynamic campaign to redefine its relationship with its 
diaspora in an attempt to institutionalise migrants‘ transnational practices by designing 
specific programmes to channel remittances to key sectors such as housing and 
finance. To this end, in 2003 the government, through the Ministry of Foreign Relations, 
created the ‗ColombiaNosUne‘ (Colombia unites us) programme. The programme 
seeks to ‗permanently link the Colombian state with its communities living abroad‘, 
‗recognize them as a vital part of the nation‘, ‗strive for the creation of a comprehensive 
migration policy‘ and ‗to advocate for mechanisms to facilitate the sending of 
remittances and to channel them towards savings and investment‘ (MRE, 2004). 
 
Under ‗ColombiaNosUne‘, the government has backed a programme designed and 
financed by the IADB, based on the use of remittances for mortgage-backed housing 
acquisition. But the Colombian government has gone a step further than many other 
sending states and it has put its weight behind the institutionalisation of transnational 
housing investments by promoting and facilitating the expansion of the national 
property (and financial) markets to include Colombians abroad through the international 
property/housing fairs (these programmes are explained in detail in chapter 5).  
 
There are also a number of mixed (government / private sector / NGOs) initiatives 
connected to the ColombiaNosUne programme. For example, ‗RedEsColombia‘, 
Conexión Colombia‘ (Colombian Connection) and ‗Colombianos en el exterior‘ 
(Colombians abroad); whose mission is to improve and sustain the transnational links 
between Colombians abroad and their communities back home and to channel 
                                                 
68
 Jones-Correa (2001) has argued that dual nationality laws in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and 
the Dominican Republic were passed because of pressure from their migrant populations 
abroad, especially those in the US.  
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resources towards development projects.  Other initiatives include, ‗Yo creo en 
Colombia‘ (I believe in Colombia) and ‗Colombia es pasión‘ (Colombia is passion), that 
seek to improve Colombia‘s image abroad and to build internal and external trust and 
solidarity and competitiveness in Colombia.  The significance of these initiatives cannot 
be underestimated.  Between 2003 and 2005, Conexión Colombia channelled 2 million 
US dollars towards 22 foundations working with development projects in Colombia 
(Khoudour-Castéras, 2007b). 
 
Although the ColombiaNosUne programme has highlighted the contribution that 
migrants make to the social and economic stability of the country, so far the impact of 
the programme has been limited. One of the main reasons for this limited success can 
be attributed to the fact that the focus of the programme has been to open spaces for 
national and multinational corporations to offer their goods and services to the migrant 
population69 (Guarnizo, 2006a).  
 
Yet, the focus of the national legislation towards migrants seems to be going in the 
same direction of ColombiaNosUne. Although there had been talks at different 
government levels about consolidating the government‘s stance on its citizens abroad 
since the adoption of the new constitution in 1991, the Integral Migration Policy (PIM) 
was only approved in August 2009. The PIM summarises the national government‘s 
legal framework, strategies and programmes that seek to foster the development of the 
Colombian population residing abroad and the foreign population residing in the 
country. Nevertheless, one of the main objectives of the PIM is to spell out the 
institutional reforms needed to ‗expand the portfolio of investment opportunities for 
Colombians abroad to allow remittances to be channelled towards productive activities, 
attract productive capitals and generate new businesses for the country‘ (my 
translation, CONPES, 2009)70. Moreover, some civil society organisations and people 
in policy circles in Colombia have suggested that not enough funds have been 
appropriated at the institutional level to make sure that the policy has a real impact on 
the lives of the millions of Colombians scattered throughout the world (Gómez, 2008).   
 
In addition, the Colombian senate is now debating a piece of legislation that will create 
a National System of Migration (Sistema Nacional de Migraciones). This system would 
bring together institutions and civil society organizations and its main objective would 
be to design and implement the country‘s migration policy and the programmes 
                                                 
69
 These and other reasons are discussed in chapter 5.  
70
 CONPES stands for National Council for Economic and Social Policy.  
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designed to protect the rights of Colombians abroad, give them assistance and improve 
their quality of life in their countries of destination (my translation, Congreso de 
Colombia, 2010). Likewise, during the 2010 World Social Forum on Migrations, a 
number of Colombian civil society organisations grouped under the ‗Social Migration 
Platform, Hermes‘ issued a statement suggesting that although this legislation is a 
positive step in terms of migration policy, the bill does not provide a mechanism for the 
real participation in policy decisions of those it intends to serve (the migrants) and does 
not guarantee the appropriation of the funds necessary for its implementation 
(Plataforma Hermes, 2010).  
 
Although the ColombiaNosUne programme and its associated projects were designed 
during the government of Alvaro Uribe (2002 -2010), the current government of Juan 
Manuel Santos has followed the same approach. A few days after he assumed office, 
Santos urged the financial sector to strive towards designing the necessary instruments 
to ‗bank‘ Colombians who are still not part of the system. While drawing parallels with 
the military operation that freed 15 hostages held by the guerrillas while he was the 
Minister of Defence in 2008, Santos declared: ‗we have to think the unthinkable‘; ‗this 
four-year mandate will be about banking the unbanked and deepening financial 
services‘ (El Espectador, 2010a).  
 
3.5. Concluding remarks  
This chapter has shown that in Colombia, increased trade and market liberalisation, 
privatisation and sharp cuts in health and education not only increased the gap 
between the rich and the poor, but also destroyed the livelihoods of millions of rural and 
urban people employed in the manufacturing, agricultural and public sectors. The 
interweaving of this economic reality and the worsening of the socio-political situation in 
the country in the 1990s pushed millions of Colombians, from all socioeconomic 
backgrounds but  especially from the coffee region to seek social, political and 
economic refuge in old and new destinations abroad. A multiplicity of factors conspired 
to force thousands of people from the coffee region: the process of liberalization of the 
economy took place in the context of very low coffee prices in the international 
commodity markets, the effects of the dissolution of the International Coffee Agreement 
unfolded during this decade and the region was at the epicentre of a devastating 
earthquake. 
 
The Colombian community in London is estimated to be around 150,000, of which 
close to 50% come from the county‘s coffee region. The socioeconomic background of 
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Colombians in London is quite diverse. Although most Colombians are found at the 
lower end of the occupational and socioeconomic structure of London society, people 
from all walks of life and from all the different income brackets are represented in the 
community. This diversity reflects the complex social, economic and cultural 
demographics of the country. The UK is the fourth biggest source of remittances to 
Colombia. Remittances constitute the second largest source of foreign currency to the 
Colombian economy and around three million households (about a third of the total 
population) receive remittances. The high rates of emigration from Colombia and the 
remittances that have followed have produced profound transformations in the social, 
economic, political and cultural structures of the country.   
 
Given the high rates of migration and the increasing importance of remittances to the 
country‘s social and economic stability, the Colombian government has responded by 
engaging in a dynamic campaign to redefine its relationship with its diaspora in an 
attempt to institutionalise their transnational economic practices. It has done so by 
attempting to make migrants an integral part of a reconstituted definition of the 
Colombian nation while designing and implementing programmes that favour the 
housing and financial sectors and privilege financial markets as the main vehicle for 
migrants‘ socioeconomic reproduction.  
 
The next chapter will explore the methodological approach that underpins this 
research. It will discuss the motivations for engaging in this research project and a 
justification for the research methods employed at both ends of the migration network. 
It will also provide some reflections on the process and the methodological contribution 
of this research.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Methodology: Tracing Migrants’ Transnational Practices along 
the Geography of the Migration Network 
 
This chapter explores the methodological approach that underpins this research. The 
first section explores my motivations to pursue this research. The second section 
provides an overview of the theoretical foundations of the methodological approach 
taken along with a critical reflection on my positionality in relation to my research 
participants. The third and fourth sections document the different approaches to data 
collection that I took in London and Colombia, along with a justification for my choice of 
methods. These sections also discuss some of the challenges of conducting fieldwork 
at both ends of the migration network. In sections five and six I explain the process of 
data analysis and interpretation and how I plan to re-engage with my research 
participants and the wider community. I then conclude with some reflections on the 
research process and highlight the methodological contribution of this research to the 
field of Geography. 
 
4.1. Why I decided to study Colombian migration to the UK 
The choice of my case study was a combination of intellectual curiosity and personal 
reasons. I developed an interest in international migration after working for three years 
as a Welfare Programmes Manager with Latino migrant families in the United States. 
During this time, I learned a great deal about the social, economic and political 
environment migrant families faced upon exit from their countries of origin and arrival in 
the United States. I soon realised that there was a knowledge gap in my training as an 
Economist and that my knowledge of social theory and policy was limited.   During my 
training as a graduate and post-graduate student in economics, the emphasis was 
placed primarily on understanding economic issues and placing them in the broader 
macroeconomic context, often through the analysis of quantitative data. This thesis is 
the result of my efforts to combine the qualitative, in-depth case study analytical skills I 
have acquired as a PhD student in Human Geography with the broader understanding 
of economic processes that I have as an economist. My initial interest rested primarily 
in the social and economic reality of Colombian migrants in the UK and their 
connections with their families back home. However, based on my initial readings of 
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the literatures on migrant transnationalism, I came to recognise that structural 
constraints on individual decisions such as state policies in home and host countries, 
regional and supra-national contexts are as important as individuals‘ and families‘ 
agency in understanding migrants‘ socioeconomic transnational practices. 
Consequently, I decided to also tease out the structural underpinnings of these 
dynamics and their connections to wider (global) socioeconomic and political 
processes.  
 
Other intellectual reasons for pursuing this research had to do with the fact that in the 
years prior to beginning my PhD, Colombian migration to the UK had seen a dramatic 
increase and the phenomenon was understudied. In particular, although the research 
available at the time suggested that migration had transformed Colombia into a 
„transnational social formation‟ (Guarnizo, 2006a), most research had been conducted 
either at the point of departure or destination (cf. Bermúdez Torres, 2006; Gaviria and 
Mejía, 2005; Guarnizo, 2006b; Khoudour-Castéras, 2007a, 2007b; McIlwaine, 2005; 
Urrutia Montoya, 2003). Moreover, the limited research available on the transnational 
practices of Colombians abroad had, for the most part, focused on the established 
flows of migrants to the United States and more recently, on the transnational 
connections established by migrants in Spain. Thus, I felt that I could make an 
important contribution to knowledge by investigating migrant households‘ multifaceted 
links along the geography of the migration network and their broader political, 
economic and social implications at the community, country and global levels. I focused 
on Colombian migration to London because the available data indicated that the 
majority Colombians in the UK resided in the capital city (Bermúdez Torres, 2003; 
Open Channels, 2000).  
 
Another important, and more personal reason, had to do with the fact that I had left 
Colombia more than ten years before (as a recent graduate) and I felt deeply excited 
about having the opportunity to go back ‗home‘ for an extended period of time and 
learn more about my country in a different, more professional, capacity. This was 
indeed a great opportunity which I deeply enjoyed. Finally, I was also inspired by more 
political concerns such as the urge I have felt since I decided to transition into Human 
Geography to engage in research that, in my view, had more applicability and currency 
in the policy making arena.  
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4.2. Methodological Approach 
The methodological approach to data collection and analysis taken in this thesis is 
inspired by some of the principles and practices of ‗Grounded Theory‘. Grounded 
Theory advocates the use of qualitative methodologies for building theories based on 
empirical data rather than for testing pre-existing theories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
The theory provides a set of procedural guidelines for data gathering and analysis, 
such as how to collect rich data, how to develop simple and advanced codes and 
memos and reflecting on the research process to conceptualise ideas (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). Following these guidelines allows the researcher to, among other 
things, step back and critically analyse situations, the ability to think abstractly and the 
ability to be flexible and sensible to the words and actions of respondents (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). In short, Grounded Theory is a useful methodological approach to 
understand the complexity and variability of social phenomena and the interrelations 
between processes, structure and agency (Strauss, 2003; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
 
Hence, instead of going into the field with the intention of testing a particular hypothesis 
or theory, as advocated by the scientific method, I set out to allow the data to ‗speak‘ 
and to develop my theoretical framework in intimate relationship with the data I 
collected (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss, 2003). I have articulated a cross-disciplinary 
conceptual framework by bringing together different theoretical perspectives from a 
range of disciplines in the social sciences such as, Human Geography, Sociology, 
Anthropology and Economics. This framework allows for unpacking the complex 
processes that are produced and reproduced by the transnational flows of people and 
resources along the migration network. In addition, it allows for an understanding of the 
interactions between state policy, economic development, global financial flows, family 
livelihood strategies and migration experiences and aspirations. Thus, I have 
developed an empirically grounded cross-disciplinary theoretical framework that brings 
geography back into transnational discourses by tracing migrants‘ transnational 
practices along the geography of the migration network. This is a particularly important 
methodological and theoretical contribution to the field because as Mitchell (1997: 101) 
has pointed out, ‗transnationalism necessitates a crossing of borders, both literal and 
epistemological‟.  
 
In this sense, I have answered Pollard et al.‘s (2009) call for ‗crossing disciplinary 
boundaries‘ and emphasising the mutual constitution of the global north and south. I 
have done so by articulating the local-to-global connections of the transnational 
practices that flow through the migration network while privileging embodied accounts 
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of migrant households‘ livelihoods and challenging the boundaries between economic 
geography and development studies. Thus, I have „theorize [d] connections between 
local worlds and larger social structures71‟ (Charmaz, 2006: 133). And I have been able 
to theorise these connections by ‗pushing the envelope of research practice‘ (Barnes et 
al., 2007) because „method provides a crucial “hinge” between empirical evidence and 
theoretical claims‟ (Barnes et al., 2007: 23). In particular, by empirically analysing the 
flows between two connected sites, London and the Coffee Region of Colombia, a 
theoretical picture of the whole was assembled. Hence, local-global forces are 
„examined as the product of flows of people, things, and ideas‟ (Burawoy, 2000: 29), 
because as Cook and Crang (1995: 10) have rightly pointed out, the global is not ‗out 
there‘, but is always ‗in here‘. In short, I have centred my analysis around the particular, 
‗local‘ ways in which Colombian migrants are being constructed as transnational 
financial subjects as well as how these subjectivities have been shaped by ‗global‘ 
neoliberal development discourses.   
 
This theoretical picture was assembled by paying particular attention to the role of the 
state in the construction of these subjectivities in the context of the historical political 
economy of development in Latin America and the recent reconfiguration of the 
relationship between the state and its citizens in an era of growing financialisation of 
the process of capital accumulation. However, by making migrant households the 
central actors of this research, I have attempted to give voice to their ‗neglected 
knowledge‘ (S. J. Smith, 2001). That is, I have sought to highlight migrants‘ lived 
experiences and provide a nuanced understanding of the diversity and complexity of 
their responses to the policies of the state.  
                                                 
71
 Burawoy (2000) has argued that the use of grounded theory as a methodological tool leads to 
empirical generalisations and astructural analyses, in particular in terms of the reproduction of 
globalisation. 
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Methodological Techniques 
In order to explore the complexities of migrant households‘ experiences and gain an 
understanding of the practices of the state and the processes shaping them, I have 
relied on qualitative methodologies such as ethnographically-informed semi-structured 
interviews and participant observation. I conducted a total of 58 semi-structured 
interviews, 23 in London and 35 in Colombia. These interviews encompassed a mix of 
actors such as migrant families, academics, local leaders and government officials. 
Although the relevance and usefulness of these methodologies in Human Geography 
have been criticised (Johnston et al., 2000), they allow for building theory through 
empirical research (Strauss, 2003). In addition, they also allow for developing empathy 
between researcher and researched and for reflexivity (in terms of positionality and 
representation) on the part of the researcher of the research encounter (Dwyer and 
Limb, 2001). I found these issues of empathy and reflexivity particularly important 
personally, as a researcher and more generally, for this type of research. Specifically, 
as a Colombian migrant researching Colombian migration, these qualitative methods 
allowed me to identify and sympathise with many of the very personal experiences, 
feelings and emotions articulated by migrant households. In addition, given that social 
science migration research tends to be anchored in migrants‘ lives and lived 
experiences, reflexivity is a key component of the analytical process. Constant 
reflexivity may allow the researcher to interpret and represent the rich qualitative data 
collected in a manner that contextualises migrants‘ representation of the complex 
cultural, economic, social and political processes that underpin migration.  
 
I complemented the data obtained through these qualitative methodologies with 
secondary quantitative data in order to place the findings into the wider socioeconomic 
context in which they take place. This data includes a quantification of Colombian 
migration and remittances flows and their significance within the wider regional and 
global contexts. It also includes aggregate social and economic characteristics of 
Colombia and migrants‘ place in UK society. The importance of providing this data 
stems primarily from the fact that migrants‘ locally grounded transnational practices 
shape and are shaped by broader structures and processes that frame their lives 
across borders. 
 
I also employed another set of methodological techniques which included volunteering 
at migrant organisations, participating in other research projects related to my topic, 
establishing links with local academic groups and engaging in informal conversations 
with key actors. These techniques were particularly important for me because they not 
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only facilitated the process of recruiting research participants but also allowed me to 
acquire a wide range of contextual and practical insights not available in the formal 
literatures. A complete account of these techniques and the research process in both 
sites, London and Colombia, is presented in sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
4.2.1 Positionality: a critical reflection 
Considering that issues of researcher positionality remain unacknowledged and 
unexamined in much economic geography literature (Barnes et al., 2007) and in order 
to avoid „the false neutrality and universality of so much academic knowledge‟ (Rose, 
1997: 306), in this section I reflect on my positionality as a Colombian migrant studying 
Colombian migration. Because of a self-reflexive understanding of my own biases 
(Katz, 1994; McDowell, 1992; Rose, 1997), I am conscious that this thesis represents 
only my partial and particular interpretation of the complex issues I have aimed to 
explain. This is especially the case in terms of migrants‘ experiences and negotiations 
of the very particular conjunction of social, cultural, political and economic processes 
that influence their decisions, in this case, about housing investments. Therefore, the 
basis for the empirically-grounded theoretical framework put forward in this thesis 
constitutes an ‗interpretive portrayal‘ of the lived realities of this specific group of people 
(Charmaz, 2006).  
 
Although I am also a Colombian migrant, and have been since I left my country more 
than 10 years ago, I cannot claim to have ‗insider‘ knowledge (Rose, 1997) or a greater 
understanding (than that of an ‗outsider‘ non-Colombian) of the group of people I have 
researched. Although my father has never set foot in a school (he taught himself how 
to read and write) and my mother did not study beyond high school, I had the privilege 
of attending a private university in Colombia. In addition, I had the choice to leave 
Colombia for my personal and professional growth, rather than being forced out by 
poverty and/or conflict, like most of my interviewees in London. However, the fact 
remains that because all my participants and I were born and raised in Colombia, we 
share a common cultural frame of reference. This common background and the fact 
that we spoke the same language helped me to quickly build rapport with them and 
grasp many of the culturally specific nuances and references in their comments and 
personal accounts.  This is not to say that my position in terms of education, 
professional status and personal history, my positionality, was perceived equally by all 
the different actors I interviewed (Rose, 1997; Valentine, 1997). Although I cannot be 
sure of how they perceived me since this is not a question I asked directly, on reflection 
I can say that, the business people, community leaders and local government officials I 
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interviewed invariably highlighted that this was an important and topical area of 
research and complemented me for embarking upon it. By contrast, most of the 
migrant families were curious to know how I would use the information they gave me, 
how I would personally benefit from conducting this research and whether I was 
connected to the government. Many of the migrants in London also asked if the 
Colombian government would get to hear their stories and said they hoped that I could 
write a report for the government documenting their ‗plight‘ in the hope that it would ‗do 
something about it‘. In any case, I can only claim that the information articulated in this 
thesis has been produced by „building fragile and temporary commonplaces‟ (Thrift, 
2003: 108) with my research subjects and communities. These commonplaces were 
built in the interactions I had with different actors throughout the data collection process 
by enquiring, discussing, volunteering, interviewing and doing participant observation in 
London and Colombia.  
 
4.3. Research Methods: London  
I initially set out to investigate the intersections between the economic, social and 
gender dimensions of labour migration and remittances for Colombian migrants in 
London and their communities of origin. My original idea was that given their sheer 
volume, migration and remittances were one of the main drivers of urban 
transformations in communities in the developing world. As such they could be used as 
a tool to understand the dynamics of socioeconomic and cultural transformations at the 
household and community levels in migrants‘ places of origin.   
 
Testing the field: trying to get a foot in   
In 2008, when I was ready to start my fieldwork, I had only been living in the UK for one 
year, so I did not have much of an extended network of contacts in Newcastle, let alone 
in London where I wanted to conduct my research. Because of the size of the city, the 
fact that Colombians are scattered in and around London and my previous experience 
working with migrants in the United States, I set out to identify the organisations that 
provided services and support to Latin Americans in London. I also sought to identify 
the spaces in which their presence in the city could be visualised, as a way to make an 
initial entrance into the ‗community‘72. I identified these organisations and places mainly 
through internet searches and by referring to the working papers emanating from the 
Global Cities at Work project based at Queen Mary University of London, which 
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 By using the term community, I do not mean to imply that this is a homogenous group of 
people. As illustrated in chapter 3, the socioeconomic background of Colombians in London is 
quite diverse and people from all walks of life and from all different income brackets are 
represented in this ‗community‘. 
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documented the lives of migrant workers in the city. I then contacted all the migrant 
organisations I found contact details for (7 in total) and requested a meeting with them. 
Two organisations responded positively73 and I arranged interviews with them, the 
others did not exist anymore or simply did not respond.  
 
I travelled to London in April 2008. The purpose of this trip was two-fold: to speak to the 
heads of these two migrant organizations and to visit the Elephant and Castle shopping 
centre and the Seven Sisters Market, which are established Latin markets in London, in 
order to get a sense of the vibrancy of the Latin community in the city. Prior to the 
interviews, I provided the interviewees with a copy of the background of my research 
and my research aims, via email. The purpose of these semi-structured interviews was 
to learn more about the services these organisations offered and to enquire about the 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the Latin American community in 
London. I asked the interviewees what they thought was the best way to access the 
Colombian community and if they were willing to help me. They both said they were 
interested in my project and would like to help me gain access to the community by 
granting me institutional support. Because these organisations rely heavily on 
volunteers, I reasoned that a good way to start would be to become a volunteer for 
their organisations. They agreed.  
 
Unexpected events 
While I was in London, I found a flyer advertising a property fair for Colombian migrants 
in the UK that would take place in London in September 2008. The fair was being 
organised by Colombia‘s Association of Builders (CAMACOL) and officially sponsored 
by the Colombian Consulate and Embassy, the ColombiaNosUne (Colombia unites us) 
programme and Proexport (government agency for the promotion of exports, tourism 
and foreign investment in Colombia). This was an unanticipated theme that emerged in 
the process of learning about the Colombian community in London. When I first saw 
the advertisement, I was bewildered. I thought, what does this mean? What is 
happening here? Is this a way of channelling remittances to specific economic sectors 
in Colombia? This must have involved a very big investment (in terms of money and 
logistics) on the part of the sponsors and the companies involved. I had to find out. 
Subsequently, I decided to attend the fair in order to find out what was happening in 
this particular setting with the aim to gain more knowledge about the wider 
socioeconomic processes (Charmaz, 2006) that were taking place in the community.  
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 In order to protect their identity, these two organisations will remain unnamed throughout this 
thesis.  
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I took on the role of a participant-observer in the fair. Participant observation does not 
necessarily involve constant immersion in a particular community for an extended 
period of time, it can take the form of occasional participation-observation in particular 
settings (Bryman, 1993; Dwyer and Limb, 2001; Platt, 1976). Although this was a public 
event, its main targets were Colombian migrants in the UK. I attended the first day of 
the fair as one of those migrants and used my knowledge of Colombia and my 
language skills to fully participate. I went to the stands of different construction 
companies and enquired about buying a house in Colombia, enquired about obtaining 
a mortgage with the representative of a bank and attended a series of talks given by 
government officials and construction companies‘ representatives. I did not record any 
of these conversations, I only took notes throughout the event. I took some 
photographs (which no one objected to, since many other attendees were doing the 
same) and collected a series of promotional material, from different programmes such 
as ‗Mi casa con remesas‘ and ‗ColombiaNosUne‘ to property booklets, mortgage offers 
and social events for Colombians in London74.  
 
This unanticipated experience took me in a slightly different direction and led me to ask 
a set of different questions. Instead of focusing on the socioeconomic and gender 
dimensions of migration and remittances of Colombian migration to London and in 
migrants‘ communities of origin in Colombia, I became more interested in the role of 
the state in the creation and maintenance of these new economic spaces as well as the 
ideological underpinnings of such endeavours. In order to situate these new interests, I 
had to engage with what I previously regarded as unrelated literatures, such as that on 
role of the state (articulated through housing policy) in shaping housing markets in 
Latin America and the political economy of housing markets in the global north. The 
more I read, the more fascinated I was. Soon, I discovered that these fairs had been 
taking place since 2005 in other cities in the global north. However, I had not seen 
these developments documented in the literature, which provided me with yet another 
reason to make this issue one of the central topics of my enquiry. 
 
Being in the field  
I lived in London between November and December 2008. During this time, I engaged 
in a wide range of activities. These included volunteering at migrants‘ organisations, 
providing interpreting at a migration-centred conference and attending activities 
organised by the Colombian consulate. I also engaged in participant-observation at 
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 A comprehensive account of the fair is given in chapter 5.  
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some of the focal points of the Colombian community such as the Seven Sisters 
Market and Tiendas del Norte, in North London; and the Elephant and Castle and 
Tiendas del Sur shopping centres, in South East London. 
 
I encountered my first methodological hurdle on my first day in London. I found out that 
one of the organisations I was going to volunteer for had lost a considerable amount of 
funding and so it could no longer provide in-house advice to migrants, which would 
considerably lessen my chances to interact directly with migrants on a regular basis. 
However, because I had previously offered my help to the director of the organisation 
and I thought there was much to be learned from the expertise the organisation had 
built over its years in operation, I offered to work there two days per week. The other 
organisation was still thriving and I felt very welcomed on my first day. I volunteered 
there three days per week. Volunteering at the migrant organisations was a very 
enriching experience and I learned quite a lot about the UK‘s immigration and welfare 
systems and about the changing nature of Latin American migration to the UK and the 
problems faced by the community75. Just being there meant that I learned of all the 
migrant-related events that took place in the city and interacted and exchanged 
experiences with Latin Americans on a daily basis. As will be explored below, this 
methodological technique also greatly improved my ability to recruit participants.  
 
Recruiting participants 
Because I was interested in documenting in depth the experiences of a particular group 
of people (Colombian migrants in London) in relation to their engagement in a 
particular socioeconomic activity (transnational housing investments), the technique I 
used for recruiting participants reflects a ‗theoretical‘ or ‗illustrative‘ sampling 
(Valentine, 2001) instead of a random statistical sampling. In this sense, I targeted and 
gained access to a group of people „who may be concerned and/or involved in living 
through the research problem‟ (Cook and Crang, 1995: 11) and prompted them to 
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 I had travelled to London again in July 2008, to speak to the representative of another migrant 
organisation. During this meeting, it was agreed that I would return to the organisation once I 
was residing in London to work as a volunteer. When I returned in November, I was told that 
they only accepted volunteers for periods of six months or longer. Nonetheless, they said they 
could use my help with some specific projects. I spent a few days there trying to help with some 
of these projects but it was not a very good experience. I felt that the working environment was 
not very professional and welcoming. Realistically, the place was somewhat chaotic so it was 
very difficult to get anything done there. After that, I spoke to the person I was helping, finished 
the task I had been given and decided not to return to the organisation. Because I had secured 
a place at the other migrant organisations, this hurdle did not have any negative impact on the 
direction of my research and/or my ability to recruit participants.  
 77 
 
recount their different perceptions and experiences of it. Hence, the findings presented 
in this thesis are not representative of, and universal to, all Colombians abroad.  
 
As Valentine (1997) has pointed out, some groups are more difficult than others to 
access. In those cases, it is more effective to try to get a foot in by approaching those 
who provide services to them or run organisations on their behalf. Because of the 
particular historical socio-political context of Colombia (sixty years of armed conflict, 
political and social violence and drug cartels wars), there is widespread mistrust in 
Colombian society. I reasoned that this mistrust may also be common among 
Colombians abroad. As the head of one of the migrant organisations pointed out: „you 
know that Colombians are very mistrusting and they just do not like to talk to 
everybody. People are willing to talk but they like to have some kind of reassurance of 
who you are and they already know us‟. So, I used my association with these migrant 
organisations as the first point of entry into the Colombian community in London.  
  
I recruited the first few participants for my research through one of these migrant 
organisations. Specifically, I wrote a short description (in Spanish) of me and my 
research project and highlighted the confidential nature of the information provided. I 
agreed with one of the senior employees that I would distribute the flyer during a 
workshop that she was going to offer, along with a sign up sheet for potential 
volunteers. I also left some of the flyers in the organisation‘s waiting room. On the day 
of the workshop she introduced me to the attendees and by the end of the day, 8 
people (6 of whom were Colombians) had signed up. The other research participants 
were recruited through snowballing, either through these initial contacts or through 
contacts provided by other employees and volunteers from both organisations, one of 
whom coordinated a support group for elderly Latin Americans76. All these contacts in 
turn, provided other contacts. By the end of this process, I had managed to recruit a 
mix of people, from cleaners and child minders to business owners, nursery teachers 
and some retired people.  
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 I did not contact these individuals directly. Instead, the coordinator invited me to one of their 
group sessions and introduced me to the group. They gave me a wonderful reception and even 
offered me Colombian coffee and food. Although many provided me with their contact 
information, I only managed to interview one of them, the rest were too busy with the end of the 
year activities to meet me. 
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Interviews in London  
I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews because they allow for an analysis of 
people‘s interpretations or experiences of the interactions between the social, the 
political, the economic and the cultural and as such they are rich and multi-layered (S. 
J. Smith, 2001). Given that the purpose of this thesis is to provide a nuanced 
understanding of the links between state policy, economic development, global 
financial flows and family reproduction strategies and migration experiences and 
aspirations, I found this technique to be most appropriate in order to answer my 
research questions. I structured my interview schedule based on the literature I had 
read and the reflections I had written in my field diary during the first few weeks I was in 
the field (the interview schedule is presented in appendix 1).  All my interviews were 
conducted in Spanish. I conducted 23 semi-structured interviews, 21 interviews with 
Colombian migrants in London, 16 women and 5 men, and two with key actors, both 
active members of the Latin American community in London77. I did not interview the 
same person more than once nor did I provide any financial compensation to my 
participants. The place of the interviews was decided in consultation with the 
interviewees. Some migrants invited me to their homes, others preferred to meet me at 
the offices of one of the migrant organisations. Business owners and NGO‘s 
employees preferred to be interviewed in their own businesses or offices.  With the 
previous permission of the participants, the interviews were all recorded using a digital 
device. None of the participants raised any objections about being recorded. Each 
interview lasted an average of 90 minutes. These files were kept on my personal 
computer as password-protected documents. Table 4.1 provides a list of my sources in 
London78. Personal details for each participant are provided in appendix 2. All names 
are pseudonyms.  
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 I had the contact information of nine more Colombian migrants but we could not find a 
suitable time to meet. I did not pursue these contacts further due to time constraints.    
78
 These are the sources I have referenced throughout this thesis. 
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Table 4.1: List of sources, London  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* I have interviewed these migrants‘ relatives in the  
Coffee Region of Colombia.  
Name Interview Date 
Diana* 1st December 2008 
Celia 1st December 2008 
Mariela 2nd December 2008 
Miriam 2nd December 2008 
Andrea* 2nd December 2008 
Luis 3rd December 2008 
Cesar 3rd December 2008 
Lourdes 3rd December 2008 
Nancy* 4th December 2008 
Mariana 4th December 2008 
Ana Aura 4th December 2008 
Rebeca 
Key actor,  
5th December 2008 
Claudia 6th December 2008 
Ana Carolina* 8th December 2008 
Alejandra 9th December 2008 
Daniela 
Key actor,  
9th December 2008 
Juana 9th December 2008 
Leonel 10th December 2008 
Antonio 10th December 2008 
Hector 10th December 2008 
Dilia 10th December 2008 
Angela 10th December 2008 
Maricruz* 12th December 2008 
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Occupation (%) Sample LatMES* 
Cleaner – domestic, commercial 
and/or manual labourer 
28 37 
Childminder 24 X 
Small business owner 24 X 
Out of the labour force 14 14 
Mid-level occupation 9 27 
Admin and sales support X 13 
Supervisor X 9 
Sample size (number) 21 215 
 
Migrants‟ socioeconomic profile 
The socioeconomic status of these 21 migrants in London can be elucidated by looking 
at the place they inhabit in London‘s occupational structure: 28% of migrants were 
employed as cleaners and/or manual labour, 24% worked as childminders, another 
24% were small business owners, 14% auto-identified as being out of the labour force 
and 9% were employed in a mid-level occupation. Of these migrants, all except one 
had legal documents to live and work in the UK. As table 4.2 shows, these migrants‘ 
occupational status (sample) follows a similar pattern to the wider Colombian 
population in London (LatMES). The majority of Colombians in London are employed in 
low-skilled service sector jobs, regardless of their level of education and professional 
experience (usually because they do not have good command of the English 
language). In contrast to the sample used here, around one-third of Colombians in 
London lack legal documents to live and work in the UK (LatMES cited in Guarnizo 
2008).  
 
Table 4.2: Occupational status of Colombians in London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Latin American Migration in Europe Survey (LatMES),  
cited in Guarnizo (2008) 
 
Consent  
The research process and in particular, the stages of data collection and analysis, were 
conducted always taking care of respecting confidentiality. Given the very sensitive and 
personal nature of the information provided by the participants, I have kept their identity 
anonymous. Instead I have given all of them pseudonyms in Spanish to reflect the fact 
that they come from a Spanish speaking country. Participants‘ informed consent was 
obtained verbally before each interview. I always began my interviews by reassuring 
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participants about the confidential nature of the study and explaining the aims of the 
study. At the beginning, I also asked them what they would like to emerge and/or get 
out of the interview. I used this question to gain a feel about what kinds of issues 
migrants really wanted to highlight about their experiences. I felt that this open question 
also showed them that I was interested in hearing much more than answers to a rigid 
set of questions.  In effect, most of these interviews were quite fluid and felt more like a 
conversation. However, I did encounter a few difficult situations in which the participant 
would recall some distressing experiences and began to cry. These difficult 
experiences were usually related to the hard times they endured upon arrival in the UK 
and/or not being able to attend a parent‘s funeral in Colombia because of the lack of 
documents to return to the UK. In these cases, I told the interviewees that they did not 
have to talk about that if they did not want to and tried to quickly move on to a different 
issue79. Although I had prepared a list of key themes and questions, I let the 
interviewees talk for as long as they wanted and expand on any experience they found 
particularly important. In this way not only did I obtain answers to all my key questions 
but I also learned much more about the context in which these particular experiences 
took place.  
 
Tracing households back to Colombia 
Since the aim of this research is to trace migrants‘ transnational practices along the 
geography of the migration network and thus, connect subjects to multiple sites and 
geographical scales, at the end of each interview, I asked migrants if they were willing 
to put me in touch with their relatives in Colombia. I explained to them that my research 
sought to examine the impacts of migration and remittances at both ends of the 
migration network and that I was interested in tracing families back to Colombia, as I 
put it, ‗in order understand what was happening on the other side‘. I made it clear to 
them that this was strictly voluntary and that the information provided by their relatives 
would also be treated with care and confidentiality. I also clarified the fact that I was not 
going to talk to their relatives about what they had just told me during the interviews. I 
thought that providing this kind of assurance was particularly important because it was 
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 It is often difficult to foresee which topics or questions are going to elicit strong emotional 
reactions. One of the most difficult types of interviews are those in which the participant 
becomes tearful or cries (Kitson et al. 1996; Rubin and Rubin 2005). However, one is never fully 
prepared or trained on how to react in these circumstances. As some scholars have pointed out, 
although issues around the researcher‘s positionality have been widely discussed in the social 
science literature (cf. McDowell 1992; Rose 1997), the emotional and personal implications of 
fieldwork, for the researcher and researched, remain under explored (Bondi et al. 2002; Humble 
2011; Punch 2010; Widdowfield 2000). In order to deal with these uncomfortable situations, the 
best thing an interviewer can do is to tone down the emotional level of the conversation by 
returning to more descriptive, less emotionally sensitive questions (Rubin and Rubin 2005). 
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not always evident from their stories that their relatives in Colombia knew all the details 
about their lives as migrants in London. Potentially difficult issues included discussing 
the reasons they had for leaving Colombia, the nature of their relationships with their 
relatives back home, issues around the management of remittances, their family‘s 
expectations of them and the type of job they had and the social conditions in which 
they lived in London. In the cases where I successfully got in touch with their relatives 
in Colombia, the life histories that were recounted corroborated the stories migrants 
had told me in London. Generally, all the relatives interviewed seemed to have a good 
knowledge of the migrant‘s trajectory, current situation and future plans. I also asked 
them to recommend places to visit in their towns and cities of origin. They responded 
very positively to this question and I ended up with a long list of places/areas to see.  
 
Of the 21 migrants interviewed, 11 provided the contact information of their family 
members still living in Colombia. Two of the interviewees had only distant elderly 
relatives left in Colombia with whom they did not have much contact. The remaining 
participants expressed uneasiness about providing their relatives‘ information, they 
said because ‗they did not think that their relatives had the time or interest to talk about 
their personal lives‘. Most of my participants came from the Coffee Region of Colombia 
and their family members, whose information they had provided, were still living 
there80. I chose this area as the epicentre of my fieldwork.  
 
4.4. Research Methods: Colombia  
Although I had already defined the geographical area for my fieldwork, I had the 
contacts of some of the migrant families and I had read all the available information on 
migration and remittances emanating from Colombia, I felt that this was not enough. 
Before beginning my interviews, I wanted to learn/know more about the ‗reality on the 
ground‘, the context in which the relatively new socioeconomic processes associated 
with the high rates of emigration from the Coffee Region were taking place. I also knew 
that I needed to recruit more participants. In addition, although I was going ‗home‘, this 
was an area of the country I had never visited (I am from a small town in the Caribbean 
region) and I did not know anyone there. Based on the positive experience I had had in 
London in terms of accessing my ‗target‘ group and recruiting participants by 
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 In contrast to the anonymous nature of my interviewees, I do name the geographical locations 
(particular cities and towns) where I conducted my research in Colombia. There are two reasons 
for this. First, I delimited my research area to the Coffee Region because that is where most of 
my participants originated from and where their families currently live. Second, as explained in 
chapter 3, because of the critical role that coffee has historically played in the Colombian 
economy, that area has a very distinct history from the rest of the country. 
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establishing links with some of the institutional actors that had contact with them, I 
decided to take a similar approach to make an initial entry into the field. While 
conducting fieldwork in London, I found out that there was a research group in the 
Coffee Region of Colombia that had been active in researching Colombian migration 
for a few years: The Human Mobility Group. The group is part of Alma Mater, the 
Network of Public Universities of the Colombian Coffee Region and is based in Pereira, 
a capital city in the heart of the region. This group has an important local, national and 
international reach and works closely with a range of NGOs and other organisations to 
produce empirically-based research to influence public policy and actions that attend to 
the social demands generated by the migration phenomenon.  Since they seemed to 
be the only group in the country exclusively dedicated to the study of mobility, I thought 
that they had the expertise that I needed to complement my research. I wrote to them 
and explained what I was doing and planning to do. They gave me a very warm 
reception and offered me a space in their offices for the time I would spend conducting 
my fieldwork81. So, given this institutional support and the fact that Pereira occupies an 
important place in the geographies of international migration from Colombia to London, 
for the four months (June to September 2009) that I spent conducting my fieldwork I 
was based in Pereira. I used the city as a base but travelled extensively throughout the 
region and to Bogota to interview people.  
 
During my time in the coffee region of Colombia I spent a lot of time observing (and 
documenting in my field diary) what I perceived as migration-related political and 
socioeconomic processes in the area. I also participated in a number of different 
activities such as national and international conferences on the state of the art research 
on Colombian mobility and attended events related to my research. I heard about these 
activities through members of the Human Mobility Group. These activities included the 
launch of a pilot migration-for-development project for women in migrant households82, 
the launch of a television channel for Colombians abroad and a workshop organised by 
the International Labour Organisation as part of its MIGRANDINA project83. The main 
purpose of the workshop was to present the state of research and legislation on labour 
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 This arrangement did not involve any formal agreement or any kind of payment. Because the 
group is part of an academic institution, they usually host research students from other national 
and international universities.   
82
 This project was financed by AECID (Spain‘s Agency for International Development 
Cooperation) based on a promise made by the Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero, at the UN assembly in 2006. Zapatero‘s promise was the promotion of remittances as 
propellers of development. This was a pilot project taking place in Senegal, Ecuador, Morocco 
and Colombia.  
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 This project seeks ‗to provide institutional strengthening on migration issues in order to 
contribute to the development of the countries of the Andean Region‘ (MIGRANT 2011).  
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migration in the region and facilitate an inter-sector dialogue between the different 
participating agents in order to define a local strategy in terms of migration policy. I was 
also invited, by the director of the group, to participate in the field research team for the 
Latin American Migration Project, a project to advance understanding of the complex 
processes of international migration in Latin America84. It involved travelling throughout 
the coffee region to conduct ethnosurveys, detailed random household surveys that 
document the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of chosen communities, 
in order to asses the incidence and impact of migration. These ethnosurveys have 
been carried out in 10 different countries in Latin America. I accepted because I would 
not only have the opportunity to gain first hand experience in collecting a wider range of 
information linked to emigration throughout the region but also, I could potentially 
recruit some more participants for my study85. In the two weeks that I spent 
participating in this project, I achieved both goals. Not only did I recruit one participant 
for my research but I also learned a great deal about the lived experiences of migrant 
and non-migrant households and the socioeconomic and political changes that had 
taken place in the region in the previous decades, especially since the coffee crisis of 
the 1990s.  
 
Engaging in these different activities was a reflection of my enthusiasm and 
engagement with the research process. Although I have not explicitly referenced these 
activities in this thesis, they have greatly complemented by own research by providing 
me with a comprehensive understanding of the political, social, economic and cultural 
dimensions of migration in the Coffee Region and Colombia. I have tried to 
contextualise my findings within these wider regional and national dynamics and have 
made an effort to point to the dialectic relationship between these different dimensions 
of migration.  
 
Narrowing the focus: households, communities and field realities  
My original idea was to examine the socioeconomic impact of migration (and 
remittances) to (from) London at the household and community levels in the Coffee 
Region. By taking this approach, I thought that I could make an original and important 
contribution to the fields of geography and migration studies based on three critical 
elements. One, that migration from Colombia to London is regionally concentrated and 
the Coffee Region has the highest rate of emigration in the country. Two, I had traced 
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 This project is run jointly by Princeton University in the United States and the University of 
Guadalajara in Mexico.  
85
 As all the other researchers who participated in this project, I was assigned a certain number 
of surveys to conduct and was paid for them accordingly.  
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most of the families of my interviewees in London to this region. And three, the limited 
literature available had hinted at a series of changing socioeconomic processes as a 
result of the high outflow of people from the region and its resulting inflow of 
remittances.  
 
However, after being in the region for a few weeks, I realised that there were a number 
of problems with measuring socioeconomic impacts at the community level. First, the 
migrant families whose contact information I had were not concentrated in one specific 
area but were scattered throughout the region. Second, it would be difficult (almost 
impossible) to assess or isolate the socioeconomic impact of remittances originating in 
London given that, in any given community in the region, migration to the UK only 
represents a very small percentage of the total, compared to migration to the United 
States and Spain86.  And third, as one prominent local academic pointed out, 
measuring the socioeconomic impacts of remittances at the macro and micro levels in 
Colombia is quite complicated given that it is not clear what is to be attributed to 
migration and what is to be attributed to drug trafficking87. In light of these difficulties 
and the fact that one of the most important methodological contributions of this study 
was to explore both ends of the migration network by tracing families along the 
geography of the London-Coffee Region migration corridor, I decided to narrow my 
focus of analysis to exploring the socioeconomic impact of migration and remittances at 
the household level, specifically in the context of housing investments88.   
 
Recruiting participants  
Before going to Colombia, I identified some key actors in Bogotá, Pereira, Cali and 
Medellin and established contact with them via email. Most of them agreed to give me 
interviews. Apart from these contacts and the ones provided by the migrants in London, 
I recruited most of my participants through snowballing. Many of these actors in turn 
referred me to other actors such as other migrant households or acquaintances in the 
different sectors they belonged to such as the academy, the third and private sectors. I 
                                                 
86
 At this point, it had become clear that I also had to delimit the scope of my interviews in the 
Coffee Region to people with relatives in London and exclude these other important sources. 
Given that most of the research available had already focused on documenting the 
transnational practices of Colombian migrants in the United States and Spain, including these 
migrant households would have jeopardised the novelty of my research. 
87 Personal communication with William Mejía, director of the Human Mobility Group, June 
2009.  
88
 However, based on secondary qualitative and quantitative data, I have framed my empirical 
findings within the regional, national and global social, economic and political contexts in which 
they have taken place (see chapter 3).  
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was truly amazed by the power of snowballing in the context of Colombia. It seemed 
that every time I talked to people about my research, I would be referred to migrant 
families or key actors in the most unexpected places. For example, the owner of the 
house where I lived, was not only a returned migrant from the US, but she worked in a 
construction company and had a close friend whose sister was a migrant in London 
and whose mother she knew well.  
 
Yet, one interesting methodological insight that I gained throughout the fieldwork was 
that it was very easy to approach and arrange interviews with people whose contact 
information had been provided by colleagues who were easily associated with the 
academy, specifically with Alma Mater. When I tried to recruit people outside of the 
aforementioned channels, snowballing or institutional support, I failed. I placed signs 
explaining my research in the cultural centre of the condominium where I lived and at 
the university, but did not get one single reply. Once again, linking with the institutions 
that had had contact with the ‗target group‘, in this case, with an organisation that was 
recognised as a respectable academic institution, proved to be a valuable research 
tool. In summary, I recruited most of my participants through snowballing. My main 
points of access to migrant families in the coffee region were the family members of the 
migrants I had interviewed in London and colleagues at Alma Mater. Nonetheless, at 
the end of the recruiting process, I managed to assemble a diverse sample of families 
with very different trajectories and life stories.  
 
Interviews in Colombia 
I conducted a total of 35 interviews in Colombia, 21 with migrant families (6 whose 
contact information had been provided by their relatives in London89) and 14 with key 
local and national actors such as academics, local leaders, NGOs representatives, 
government officials and members of private entities involved in the remittances and 
construction businesses. All my interviews were conducted in Spanish. I structured my 
interview schedule based primarily on the information I had collected in London, the 
insights provided by some of the key actors and the reflections I had written on my field 
diary during the first few weeks in the field (the interview schedule for migrant families 
is presented in appendix 1).  
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 Although a total of 11 migrants in London had provided contact information for their relatives 
in Colombia, I did not manage to interview all of them. I could not get in touch with three of them 
and the other two said that they did not have time to meet me.  
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The process of interviewing in Colombia was similar to that in London: the place was 
decided in consultation with the participant (usually their home or place of 
employment), the interviews were recorded with their prior consent and these files were 
kept on my personal computer as password-protected documents. None of the 
participants raised any objections about being recorded. Each interview lasted between 
60 and 120 minutes. I did not interview the same person more than once nor did I 
provide any financial compensation to my participants. Table 4.3 presents a list of the 
key actors I interviewed in Colombia. Table 4.4 presents a list of the migrant 
households I interviewed in the Coffee Region90. As mentioned in the previous section, 
I did not encounter any difficulties interviewing the family members of the migrants I 
had interviewed in London. The life histories that they recounted corroborated the 
stories migrants had told me in London and all the relatives interviewed seemed to 
have a close relationship with the migrant and good knowledge of the migrant‘s 
trajectory, current situation and future plans. Personal details for each participant are 
provided in appendix 2. As in the London case, all names are pseudonyms. 
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 These are the sources I have referenced throughout this thesis.  
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Table 4.3: List of key actors, Colombia 
Name Affiliation Interview Date Location 
Fabiola Academic 29th May 2009 Bogotá 
Gustavo  Academic 1st June 2009 Bogotá 
Antonio NGO Representative 3rd June 2009 Cali, Valle del Cauca 
Manuela Academic  3rd June 2009 Cali, Valle del Cauca 
William Academic  17th June 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Carolina Representative of ‗Mi casa 
con Remesas‘  
3rd July 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Leo Construction company 
owner and member of 
National Association of 
Builders (CAMACOL) 
6th July 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Cristina State government  
representative 
21st August 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Daisy Local government 
representative  
27th August 2009  Palmira, Valle del Cauca 
Sabrina Centre for the Attention of 
Migrant Families 
27th August 2009 Palmira, Valle del Cauca 
Cristian Community leader, Cuba 3rd September 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Jorge Remittances Industry 17th September 2009 Bogotá 
Laura Construction company 
employee 
27th September 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Javier Bancolombia‘s commercial 
division for Colombians 
abroad 
29th September 2009 Medellin, Antioquia 
(telephone interview) 
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Table 4.4: List of migrant households, Colombia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* I have interviewed these participants‘ migrant relatives in London.  
Only Arturo and Graciela belong to the same family. 
 
Migrant households‟ socioeconomic profile  
In these 21 migrant households in the Coffee Region, there were a total of 52 people 
who depended wholly or partially on the remittances received from London. Among the 
most prevalent dependants were the parents, children and siblings of the migrants. The 
demographic composition and socioeconomic status of these migrant households in 
the Eje Cafetero is as follows: the average age of the remittance-recipients was 52. Of 
these, close to 54% were women and around 38% were over 60 years of age. The 
great majority of households, 90%, belonged to the lower-middle income strata 
(estratos 2 and 3).  
Name Interview Date Location 
Dulce* 1st July 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Graciela* 2nd July 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Claudia 2nd July 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Arturo* 3rd July 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Hilda 7th July 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Judith* 8th July 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Lucia 25th August 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Liliana 25th August 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Patricia 26th August 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Viviana* 27th August 2009 Palmira, Valle del Cauca 
María 1st September 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Oriana 7th September 2009 Dos Quebradas, Risaralda 
Carmen 7th September 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Fabiola 7th September 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Martha 7th September 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Eugenia 8th September 2009 Zaragoza, Valle 
Lina 8th September 2009 Zaragoza, Valle 
Jose Luis 13th September 2009 Anserma, Caldas 
Margarita 14th September 2009 Anserma, Caldas 
Yair 26th September 2009 Pereira, Risaralda 
Ana* 29th September 2009 Cali, Valle del Cauca 
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Demographic data Sample 
Other 
studies* 
Main dependants: parents, 
children, siblings 
  
Average age of remittance-
recipient (years) 
52 38 
Remittance-recipients: % of 
women 
54 56 
Remittance-recipients: % over 60 38 20 
% of households in lower and 
lower-middle income strata* 
901 502 
 
As is presented in table 4.5, this demographic profile somewhat resembles the profile 
of migrant households in the Coffee Region: most remittances are sent for the 
remitter‘s parents, children and siblings and around 56% of remittance recipients are 
women. In addition, around 50% of the migrant households belong to the lower and 
lower-middle income strata (estratos 1-3). In contrast, the average age of remittance- 
recipients is 38 years and only around 20% of them are 60 years or over (Barbat, 2008; 
Garay and Rodriguez, 2005b). 
 
Table 4.5: Migrant households’ profile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
 Barbat (2008) and Garay and Rodriguez (2005b) 
1 
Estratos 2 - 3 (lower-middle income) 
2
 Estratos 1 - 3 (lower and lower-middle income) 
 
4.5. Data analysis 
After each round of fieldwork, I fully transcribed all the interviews in their original 
language, Spanish91. While I was transcribing the interviews, I engaged in the process 
of ‗open coding‘ (Strauss, 2003) that is, highlighting key words and writing comments 
on the margins of the documents in order to ‗open up‘ my data to inquiry. These 
comments were related to what I found were interesting statements on the social, 
economic and political dimensions of migration and remittances articulated by the 
participants. In some cases, the comments were one-word sentences that pointed to a 
specific issue such as the (economic) crisis or education. In order to make sure that I 
had not overlooked any important issues, once I finished the transcriptions, I reread the 
interviews (and sometimes listened to the interviews again) and continued with the 
process of ‗open coding‘ where appropriate.  My field notes were an integral 
component of this process. I used my notes to document the experience of the 
research process, as a place to write about the frustration and satisfaction of being in 
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Because of time constraints, only the interviews extracts that have been referenced have 
been translated into English.  
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the field, a space for self-reflection and for documenting observations and first hand 
experiences of events or experiential data (Strauss, 2003). As Punch (2010) has 
observed, field diaries are essential to the research process because they allow 
researchers to capture the „immediacy and emotional impact of the fieldwork‘ and may 
ultimately ‗shape the research process and outcomes‟ (page 2). However, as Humble 
(2011) has pointed out, although emotions may provide useful insights into the subject 
area, a systematic account of these emotions tends to be absent from the research 
narrative, especially in the area of development research. Although I have not explicitly 
cited my field notes throughout this thesis, I constantly referred to these notes in the 
process of data collection and analysis, for they added nuanced details to my findings 
and reflections and provided clarification and sometimes direction.  
 
In order to begin identifying the key themes that emerged from the fieldwork and 
establishing connections and relations between them, I then printed all the comments I 
had written and analysed them thoroughly. Instead of ‗cherry picking‘ the quotations 
that supported my pre-conceived theories and ideas (Jackson, 2001), I identified the 
key themes and subthemes (which qualified and brought life to the main themes) by 
grouping statements together according to how many times they were repeated in the 
data. Once I had done this, I developed a document in which I cross-referenced and 
connected these key themes and I created a separate file for each of them with a link 
to their interview sources. Given that my interest centred on tracing migrants‘ 
transnational practices along the geography of the migration network, in the final stage 
of the data analysis, I engaged in an iterative exercise of comparing, contrasting and 
integrating all the empirical data I collected in both sites, London and Colombia. This 
final analysis formed the basis for structuring this thesis.  
 
4.6. Giving back 
Although qualitative methodologies as a research tool have allowed space for ‗situated‘ 
knowledge (over ‗grand theory‘) in Human Geography (Dwyer and Limb, 2001), 
questions have been raised about the unequal power relations between researcher and 
researched, because the former interprets the lives of the latter (McDowell, 1992). 
Instead of ignoring this reality, some scholars have suggested that one of the ways to 
deal with this shortcoming (not solve it) is to „make explicit the ties between local 
effects of global economic restructuring‟ (Katz, 1994) or as Massey (1984) had 
suggested earlier, finding the global in the local. Because I cannot presume that the 
findings of my research will accrue any direct benefits to my participants or provoke 
any tangible change in their (harsh) socioeconomic reality, this is what I have tried to 
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do in this thesis. Specifically, I have tried to expose the linkages between the 
Colombian government‘s currents effort to channel remittances to ‗productive 
investment‘ and broader global dynamics in terms of the financialisation of households‘ 
socioeconomic reproduction and development processes. Moreover, I have provided 
an explicit account of migrants‘ (limited) engagement with these efforts and the 
alternative ways, to the formal government programmes established for this purpose, in 
which migrants are materialising their dream of homeownership.  
 
I will also prepare a briefing document that outlines the wider policy implications of this 
study, at the local and national levels. I plan to disseminate this policy briefing to the 
Colombian Consulate/Embassy in London as well as to the different actors and 
institutions that I engaged with during my fieldwork. For this purpose, I have obtained a 
Santander International Exchange Bursary to return to Colombia. The purpose of this 
trip is to feedback the results of the doctoral study to the communities in which the 
research took place and the main actors who participated in it, among them, migrant 
families, community leaders and local government officials. This trip will provide the 
time and space needed to re-engage with the people whose voices are heard 
throughout this thesis. The aim is to obtain their feedback in terms of the main 
conclusions that have been drawn in order to consolidate and disseminate a report that 
outlines the wider policy implications of this study. Given the diversity of the actors 
involved, the feedback activities will be structured in two different ways: visits to 
migrant families and two seminar-style presentations at the local universities. The 
families will be visited on an individual basis while the institutional actors will be invited 
to participate in the seminars, which will also be opened to the wider community. 
Moreover, I have been invited to present my research in the seminar series of National 
Network of Researchers of Colombian Migration, which gathers academics and policy 
makers in Bogotá. This will be my way of giving something back to the people who 
generously gave me their time and, in many cases, shared with me very personal 
experiences and emotions. As Gill Valentine (2001: 50) has pointed out, „the least we 
can do [for our participants] in return [for their help] therefore is to feed our findings 
back to them‟. 
 
4.7. Concluding remarks 
The methodological approach to research taken in this thesis is inspired by the 
principles and practices of ‗Grounded Theory‘, primarily, by developing my theoretical 
framework in intimate relationship with the data I collected. The main methodological 
contribution of this research stems from having brought geography back into 
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transnational discourses by tracing migrants‘ transnational practices along the 
geography of the migration network. Thus, this research employed a multi-method 
approach to data collection at both ends of the migration network, London and 
Colombia. These methods included semi-structured interviews, participant observation 
and the collection of secondary qualitative and quantitative data in both locations. I also 
employed a set of methodological techniques such as volunteering at migrant 
organisations, participating in other research projects related to my topic, establishing 
links with local academic groups and engaging in informal conversations with key 
actors. Employing these diverse techniques at both ends of the migration network 
facilitated the process of recruiting research participants and sometimes, even enabled 
interviews to happen. More generally, these techniques allowed me to acquire a wide 
range of contextual and practical insights not available in the formal literatures and to 
gain a richer and deeper, more contextualised understanding of the linkages between 
the political, social, economic and cultural dimensions of migration. I have incorporated 
these insights in my work by highlighting the local-to-global connections of the 
transnational practices that flow through the migration network while privileging 
embodied accounts of migrant households‘ livelihoods.  
 
One important methodological insight that I gained in the context of conducing 
fieldwork along the geography of the migration network was that linking with the 
institutions that provided services to or run organisations on behalf of my ‗target group‘, 
migrant households, proved to be a very valuable research tool. The analysis 
presented in this thesis emerged out of an iterative exercise of comparing, contrasting 
and integrating all the empirical data I collected in both sites. However, I am conscious 
that this thesis represents my partial and particular interpretation of migrant 
households‘ lived experiences and the complexity of their responses to the policies of 
the state. By conducting fieldwork over space (London and Colombia) and stretching 
my analysis across scale (connecting global to local processes) I have attempted to 
„assemble a picture of the whole by recognizing diverse perspectives from the parts, 
from singular but connected sites‟ (Burawoy, 2000: 5). Although I collected many more 
experiences and much more information than I am able to document in this thesis, I 
have attempted to let some of that ‗experiential richness‘ (Cook and Crang, 1995) 
transpire in my writing.  
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The next, and first empirical chapter, explores the role of the Colombian government in 
rendering migrants as agents of economic development by exploring its official 
narratives around the use of remittances to finance housing investment at the national 
and international level. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Channelling Remittances to Productive Investment: ‘Mi casa 
con Remesas’ and International Housing Fairs  
 
This chapter explores the official narratives around the use of remittances to finance 
housing investment articulated by the Colombian government at the national and 
international level. In particular, it examines the role of the Colombian government in 
producing responsible investor-citizens through the promotion of the housing and 
financial sectors. It does so by providing detailed contextual information about 
Colombia‘s housing policy, the characteristics of its housing and housing-finance 
markets and the workings of two housing programmes that target Colombian migrants: 
‗Mi casa con remesas‘ and international housing fairs. By analysing the political and 
financial geographies of transnational migration in the context of housing, this chapter 
will unpack the ways in which the Colombian government is constructing migrants as 
transnational financial subjects, how these subjectivities have progressively been 
incorporated into the national policy discourse and practice and the degree to which it 
has succeeded in trying extend the national markets to Colombians abroad.     
 
It draws on qualitative and secondary quantitative data and interviews with a range of 
actors across the construction and financial sectors and the ‗Mi casa con Remesas‘ 
programme in Colombia. It also draws on the insights gained by participating in and 
observing a housing fair for Colombian migrants in London. This chapter also provides 
the context for understanding the interplay between the official narratives and the 
different views and experiences around housing investment of Colombian migrants in 
London and their households of origin in the Coffee Region of Colombia, which will be 
explored in chapters 6 and 7. 
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5.1. Colombia’s housing policy: recent trends  
The 1991 Colombian Constitution states that: 
 
―All Colombian citizens have the right to a decent home. The State will establish 
the necessary conditions to make this right a reality and will promote social 
housing programmes, adequate long term financing systems and associative 
forms of execution for these housing programmes‖92.  
 
Despite the creation of the Instituto de Crédito Territorial (ICT)93 in 1939, housing was 
not traditionally a top priority in national development policies (Gilbert, 1997) and up 
until the 1950s, the Colombian government did not have a clear and consistent social 
housing programme (known by its Spanish acronym VIS)94 (Gilbert and Ward, 1982).  
The approach to housing policy only started to change in the 1950s, when Colombia 
began a rapid transition from a rural to an urban society and housing problems in the 
cities became evident. In this context of rapid urbanization, the government sought to 
alleviate the housing problem by establishing large scale public housing programmes 
(through ICT) but these programs had limited funds and fell short of meeting the high 
demand (Gilbert, 1997, 2004). Since colonial times, land distribution in Colombia has 
been highly uneven; the private building industry has been geared towards formal 
construction and therefore home-ownership has been beyond the reach of the poor 
(Gilbert, 1998). In the face of a shortage of rental accommodation and the desire of 
most Colombians for home ownership, ‗self-help‘ housing on invasions and pirate 
urbanisations throughout the country served to cover the housing needs of the new 
masses in the growing cities (Gilbert, 1997).  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the government continued to build public housing through 
ICT but also followed the World Bank-backed approach of providing sites-and-services 
and squatter-upgrading (Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert and Ward, 1985).  The conservative 
governments of Misael Pastrana (1970-74) and Belisario Betancur (1982-86) gave an 
important boost to housing policy by making it central to their national development 
plans and expanding the construction of low-income houses (Gilbert, 1997; Gough, 
                                                 
92
 My translation. Artículo 51, Constitución Política de la República de Colombia (1991): ‗Todos 
los colombianos tienen derecho a vivienda digna. El Estado fijará las condiciones necesarias 
para hacer efectivo este derecho y promoverá planes de vivienda de interés social, sistemas 
adecuados de financiación a largo plazo y formas asociativas de ejecución de estos programas 
de vivienda‘. 
93
 ICT was the state agency responsible for building and financing government housing 
solutions. 
94
 VIS stands for Vivienda de Interés Social (Social Interest Housing) and refers to housing for 
low income groups. 
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1999).  However, by the end of the 1980s, ICT was highly indebted and a target of 
corruption and clientelism and the proliferation of self-help settlements throughout the 
country made evident serious flaws in the national housing policy (Gilbert, 1997, 2004).  
 
On the whole, Colombia‘s development policy in recent history has closely followed the 
guidelines of the international development and aid agencies such as the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank and USAID. Up until 1990, the approach to 
housing policy by national governments mirrored that of most Latin American 
countries95. The housing market was characterized by a formal building sector that 
supplied the needs of the middle class, a public state housing agency that built a 
limited number of houses for the poor and the proliferation of self-help construction by 
low-income households. 
 
During the government of César Gaviria (1990-94), Colombian housing policy changed 
radically.  As explained in chapter 3 (section 3.1.1), Gaviria‘s national development 
plan ‗The Pacific Revolution‘ laid out an approach to development that translated into a 
series of neoliberal economic policies that aimed to ‗integrate‘ Colombia into the global 
capitalist system.  This ‗revolution‘ gave the government carte blanche to liberalise 
trade, eliminate all restrictions on foreign direct investment and reform the labour code 
and the social security system. In this scenario, housing was to follow the suit of other 
sectors that provided basic services such as health, education, infrastructure and 
transport in which public sector participation was reduced (usually through 
privatisation) to allow the private sector to play a greater role in the provision of the 
services (Gilbert, 2004).  
 
Not surprisingly, the government quickly adopted the new housing model, the Capital 
Housing Subsidy Model, being pushed by the World Bank and the major development 
agencies which sought to „encourage government to play an enabling role: to move 
away from producing, financing and maintaining housing, and toward improving 
housing market efficiency and the housing conditions of the poor‟ (World Bank 1992, 
cited in Gilbert, 1998: 100).  
                                                 
95
 These are detailed in chapter 2, section 2.6.1. 
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The Capital Housing Subsidy Model placed a greater emphasis on housing finance and 
urban management and aimed to incorporate the private sector into the social housing 
market.  The model had three main goals: to minimise government expenditure on 
housing, promote transparency in the allocation of housing subsidies and encourage 
the poor to acquire homes produced by the private (formal) sector (Gilbert, 1997, 
2004).  
 
Under this model, the Colombian government ceased to build and finance public 
housing directly by transforming ICT into INURBE (National Institute for Social Housing 
and Urban Reform), and more importantly, it allowed the private sector to fully 
participate in the construction and financing of VIS. This new housing institution had a 
much reduced capacity not only in terms of its functions but also in terms of its work 
force. While ICT had 3,100 employees, INURBE only had 600 (Gilbert, 1997).  The role 
of INURBE was that of a mediator between the private housing industry and individuals 
(mostly the urban poor) and its main function was to allocate housing subsidies 
(Subsidio Familiar the Vivienda, henceforth SFV) to low income households for the 
improvement, construction or acquisition of privately supplied homes.  To qualify for a 
subsidy, households had to meet a stringent set of requirements such as having a 
certain amount of savings and be willing to take out a mortgage, among others. In 
essence, this housing policy transferred the responsibility for the provision of social 
housing from the public to the private sector.  
 
Even though a substantial number of Colombian households have benefited from the 
subsidy programme since its establishment in the 1990s, the subsidies on offer have 
not been able to keep up with the demand.  In effect, data from 2001 suggests that an 
estimated 80% of the total urban households who are not homeowners belong to the 
lower and lower-middle strata96, that is have family incomes below four minimum 
salaries (CONPES, 2002).  In other words, the majority of Colombian urban 
households who are not homeowners are potentially eligible to qualify for a subsidy.  
 
In contrast, fewer and fewer resources are devoted to finance this subsidy model. For 
example, Colombian housing subsidies represented only 0.6% of central government 
expenditure in 1998 and only around 0.5% of the total population in need of housing 
had been reached in 199597 (Gilbert, 2004). Given the high demand and the limited 
level of government housing expenditure in the country, the amount of each subsidy 
                                                 
96
 For an explanation of Colombia‘s stratification system, see footnote 47.   
97
 The comparable figures for Chile are 5.8% and 2.2%, respectively (Gilbert 2004). 
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has been overall quite small and people are increasingly reliant on the financial sector 
to provide the loans needed to access the houses on offer. Yet, this should have been 
expected given that one of the main objectives of the housing policy that was 
introduced in the 1990s was to open up spaces for the private sector in areas 
previously reserved for the state. Thus, in seeking to fulfil its duty to help in the 
production of financialised consumer-investors-citizens, the government‘s subsidy 
programme forces the poor to rely on the financial sector in order to get on the social 
housing ladder.  
 
In this scenario, the main problem seems to be the fact that most of the potential 
beneficiaries of the subsidies do not have the required savings to qualify for the 
subsidy or to make the down payment needed to access housing finance. This is not 
surprising given that the majority of the potential beneficiaries of the programme - 52% 
- have family incomes between 0 and 2 minimum salaries (CONPES, 2002). In other 
words, measured against the socioeconomic realities of the country, most of these 
households live below the poverty threshold and therefore barely make enough money 
to cover their basic needs and secure a decent standard of living, let alone accumulate 
enough savings to become homeowners.  
 
The current housing subsidy system 
Although subsequent administrations have made a few changes to the subsidy model, 
the key elements of the 1990s still remain. A summary of the requirements for families 
to qualify for a subsidy is outlined in table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Housing subsidy requirements 1990s and 2009 
 
* The potential beneficiary should have savings accumulated through a planned savings 
account (ahorro programado) which are tax-exempt or through an employee-mandatory 
savings account (cesantías). 
Source: Subsidio Familiar de Vivienda de Interés Social Urbana - Ministerio de Ambiente, 
Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial (2009) and interview with Laura Rojas, construction company 
sales advisor (Pereira, 2009).  
 
Under the subsidy programme, a household is defined as a minimum of two people 
that form a familial group such as spouses or de facto marital unions and/or a group of 
people united by kinship up to the third degree (uncles/aunts, nieces) that share the 
same housing space. The SFV is a once-in-a-lifetime, one-off capital payment for the 
acquisition of a new privately supplied VIS98. The allocation of the subsidy is performed 
by assigning scores to the competing households based on attributes such as income, 
amount and seniority of the savings available and whether the applicant is a female 
head of household. The higher the score, the more chances a household has to ‗win‘ 
the subsidy. Currently there are two ways of accessing the SFV, through the Cajas de 
Compensación Familiar (CCFs) 99 or the Fondo Nacional de Vivienda (Fonvivienda) 
which replaced the old INURBE in 2003.  
                                                 
98
 In theory, subsidies are also available to finance housing improvements (in which case the 
maximum subsidy is half of that available for acquiring new housing). However, in practice the 
majority goes to finance new housing.  
99
 Cajas de Compensación Familiar are regional, not-for-profit institutions that capture 
resources from private companies to provide social services such as health, education, housing 
and recreation to employees and their families.  By law, all formal sector companies have to 
contribute 4% of their total payroll for the funding of these institutions. These companies have to 
affiliate all their low-income employees, those earning up to 4 times the minimum legal monthly 
salary, to one of the regional CCFs. A similar type of organisation exists in Chile, although those 
can capture resources from the general public and operate pretty much like banks.  
Requirements 1990s 2009 
Household size = 2 or more     
Household cannot be home 
owners 
    
Household with poorly built, 
overcrowded or ‗irregular‘ 
houses 
                
Household income = less than 
4 minimum legal salaries 
    
Household savings available*  5% of value of house 10% of value of house 
Type of property to be bought 
with subsidy  
New or  
used house (on and off) 
New or construction on 
own land 
Housing finance UPAC-denominated 
private mortgages 
UVR-denominated 
private mortgages 
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CCFs channel the government‘s housing subsidies for its affiliates, who are for the 
most part, formal sector employees that earn between one and four minimum legal 
monthly salaries; that is up to COP$1,987,600 or about £662 per month100. CCFs 
allocate mostly subsidies for VIS.  Nowadays, VIS is defined as a social housing unit 
that costs up to 135 times the minimum salary or COL$67 million.  The value of the 
subsidy varies from around COL$2 million for a household whose income is four 
minimum salaries to around COL$11 million for a household whose income is between 
zero and one minimum salaries (Ministerio de Ambiente, 2009).  So, if the average 
price for a VIS is around COL$55 million, then the subsidy can vary from approximately 
3.5% to 20% of the total value of the house, depending on the income level of the 
family unit101. Fonvivienda allocates subsidies for people who for one reason or another 
are not affiliated to a CCF. The subsidies offered through Fonvivienda are mostly for 
Vivienda de Interés Prioritario (VIP), a type of VIS designed for the poorest segment of 
the population. A VIP can cost up to 70 times the minimum salary or COL$35 million 
(Ministerio de Ambiente, 2009). 
 
The requisites for applying for the subsidies through either channel are exactly the 
same. People who work in the construction business corroborated the fact that the 
number of people eligible by far exceeds the total subsidies available per year and so 
there is a ‗subsidy queue‘102.  They also suggested that it used to take an average of 
one and a half years to access a subsidy and that this waiting time has been 
increasing, especially because no subsidies have been allocated for VIP in the last two 
years.  
 
One of the curious facts about this form of housing policy is that the government has 
never defined what the physical characteristics of a privately built VIS should be.  
Although there have been a few reports of quality problems, the only requirement that 
the private building industry has to meet is the price cap established in terms of 
minimum salaries. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide a snapshot of the type of VIS and VIP 
on offer in the largest low-income neighbourhood in Pereira.  These are very small and 
basic housing units usually designed to house a family of four. The average VIP is just 
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 In 2009, the Colombian minimum salary was set at COP$496.900 per month or around £165. 
The exchange rate was approximately COP$3,000 per £1.  
101
 Data from Ministerio de Ambiente (2009), calculations by author.  
102
 Interview with Laura, construction company employee. Complaints about this problem have 
been persistent over time. A study revealed that SFVs provided by INURBE were estimated at 
only 12% of the total requested in 2001 (Gilbert 2004). 
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a little more than a serviced site with an area of 32 m2; a VIS is no more than a shell 
and core unit with an area of 50 m2.  
 
Figure 5.1: VIP, Barrio Cuba, Pereira      Figure 5.2: VIS, Barrio Cuba, Pereira 
 
Photographs by author. 
 
But there is an even more important structural problem that underlines the undersupply 
of social housing. Since colonial times, land and wealth distribution in Colombia has 
been highly uneven103. Yet, over the years the government has not done much to 
remedy this problem. Although several attempts at agrarian reforms have been made 
in the last two decades, they have had a limited effect on redistribution (Baer and 
Maloney, 1997).  This problem has been compounded by the rapid pace of 
urbanization that has taken place in the last forty years, a product of the rapid rate of 
industrialization in the major cities and the rural-bias of the long running armed conflict.  
Although in theory the government‘s housing policy has sought to alleviate the housing 
problems in the cities by providing a limited number of subsidies for poor families to 
access social housing, it has not set aside urban land for its construction. 
 
Therefore, in practice, social housing demand is not being met and the subsidies can 
only be used according to the available private supply of housing. There is clearly a 
high demand for VIS and even when there are subsidies available, many households 
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 The share of income going to the top 10% of earners was 51% in 1964 and 40% in 1991 
(Baer and Maloney 1997).  
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may face difficulties finding a suitable housing unit because private construction 
companies have little or no incentive to build VIS given that this type of housing has 
very little value-added and so does not provide much in terms of profits. Leo, a long 
term member of CAMACOL, the national builders‘ association, who is also the owner of 
an important construction company, summed up the problem well:  
 
―…Evidently, subsidies for VIS have been growing in recent years…that system 
has a good coverage, but not the kind that the country needs. Although the 
resources are apparently substantial, the reality is that the subsidies provided 
only make it worthwhile for people to access VIP and it is very difficult for the 
private construction companies in the country to provide that type of housing; so 
many subsidies are awarded but many are lost (not used) because the supply 
simply does not exist….Not only is there a problem with VIS in terms of the lack 
of land available for development but this type of housing has a very low value 
added‖. 
 
In their continuous effort to promote the construction sector as an efficient tool for 
employment generation and economic growth in the first half of 2009, the government 
introduced a new set of incentives for persons wishing to invest in a new house by 
subsidising the interest rates of housing loans regardless of income. The subsidies are 
administered and allocated through banks.  All a person or household has to do to 
access the subsidy is to inform the bank at the time of signing the mortgage 
agreement. The government then picks up a portion of the debt in question for the first 
seven years of the mortgage. The amount of the subsidy varies according to the price 
of the house.  The details of the subsidy are outlined in table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2: Interest Rate Subsidy Scheme 
         Source: Decreto 1143, Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia (2009). 
House price 
 
Interest rate (%) paid 
by government 
Mortgage rate (%) 
before / after subsidy 
Up to COL$ 67 million  5 15 / 10 
COL$67 – 116 million  4 15 / 11 
COL$116 – 166 million  3 15 / 12 
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Once the subsidy is applied, a household‘s monthly mortgage payment is reduced by 
roughly 30%.  In the three months following their introduction, 15,000 of the 32,000 
available subsidies had been taken up. The fact that this type of housing policy has 
materialised as ‗no-strings-attached‘ mortgage subsidies means that they are skewed 
towards the middle and upper-middle classes who are in a suitable position to access 
housing finance but only make up a very small percentage of the country‘s resident and 
migrant populations. 
 
The government‘s insistence on financing only new mortgage-backed housing and the 
absence of targeting of low income groups makes it evident that these aggressive 
measures have not been implemented with the aim of aiding families in need but with 
the sole purpose of subsidising the construction of housing with more valued-added 
and benefiting the construction and, by extension, the financial sector.  
 
These ideas are corroborated by people in the housing industry who readily admit that 
this new form of subsidy not only allows for greater profits but also sends a clear 
message about the importance of the sector in the economy and the government‘s 
commitment to providing the necessary conditions for a full recovery in the aftermath of 
the housing crisis of the 1990s.  In the words of Leo, the long term member of 
CAMACOL:  
 
―These subsidies are extremely important because they motivate construction 
of the type of housing that provides the most value-added. These subsidies 
send a clear message to the population that they can still trust the construction 
sector and also promote the growth of the sector. In addition, construction 
companies can get rid of the excess inventory produced by the 98/99 crisis, 
which provoked the bankruptcy of 40-50% of the construction companies in the 
country‖.  
 
This is not however, the first time that the government‘s tendency to favour the 
privileged has become evident.  As Gilbert (2004) points out, in order to prevent a 
meltdown of the financial system during the severe economic crisis of 1999, the 
Colombian government provided middle-class mortgage holders with a debt relief 
package that was 33 times higher than the annual amount spent on housing subsidies 
for the poor.  
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Colombian Migrants and Housing Subsidies 
As was detailed in chapter 3, in recent years the Colombian government has radically 
changed its policies towards its citizens residing abroad. Briefly, since the introduction 
of the new Constitution in 1991 Colombians living abroad have acquired the rights to 
dual citizenship, voting from abroad, representation in the National Congress and the 
right to be elected to Congress (Guarnizo, 2006a; Guarnizo et al., 1999). Since 2003, 
through the ‗ColombiaNosUne‘ programme, the government has actively sought to 
recognise migrants as a vital part of the nation and make them the target of public 
policies.  
 
Despite all these developments, migrants have not been fully recognised as a vital part 
of the nation and the public policies that have targeted them have been quite selective. 
In the case of housing policy, there are clearly some requirements that curtail migrants‘ 
access to the current housing subsidy programme104.() As explained in the last section, 
one of the requirements to apply for the SFV is that the members of the household 
have to share the same housing space.  In addition, if the subsidy is obtained, the 
beneficiary is required to be the owner-occupier of the property and is forbidden to sell 
it in the five years following the award. Given their geographical dispersion and the fact 
that most Colombian migrants are not engaged in temporal and circular migration, 
Colombians who reside abroad can not realistically be part of these households and so 
cannot access the housing subsidy. These structural deficiencies may particularly 
affect Colombians migrants in London.  Not only do the great majority of them (98%) 
still have nuclear family members in Colombia (Gaviria and Mejía, 2005) but also a 
significant portion of them (46.5%) come from the lower and lower-middle strata of the 
Colombian society (LatMES cited in Guarnizo, 2006b).  These are precisely the 
families that the housing subsidy is intending to help become homeowners. Thus, in 
practice, there is a mismatch between the state‘s role in producing investor-citizens in 
an era of growing financialisation of the process of capital accumulation and its efforts 
to expand the national construction and financial markets to Colombians abroad.  
 
In summary, housing policy has been historically used by the government to favour 
specific sectors of the economy such as the construction and financial industries.  This 
has been justified by promoting the construction sector as one of the most dynamic 
forces in the national economy and as an efficient tool for employment generation. The 
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 In contrast, although not without some strings attached, the government of the Dominican 
Republic has instituted a programme specifically for migrants wishing to return to the island. It 
gives them preference in accessing purpose-built housing units and grants them 60% of the 
down payment (Levitt 2001b).  
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re-positioning of the financial sector as the main medium to access housing, public and 
private, is just one of the latest instances of the state‘s use of housing policy as a 
political tool. In effect, the Colombian state has had a long history of protecting the 
interests of the dominant class. Since their creation in the mid-19th century, two 
oligarchic parties have controlled the political system and this has historically excluded 
low-income groups from participating in decision making.  Housing policy has not been 
exempt from this trend: the design and implementation of housing policy has rested in 
the hands of the national government (with the advice of the World Bank and the major 
development and aid agencies) in consultation with the construction and financial 
sectors with the persistent exclusion of the poor. As Gilbert and Ward (1985) have 
pointed out, in Latin America, the use of public housing policy to create jobs and 
sustain the private construction industry is one of the many instances in which the 
government may appear to be intervening on behalf of the welfare of the poor.  As will 
be explored in sections 5.4 and 5.5, the state‘s efforts to privilege the housing and 
financial sectors through the manipulation of housing policy have recently been 
expanded to include Colombians abroad by attempting to make them an integral part of 
a reconstituted definition of the Colombian nation. So how important are the 
construction and housing sectors to the Colombian economy? 
 
5.2. The construction sector and the housing market: characteristics  
The role of the construction sector in the economy 
In the last two decades, the construction sector‘s relative importance in the Colombian 
economy has declined from 7 to 5% of GDP and its contribution to total employment 
has dropped from 6.7 to 5.4% (Clavijo et al., 2005), one of the lowest in the Latin 
American region105. Similarly, the housing sector declined from 3.8% to 3% of the 
country‘s GDP. 
 
The rate of homeownership (the ratio of homeowners to the number of properties) has 
also shrunk in recent years from around 66% (Clavijo et al., 2005) in the 1980s to 50% 
in 2007 (CENAC, 2010)106. However, given the prohibitively high interest rates that 
characterize the Colombian mortgage system (around 13% in real terms), mortgage 
credit represents only a modest proportion of GDP and of total credit, respectively, 5 
                                                 
105
 In comparison, while the construction sector‘s relative importance in the Costa Rican 
economy in 2008 was similar to that of Colombia, its contribution to total employment stood at 
7%, almost two percentage points above the Colombian rate (data from CENAC 2010). Costa 
Rica also adopted a similar version of the housing subsidy model in the 1990s.  
106
 The comparable rates for some developed economies such as the US and the UK are 67% 
and 69%, respectively (Clavijo et al. 2005). 
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and 16% in 2005 (CENAC, 2010). This may either indicate that a big fraction of those 
homes are the product of ‗self-help‘ developments and may be of very low quality 
(Clavijo et al., 2005) or that remittances are playing a much greater role than previously 
thought in fuelling this market.   
 
In recent years, the government has designed and implemented programmes that 
specifically target the migrant population and their families such as ‗Mi casa con 
remesas‘ and the ‗international housing fairs‘ with the aim to facilitate the channelling of 
remittances towards housing investment.  However, the overall impact of these 
programmes on the Colombian housing sector has been relatively small and they have 
not prompted the kind of boom that was expected by the companies involved. These 
issues will be explored in detail in sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
 
The housing market 
In the last fifty years Colombia has been transformed from a rural to an urban society. 
By  the end of the 1990s, 78% of the country‘s population lived in the cities (CEPAL, 
1999). This rapid transition has put great pressure on the demand for housing and has 
generated an acute qualitative (quality of existing units) and quantitative (number of 
existing units) housing deficit. The national housing deficit has widened in recent years 
and it is estimated that the total housing stock needs to grow by three million (about 
one third of the total households in the country) to house every family. The shortage of 
social housing (VIS) is around 1.2 million units and the remaining 1.9 million represents 
the deficit for non-VIS (Clavijo et al., 2005; El Espectador, 2010b).   
 
Although the government introduced a housing subsidy programme (SFV) for VIS in 
the 1990s, public expenditure on social housing was still as low as 0.6% of GDP in 
2006, one of the lowest in Latin America107. As a result, the potential urban demand for 
the SFV has persistently been greater than the number of subsidies allocated.   By way 
of illustration, between 1999 and 2001, the average number of households that applied 
for the subsidy in each round108 was 167,000 while the total subsidies allocated only 
totalled 62,000 (CONPES, 2002). But inadequacies of the SFV go beyond the 
mismatch between the demand and supply of subsidies.  Since the system requires 
that households take up a mortgage to finance the difference between the market price 
of the property and the subsidy, many poor families who are allocated a subsidy are 
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 In the region, only Ecuador, Chile and Uruguay spend less on social housing (data from 
CENAC 2010). 
108
 Subsidies are allocated four times per year.  
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unable to use it.  Three main reasons account for this problem: households do not have 
enough funds to cover the down payment of the house (30% of the house value)109, 
their low incomes render them unable to make the monthly mortgage payments and/or 
even if they meet all the requirements, there is a shortage of affordable housing 
solutions, especially at the lower end of the scale (VIP).  
 
In addition, as mentioned in section 5.1, the allocation of the subsidy is performed by 
assigning scores to the competing households based on attributes such as income, 
amount and seniority of the savings available and whether the applicant is a female 
head of household.  In 2001, adjustments were made to the form in which scores are 
calculated with the aim to give more weight to variables more in line with the neoliberal 
idea of responsible investor-citizen. For example, variables such as available savings 
and regular contributions to the planned savings accounts went from representing 17 
and 2.5 % to representing 32 and 3.5%, respectively (data from CONPES, 2002).  
 
Placing a greater emphasis on the variables that measure a household‘s personal 
effort instead of more structural measures such as a household‘s socio-economic 
condition, is one more indication that the government has fully embraced the promotion 
of homeownership as part of a bigger agenda based on the making of responsible 
consumer-investor-citizens who are solely in charge for their own socio-economic 
security and success.  This idea of the responsible citizen has been materialised by 
positioning financial markets at the centre of individuals‘ and households‘ 
socioeconomic reproduction. This agenda has recently been expanded to include 
Colombian migrants through the channelling of remittances for housing investment at 
the national and international levels. So, how have Colombians historically financed 
their housing purchases?. What role has the financial sector play in helping 
Colombians realise their dream of homeownership? And how has the state shaped the 
functioning of the sector? 
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 Only up to 70% of the value of a house can be financed in Colombia. The issue of housing 
finance will be explored in the next section.  
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5.3. Colombia’s housing-finance market: characteristics  
Until the beginning of the 1970s, housing finance in Colombia rested in the hands of 
the government through two state banks, the Banco Agricola Hipotecario and the 
Banco Central Hipotecario (BCH)110 and the Instituto de Crédito Territorial (ICT)111.  
Mortgage funding came mainly from the national budget, personal savings accounts 
and forced investments by other private financial institutions112  (Cárdenas and Badel, 
2003). 
 
In an environment characterised by low economic performance and inflation pressures, 
the conservative government of Misael Pastrana (1970-1974) hailed the housing sector 
as an efficient mechanism for employment generation and economic growth and made 
it one of the four pillars of its national development plan and so housing finance 
became a central concern.  As part of this policy, the government radically changed the 
national mortgage finance system in 1972 by creating a set of new savings and loan 
corporations, Corporaciones de Ahorro y Vivienda (CAVs)113, which would stimulate the 
development of the sector. The CAVs were responsible for channelling private savings 
into the construction sector and providing UPAC114 denominated long term mortgages 
at low interest rates.  CAVs were given a monopoly over the use of the UPAC and 
given the underdeveloped nature of the Colombian money and capital markets at the 
time, they became the main providers of housing finance in the country (Cárdenas and 
Badel, 2003; Gomez et al., 2005; Silva, 2003).  
 
Although by the mid 1980s this new system had had positive effects on housing 
construction (see figure 5.3) by providing mostly middle-income families with stable, 
cost-of-living-adjusted mortgage payments, its success in terms of providing loans for 
lower-middle and low income groups was questionable (Cárdenas and Badel, 2003).  
In effect, the country‘s urban housing deficit (which tends to be concentrated among 
low-income households) almost doubled between 1973 and 1980 (Silva, 2003).   This 
should not be surprising given the highly unequal distribution of wealth and 
                                                 
110
 These banks were created in 1924 and 1932, respectively. 
111
 ICT was created in 1939 and was the state agency responsible for building and financing 
government housing solutions. 
112
 These forced investments were imposed by law on commercial banks, insurance companies 
and other financial agents (Silva 2003) 
113
 The literal translation of CAVs is Savings and Housing Corporations. 
114
 UPAC stands for Unidad de Poder Adquisitivo Constante.  It was created in 1972 as an 
indexation mechanism for savings accounts and housing loans provided by the CAVs.  UPAC‘s 
value was linked to the performance of a bundle of macroeconomic indicators such as interest 
rates, exchange rates and economic growth. 
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precariousness of the country‘s labour market and thus the inability of the majority of 
the population to comply with the requirements needed to access housing finance.  
 
Figure 5.3: Number of construction licences for housing, 1970-1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: DANE. Boletín Mensual de Estadística, 1993. Graph by author 
 
In the 1990s, Colombia‘s financial system was liberalized as part of the Gaviria 
government‘s (1990-1994) neoliberal approach to development which translated into a 
series of economic policies that aimed to integrate Colombia into the global capitalist 
system. As part of this process, other financial institutions were allowed to compete 
with CAVs in the provision of housing finance.  By the mid 1990s, these changes had 
led to a significant increase in the inflow of foreign capital, a short-lived boom in 
housing finance and construction and a rise in property prices115 (Cárdenas and Badel, 
2003; Gomez et al., 2005; Silva, 2003; Uribe and Vargas, 2002).  
 
By the mid 1990s, the inherent structural problems in the UPAC system combined with 
an economic slowdown, rising interest rates and falling property prices provoked a 
sudden mortgage crisis that spilled over into the housing sector (Cárdenas and Badel, 
2003; Gomez et al., 2005; Silva, 2003; Uribe and Vargas, 2002). As can be seen in 
figure 5.4, the amount of construction and housing licences issued by the planning 
authorities, continuously fell between 1994 and 1999116.  
                                                 
115
 This rise in land and property prices could certainly have been compounded by the money 
laundering activities of the drug cartels.  
116
 Except for a small spike in 1997. 
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Figure 5.4: Housing and construction approved licences, 1990-2008  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Data source: DANE. Información Estadística, 2009. Graph by author 
 
But the crisis not only affected the financial and construction sectors, it also had 
devastating social effects because a large segment of the population found themselves 
unable to make their mortgage payments and lost their houses. These problems have 
had long-lasting effects and even today still emerge not only in current explanations of 
people‘s inability to access housing finance but even as a powerful incentive for 
migrating. As Carolina, a representative of the ‗Mi casa con Remesas‘ programme put 
it:  
 
―Many people want to invest (in a home), but you find a number of problems 
that have no solution.  Many people are still reported on datacrédito117 as 
having overdue loans and so they cannot access credit.  The majority of the 
people that left (emigrated) did so because they lost their houses during the last 
crisis or they mortgaged it to pay for their travel expenses, so they don‘t have a 
good image of the financial institutions‖. 
 
In 1999, the government designed a new housing law that sought to avert the crisis by 
radically changing the institutional framework so that housing finance would once again 
fuel the recovery of the sector and consequently of the economy as a whole. Under the 
new law, UPAC was abolished and substituted for the UVR118, which was designated 
as the new indexation unit for long-term housing credits and CAVs were converted into 
banks (Cárdenas and Badel, 2003; Gomez et al., 2005; Silva, 2003). In addition, 
                                                 
117
 Datacrédito is a national credit database where a person‘s credit history is stored.  
118
 UVR stands for Unidad de Valor Real Constante (Constant Real Value Unit). It is an inflation-
adjusted indexation mechanism for housing finance.  
 112 
 
following the changes in housing policy that had taken place at the beginning of the 
decade, the new housing law also created a requirement for banks to set aside a 
portion of their mortgages for social housing (VIS) finance.  
 
The political orientation of different governments throughout the years has made no 
difference in the perception of the housing and construction sectors (anchored in the 
financial system) as a tool for employment generation and economic growth. The 
administration of Alvaro Uribe (2002- 2010) recognised the sector as one of the main 
drivers of economic growth in its national development plan.  Although the government 
vowed to increase funding for low income housing and promote a law that will 
institutionalise microfinance for housing, among others (CONPES, 2002), government 
expenditure on social housing remains among the lowest in Latin America.  
 
Currently, the Colombian housing finance system still follows the guidelines established 
in the housing law of 1999.   Overall, it can be said that the system is quite rigid and not 
very favourable for potential buyers: only up to 70% of the market value of the property 
can be financed (80% in the case of VIS) and the amortization (payment) periods range 
from 5 to 30 years.  In addition, real interest rates remain high, varying between 9 and 
13% per year, although there is a ceiling of 11% for VIS and 13.9% for other housing 
that is enforced by the central bank (Gomez et al., 2005).  
 
Nevertheless in the face of all these developments, the overall results have been 
mixed. Despite the fact that the UVR has proven to be a good indexation mechanism in 
the context of low inflation rates, housing finance in the country has not picked up.  
This seems to be the result of other structural problems such as the low credit demand 
associated with low levels of employment and economic activity and the lack of 
willingness on the part of financial intermediaries to extent credit to ample sectors of 
the population (CONPES, 2002). But the problem of the poor‘s inability to access 
housing finance seems to be the norm across Latin America. As Doyle (2006: 9) has 
noted: „housing finance in the region is largely inaccessible for the poor. Affordability is 
a critical and acute problem; over 60% of the population in most countries cannot afford 
a mortgage for the least expensive solution on the market‟.  
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The fact is that mortgage credit still represents only a modest proportion of Colombia‘s 
GDP (5% compared to 55-58% in the US and UK) and of the total credit portfolio (26%) 
(CENAC, 2010)119. Nonetheless, in the last few years, Colombia‘s housing sector has 
shown signs of recovery. Between 2002 and 2007, the construction sector‘s annual 
rate of growth was tripled that of the economy as a whole, around 13% (CAMACOL, 
2008). However, the current global economic crisis has had a negative impact on the 
sector and its rate of growth dropped to 1.7% in 2008 (CENAC, 2010). Given the dire 
situation of the mortgage credit market, this recovery has been associated with 
significant increases in capital inflows and remittances from Colombians living abroad 
(Banco de la República, 2004; Clavijo et al., 2005). 
 
In summary, despite the numerous changes introduced since the 1970s with the aim to 
boost the construction sector and position housing finance at the centre of the sector‘s 
revival as an engine of growth, Colombia‘s housing finance market remains shallow at 
best. The rigidity of the requirements and low levels of formal employment and 
economic activity have meant that in practice, housing finance remains out of reach for 
the majority of Colombia‘s population, who belong to the lower and lower-middle 
income strata. Thus, a closer analysis of the present situation of Colombia‘s housing 
finance market raises the question of whether recent attempts by the government to 
help the construction and financial sectors expand its consumer base, through the 
promotion of the housing sector nationally and internationally, is a response to the 
limited success of the different housing finance schemes that the country has seen 
over the past 30 years.  So, how is the government going about helping these sectors 
grow? And how successful have the programmes designed for this purpose been?  
                                                 
119
 Data for 2005. 
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5.4. Channelling remittances to ‘productive’ investment at the national level 
Since the 1990s, the number of Colombian migrants worldwide has increased along 
with their monetary contributions to their households and communities of origin.  At the 
same time, numerous scholars and international organizations have pushed for the 
recognition of a link between migration and development.  As explained in chapter 3, 
the Colombian government has tried to capitalize on these transnational links by 
attempting to make Colombian migrants an integral part of a reconstituted definition of 
the Colombian nation. As part of this trend, the Colombian government has embraced 
the idea that remittances can trigger economic development and has sought to channel 
them towards ‗productive investment‘ under the umbrella of the ‗ColombiaNosUne‘ 
programme. The main component of this ‗productive investment‘ is housing. 
 
However, a number of problems have been identified in the process of the acquisition 
and financing of housing on the part of Colombian migrants.  Apart from the official 
procedures that a resident in the country has to go through in order to buy property, a 
migrant has to incur additional costs that emanate from naming a representative in the 
country who would be in charge of carrying out the administrative and legal procedures 
of the transaction; sending the mortgage payments, credit evaluation overcharges and 
postal services, among others120.   
 
Given that a considerable number of Colombian migrants lack legal status in the 
countries of destination in the global north121, by far one of the greatest obstacles for 
migrants who wish to buy a house in Colombia is their inability to access housing 
finance in the country of destination as well as in the country of origin (given that they 
live and work overseas). In order to obtain mortgage credit, banks currently require the 
migrant to show proof of her/his legal status in the country of residence, labour and 
income certifications, tax returns and original bank statements, among others.   
 
In a nutshell, although there are no legal limitations that prevent Colombian nationals 
residing abroad from acquiring housing in Colombia, in practice it is quite a difficult and 
discouraging process. Not only do they have to incur great additional costs throughout 
the process but also in many instances, they find themselves unable to prove that they 
                                                 
120
 For example, the additional costs of buying and financing a new house for a Colombian 
migrant in Spain have been estimated at around 300% above the costs incurred by a 
Colombian residing in the country (Jaramillo and Mejía 2008).   
121
 Although there is no hard data available, it is estimated that between 50% and 66% of 
Colombian citizens residing abroad do not comply with the migration laws of the country in 
which they reside (Jaramillo and Mejía 2008).  
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have the capacity to meet the mortgage payments. In this scenario, the use of 
remittances to finance housing investment seems to be significant. A study conducted 
in 2004 found that close to 10% of remittance recipient households in the country‘s 
coffee region used a portion of remittances to finance housing acquisition and 40% 
used them to fund housing expansion and/or improvements (Garay and Rodriguez, 
2005a)122. Another study conducted in 2005 among remittance-sending migrants in 
New York found that 74% of them were saving money to invest in a home in Colombia 
(Gomez et al., 2005).  
 
Despite the prominence that remittances have gained in Colombia in recent years, only 
two studies have attempted to measure their significance in the housing sector. While 
Clavijo et al. (2005) only mention them in passing as one of the reasons for the 
dynamism of the sector after the mortgage crisis of the late 1990s, Cardenas et al. 
(2004) find remittances to be positively correlated to housing demand at the national 
level.  In addition, there are no detailed statistics on housing transactions with 
remittances that would allow quantifying the significance that these investments have 
played in the evolution of the country‘s housing sector and economy.  
 
In summary, although there are indications that investment in housing is a growing 
component of remittances expenditure, there is no definite and conclusive data about 
the impact of remittances on Colombia‘s construction sector and its forward linkages 
with the financial system. The next two sections will cast light on the role that the two 
main programmes that seek to channel remittances towards housing investment, ‗Mi 
casa con remesas‘ and the international housing fairs, have had in the current 
dynamics of the country‘s housing and financial sectors. These sections aim to unpack 
the ways in which migrants‘ resources are trying to be captured, whether migrants are 
embracing their newly assigned financial subjectivities through the housing market and 
the role that the construction and financial industries are playing in the design and 
implementation of these remittances-for-development programmes.  
                                                 
122
 The study was conducted among 2.400 households in the Area Metropolitana Centro 
Occidente (AMCO), which comprises the municipalities of Pereira, La Virginia and 
Dosquebradas in the state of Risaralda.  
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5.4.1. „Mi casa con Remesas‟  
The ‗my house with remittances‘ programme was created in 2007 with the aim to 
‗facilitate the creation of transnational family wealth among Colombian migrants by 
reducing all the obstacles they face overseas when they wish to buy a house for their 
families in Colombia.  These obstacles range from choosing a house and notary 
procedures to the acquisition of credit and the incorrect utilisation of remittances, 
among others‘ (emphasis added)123.  
 
Following the recommendations of the working groups on international remittances that 
emerged from the G8 summit in 2004, the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the 
Inter-American Development Bank set out to create a cluster of projects that sought to 
mobilise remittances to strengthen the global financial system. For this purpose, the 
MIF designed programmes around five main areas of work: remittances and housing, 
remittances and policies and legal frameworks, remittances and banking, remittances 
and productive investments and remittances and financial education and 
entrepreneurship training (Hall, 2010).  
 
Mi casa con remesas emerged as part of the projects that aimed to link the flows of 
remittances to housing acquisition in migrant‘s countries of origin by establishing links 
between financial institutions in the sending countries and a variety of actors in the 
receiving countries. It is a model of housing finance for people who receive remittances 
periodically from their family members abroad.  The MIF financed five remittances-for-
housing projects throughout Latin America: one in Colombia, two in Mexico (in alliance 
with Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal and Hipotecaria Su Casita S.A.), one in El Salvador 
(in alliance with Banco Agrícola) and one in Ecuador (in alliance with Mutualista 
Pichincha S.A.) (Hall, 2010). In Colombia, the programme is an alliance between by the 
Cajas de Compensación Familiar (CCFs), the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) and Bancolombia (Colombia‘s largest commercial bank).  It also has the 
political and logistical support of the government through the ColombiaNosUne 
programme. The programme is advertised as ‗a way to invest well the money that is 
sent to the family back home, consolidate wealth and build a future124‘.  The project has 
been widely advertised nationally (through radio, television, billboards and the regional 
CCFs) and internationally (through the international housing fairs).  The promotional 
brochure of the programme is shown in figure 5.5. It reads ‗Mi casa con remesas‘, ‗now 
your money sent from abroad represents a house in Colombia‘.  
                                                 
123
 Mi casa con remesas promotional brochure.  
124
 Ibid 
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Figure 5.5: Promotional brochure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The programme is available in the regions of the country that receive the greatest 
amount of remittances: the Eje Cafetero (coffee region) and the states of Valle del 
Cauca, Cundinamarca and Antioquia (see figure 5.6). 
 
Figure 5.6: Regional distribution of remittances 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Source: Mi casa con remesas promotional brochure. 
 
The targets of the programme are Colombian migrants worldwide and their family 
members back home. The programme is based on mortgage credit. The credit is 
available for buying new housing or for house improvements. These improvements 
may take the form of building additional rooms with the aim of creating an additional 
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source of income, typically through the creation of small businesses such as 
hairdressers and clothing and food stores. Thus far, it seems clear that ‗Mi casa con 
remesas‘ is based on the assumption (widespread in the migration/development 
literature) that families do not spend the money they receive in the form of remittances 
productively but somehow waste it in consumption that does not aid their process of 
wealth accumulation. So how can a migrant family access the programme? 
 
The workings of „Mi casa con remesas‟ 
Migrant families in Colombia can access the programme by obtaining mortgage credit 
directly from the regional CCF or Bancolombia.  This depends on the type of the house 
that the applicant wishes to buy and whether the title deed of the house will be in the 
migrant or the family member‘s name. For a Colombian abroad, there are only two 
requisites to access the programme: proof of being a remittance sender and having an 
immediate relative (first degree of kinship) in Colombia who is affiliated to one of the 
CCFs.   For a resident in Colombia, the requisites are: to be affiliated to a CCF, to have 
a family member abroad and to be a remittance recipient.   
 
The CCFs provide housing finance only in the case in which the applicant is a first time 
buyer and wants a new house that costs the equivalent of a social housing unit, VIS, up 
to COL$67 million.   S/he has two options:  
 If the title deed is to be in the applicant‘s name, then the total average of the 
remittances received in the last six months is counted as additional income to 
boost the person‘s ability to pay.  
 If the title deed is to be in both the applicant‘s and the migrant‘ names, then 
credit evaluations are performed at both ends.  In Colombia these evaluations 
are done directly by the CCF and abroad they are done through a broker of 
Bancolombia.  This modality of credit is restricted to migrants in the United 
States, Canada and Spain, the only countries where Bancolombia has offices 
overseas.  
 
Credit is available through Bancolombia in all other cases:  
 If the prospective house is not a VIS (prices above COL$67 million and below 
COL$120 million) 
 If the title deed is to be in the migrant‘s name 
 If the prospective house is used or credit is needed for house improvements 
 If the applicant is not affiliated to a CCF 
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In any of these cases, the bank can lend money to the remittance-recipient applicant in 
Colombia or directly to migrants if they reside in one of the three countries where it has 
brokers and offices.  
 
Looking closely at these eligibility requirements, one can envision a few problems.  On 
the one hand, although the idea behind implementing the programme through the 
CCFs was to facilitate housing finance to low income households, the very requirement 
of being affiliated to one of the regional CCFs means that in practice, a very small 
portion of the population may be able to benefit from the programme (this point will be 
expanded below). On the other hand, because Bancolombia is a commercial bank and 
anyone can apply for its loans, the terms and conditions of the mortgage credit it offers 
may not be better than those offered by other national financial institutions125. 
 
Although investment in housing is considered as a key element of social mobility by 
migrants and their families, current economic conditions in the housing market make it 
very difficult for the majority to make a change from one socioeconomic status to 
another. In theory the programme does not require people to buy a house in any 
specific housing development because mortgage credit is provided on the basis of the 
price of the property and not on its location. In practice, however, price and income 
constrains mean that options are very limited and that the great majority can only afford 
houses located in popular neighbourhoods. As Carolina, the representative of ‗Mi casa 
con remesas‘ in the state of Risaralda explained: 
 
―The advantage of the programme is that the person can choose the house 
wherever they want as long as it is a new house and does not exceed the social 
housing (VIS) price limit of COL$67 million and with Bancolombia, new or used 
houses up to COL$120 million.  All types of houses are on offer but we see that 
people want houses not flats, in gated communities with a pool – that is the 
dream everybody has – but we have to make them aware that houses are very 
expensive these days. Also the people who leave (migrants) want to improve 
their socioeconomic status and that is not so easy.  
…If you see, the VIS are located in Cuba and Dosquebradas126 and the people 
don‘t want to live there. The houses are small and have increased substantially 
                                                 
125
 There are three more financial institutions in Colombia that provide credit to migrants: 
Colpatria, Davivienda and BBVA (Jaramillo and Mejía 2008). 
126
 Cuba and Dosquebradas are popular neighbourhoods in the capital city of Pereira, in the 
Coffee Region of Colombia.  
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in value. Even though the subsidies have increased, so have the prices of the 
houses‖.  
  
The CCFs work closely with the bank in the facilitation of mortgage credit. Bancolombia 
is the only financial institution participating in the programme as a partner. So, if a 
person does not meet one of the requirements to access housing finance directly 
through the CCF, Bancolombia acts as a default for the provision of credit.  
 
But there are important differences between accessing housing finance through the 
CCFs and Bancolombia. Unlike a typical financial institution, the credit evaluations of 
the CCFs are much more flexible and tend to take a holistic approach to the applicant‘s 
economic situation.  Carolina, mentioned this as one of its main advantages: 
 
―The advantage of the programme offered through the Cajas is that at the time 
of the credit evaluation, we add up everything. We take into account all those 
other sources of income that families have: the woman who sells arepas127, the 
woman who washes clothes for people in the neighbourhood, the one who sells 
Yanbal128…we send out a social worker to verify all that…financial institutions 
are not interested in any of these things‖ … 
 
There are also other more interesting considerations that the CCFs may factor in at the 
time of the credit evaluation. These are to some extent related to the conventional 
wisdom or imaginaries of migrants‘ lives abroad, primarily those to do with the 
employment opportunities available to migrants and the occupational niches they fill in 
the countries of destination in the global north. In the case of women, the conventional 
wisdom goes, they are more employable because there is a high demand for labour in 
activities traditionally performed by women such as domestic work, cleaning and 
babysitting. Carolina went on to say:  
 
―Even the smallest details are taken into account at the time of determining the 
credit score: if the relative of the applicant is a woman migrant in Spain or the 
United States, then she has more employment opportunities than a man…and 
she is more responsible…We always look at the situation carefully to see how 
we can help them‖.  
                                                 
127
 Arepas are a type of cornbread, one of the main staples of Colombian cuisine.   
128
 Yanbal is a multinational company that sells mail-order beauty products. Many women in 
Colombia complement their incomes selling these products to their family and friends.  
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Nevertheless, to benefit from these more flexible terms of housing finance, the 
applicant has to be affiliated to one of the CCFs participating in the programme.  For 
the most part, affiliates of the CCFs are formal sector employees that earn up to four 
minimum monthly legal salaries, that is, belong to the lower and lower-middle strata 
(estratos 1 to 3, in the Colombian stratification system). Therefore, the reach of this 
programme is greatly constrained by the fact that around 75% of the economically 
active population in the country is employed in the informal sector of the economy 
(Méndez and Cuesta, 2006).    
 
In addition, as mentioned previously, by far one of the greatest obstacles for migrants 
who wish to buy a house in Colombia is their inability to access housing finance in the 
country of destination as well as in the country of origin because of their lack of legal 
residence in both countries. One of the main ideas behind the creation of this 
programme was to make it possible for a wider sector of the migrant population to 
access housing finance. However, to access mortgage credit through Bancolombia 
(whose eligibility requirements are broader than those of the CCFs), the migrant still 
has to show proof of legal status in the country of destination.  
 
Despite their more holistic approach to assigning credit scores to potential 
beneficiaries, the very strict eligibility requirements of the ‗mi casa con remesas‘ 
programme offered through the CCFs  (only new VIS housing for affiliates of the Caja) 
has meant that so far, the great majority of loans have been provided by Bancolombia. 
For instance, in the state of Risaralda, one of the major players in the remittances 
market with around 10%129 of the market share, only seven mortgage credits had been 
provided through the regional CCF by the summer of 2009 (out of the target of 400 
credits for all the participating CCFs)130. In contrast, Bancolombia had provided around 
400 credits in the whole country (out of the target of 600)131. Not surprisingly, around 
80% of the credit allocated by Bancolombia through this programme has been 
geographically concentrated in the areas of the country with the highest rates of 
emigration and remittances recipients: the capitals of the states of the Eje Cafetero 
(Pereira, Manizales and Armenia) and the states of Valle del Cauca and Antioquia132. 
The main reasons cited by the CCF for this disparity were that, although a similar 
number of people have applied for credit, they have been denied on the grounds that 
they have too much debt, do not have enough payment capacity or that there is an 
                                                 
129
 See figure 5.6 
130
 Carolina, representative of ‗Mi casa con Remesas‘. 
131
 Javier, representative of Bancolombia. 
132
 Ibid 
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absence of a direct family relationship between the applicant and the remittance sender 
to guarantee that the migrant will continue sending the money to back the loan.  
 
Another reason cited for the meagre success of the programme has to do with the 
direct negative effects that the recent global economic crisis has had on migrants133.  
Even under favourable credit conditions in Colombia (relatively low interest rates, 
government subsidies), the crisis has disrupted the economic stability of migrants and 
this has had a negative impact on housing investment decisions. Having recently 
attended one of the international housing fairs that took place in the summer of 2009, 
the representative of ‗Mi casa con remesas‘ summed it up this way:  
 
―A common problem for us is that people have the money to make the monthly 
mortgage payment but they do not have the 30% for the down payment and 
they want to borrow 100% of the price of the house and we can not offer that 
because of the high risks involved. If the financial situation had continued like it 
was two years ago, we would have people queuing up here to apply for the 
programme…We saw that there is a lot of expectation.  Migrants want to buy a 
house because it is their wish, they want to have their patrimony in Colombia, 
either for themselves or their families but right now the ones who are working 
do not have labour stability. For the ones not working, then there is the 
uncertainty of not knowing when they will get another job and also, they are 
afraid to commit now to start making the down payment of the house because 
they may lose the money if they stop paying during the first year‖.  
 
As mentioned previously, ‗Mi casa con remesas‘ has been widely advertised 
internationally through the housing fairs for Colombian migrants in the main cities of 
destination in the global north, New York, Miami, Madrid and London. One very 
interesting fact that has emerged in the two years that the programme has been in 
operation is that migrants themselves have not been signing up for the programme 
abroad. Although bringing the programme to the fairs has been done with the aim of 
targeting them directly, the majority of the loans provided for housing investment have 
been placed in the local/national market. Several reasons may explain this. One is that 
Bancolombia has offices or brokers in only three of the many countries where 
Colombians have settled, the US, Canada and Spain. That means for example, that the 
estimated 150,000 Colombians who reside in London, do not have direct access to the 
                                                 
133
 Although the crisis may have also affected the loans provided by Bancolombia, this issue 
was not even mentioned by the bank‘s representative during the interview.  
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programme. Another reason may have to do with the fact migrants might be buying 
houses for their family members who remain in Colombia and thus entrust them with 
the logistics of choosing and buying the property (this point will be brought to life in 
chapter 6). 
 
In any case, it is clear that the programme has not been a great success for the CCFs, 
but according to Carolina, the representative of the programme, many other important 
things have been achieved:  
 
―We have received funding until 2010 from the Multilateral Investment Fund 
(IADB).  The idea is that after that each CCF becomes self-sufficient to continue 
offering this product (mi casa con remesas)…Besides we have other goals: the 
simple fact of having united so many CCFs with Bancolombia and the IADB is 
in itself an achievement; the experience and the social impact that a project like 
this may render…For this project, we have been given a specialised credit 
score system to conduct credit evaluations for emigrants as well as the person 
who receives (remittances) – there are many things that need to be taken into 
account. In addition, we want to implement a software, have a virtual store 
where people from any place in the world can see which (housing) projects are 
endorsed by the CCFs and can call the family member here in Colombia and 
tell them to come to us…..All these things are value-added for us….we will get 
that and this would cost us a lot, so at the project level this is a win-win‖.  
 
Of course these stated goals are not the only purpose of the programme.  There are 
other more profound considerations at work such as the institutionalisation of the 
programme after 2010 (when the funding from the IADB ends) by allowing other CCFs 
and financial institutions to participate in it and further changes in the regulatory 
framework to allow for remittances to be channelled into an ever expanding range of 
specific products. On the one hand, the CCFs are aiming to offer a wider portfolio of 
services to migrants that can be backed with remittances such as personal and 
educational loans. After 2010, the idea is to „offer them (migrants) a complete package 
so they know that the money they are sending is not going to be spent just on 
consumption, it is that channelling the first objective of our programme‟134. On the other 
hand, in light of the government‘s push for the programme, Bancolombia sees 
participating in it as a long-term strategy for growth. Specifically, the lure of ‗Mi casa 
                                                 
134
 Carolina, representative of ‗Mi casa con remesas‘.  
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con remesas‘ emanates from its potential for allowing the bank to have a say in the 
modification of the regulatory framework that would allow them to offer more products 
and services to this newfound group of consumers. 
 
Although there are a few financial institutions that provide credit to Colombians abroad, 
the bank had already identified the enormous economic potential of the migrant 
population since 2001 and had become an important player in the remittances-sending 
business.  Javier, a representative of Bancolombia‘s commercial division for 
Colombians abroad put it this way:  
 
―We have been in the remittances business since 2001, linking remittances and 
mortgages since 2005-2006 (counting a portion of remittances as a client‘s 
additional income to enhance their ability to pay) and in the Mi casa con 
remesas programme since 2007…That programme seeks to develop a 
favourable regulatory framework for these investments.  You have to consider 
that the point is not simply to structure something to offer Colombians abroad, 
no. There is some sort of road map or integral workplan – it is not only a matter 
of providing credit, it is the issue of generating financial awareness among 
Colombians abroad and generating demand among the people who receive 
remittances – it is a much wider and integral agenda‖. 
 
And it is precisely this issue of positioning the financial sector at the centre of 
households‘ socioeconomic reproduction that seems to be at the heart of these efforts 
to channel remittances to an ever expanding range of products and services. These 
efforts are part of the wider neoliberal agenda of establishing a link between migration 
and development through the financialisation of remitters and their families and the 
establishment of the necessary channels for the release of the ‗investment potential‘ of 
remittances. The policies and practices that have emerged in this process are based 
on the premise that a great portion of remittances is bypassing the financial sector and 
so attracting remittance flows into formal channels is an effective way to manage them 
and strengthen the global financial system. The historical use of housing policy as a 
political tool, the repositioning of housing from a consumption item to a driver of 
economic growth and its linkages with the financial sector has made housing the 
perfect vehicle for the materialisation of these efforts.  
 
Inevitably, financial institutions have played a critical role in the government‘s attempts 
to channel remittances towards the housing sector. Bancolombia as the only financial 
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institution participating in ‗Mi casa con remesas‘ has been included as a partner in the 
programme because of the CCFs‘ small sphere of action. In particular, the CCFs lack 
the installed capacity to process loan applications for Colombians abroad and can only 
provide funds to their affiliates (who make up a very small percentage of the 
population). In addition, Bancolombia emerged as the best candidate because it was 
already an important player in the remittances business and it had began building the 
infrastructure needed to reach migrants directly. Including them in the programme was 
then a way to circumscribe the existing legislation that prevented migrants from 
accessing some financial instruments in the Colombian market.  Again, Javier summed 
it up: 
 
―The CCFs needed a financial vehicle with which to bring remittances to the 
country to make mortgage payments, so the bank was linked (to the 
programme) basically as a strategic partner to facilitate this and in addition, 
because we had some experience in the process they were initiating.  
All the people who work in this project have seen that the country is not 
prepared (in terms of the current legislation). We have had to work from the 
ground up. A Colombian residing abroad cannot have a bank account in the 
country like any other person residing here can.  The deposits are monitored 
because of money laundering but withdrawals are not allowed.  For example, if 
a Colombian resides overseas for 10 years and during that time rents his 
property here, he can have his rent deposited in his account but cannot use that 
same account to pay his property taxes, utility bills or anything else because the 
central bank does not allow it today. But now through the programme, a migrant 
can have a savings account with us if it is used to pay for a mortgage‖.  
 
As part of these efforts to modify the regulatory framework in order to expand the 
consumer base to Colombians abroad, the bank has worked closely with the 
government in the definition of the country‘s migration policies.  The Integral Migration 
Policy (PIM) was approved in August 2009 and sought to spell out the institutional 
reforms needed to ‗expand the portfolio of investment opportunities for Colombians 
abroad to allow remittances to be channelled towards productive activities, attract 
productive capitals and generate new businesses for the country, among others‘ 
(CONPES, 2009). Referring back to the fact that the country was not prepared 
institutionally for allowing these activities to take place, the representative of 
Bancolombia reflected:  
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―So the issue with the bank accounts…that is one of the obstacles for 
Colombians abroad in the current regulatory framework.  We have been 
working on that in this project (‗Mi casa con remesas‘) and we have even 
participated in the definition of the CONPES document – this document seeks 
to improve the situation of all Colombians who have emigrated, from different 
points of view: social, financial, economic, labour situation, organised migration 
and return – it is a very complete document which means that it has a lot of 
advantages but also disadvantages. Because it is so inclusive, each component 
may take a while to develop but it is very good because we are not leaving out 
any of the important aspects of this issue‖. 
 
Although many of these changes may eventually produce positive effects on migrants‘ 
socioeconomic welfare, so far direct access to credit is still restricted to migrants who 
have regular status in the country of destination and reside in one of the three countries 
where the bank has an office or a broker (the United States, Canada and Spain).  
Although the majority of Colombian migrants reside in these countries, in recent years 
they have increasingly searched for other destinations and their presence in other 
European countries such as the United Kingdom and Italy has grown rapidly.  
Therefore, this uneven distribution of resources means that Colombians who reside in 
other countries that have a considerable number of migrants but not enough to attract 
investment by the banks are not going to be able to access the mortgage credits on 
offer or any other products and services that may be available in the near future.  
 
When asked about their plans to expand to other European markets, Javier, the 
representative of Bancolombia, admitted that because of their economic significance, 
the bank‘s immediate interests lie in penetrating and expanding the products and 
services offered in the markets in which they are already operating:  
 
―We may be interested in other markets but the first thing that we are doing is 
consolidating our business in these markets (United States, Canada and 
Spain). As you know, approximately 70% of Colombians live in those countries 
and 75-80% of remittances come from there, so the connection is perfect.  It is 
where the initial market is, one that can be attacked, penetrated and expanded‖.  
 
In summary, the overall impact of the ‗Mi casa con remesas‘ programme has been 
relatively small on the Colombian housing and financial sectors, although other more 
long-term goals such as changing the regulatory framework to expand these sectors‘ 
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client base to Colombians abroad, is well under way. The programme has not fulfilled 
its stated objective of facilitating Colombian migrants the creation of transnational 
family wealth by reducing all the obstacles they face overseas when they wish to buy a 
house for their families in Colombia. There are a number of structural constraints in the 
programme‘s design and implementation that explain this. First, for the most part, 
migrants face exclusion from the programme based on their legal status in the country 
of destination. Second, to access the programme, the family member of the migrant 
has to be affiliated to one of the national ‗Cajas de Compensación Familiar, CCFs‘ but 
membership in a CCF is usually restricted to people employed in the formal sector of 
the economy, which in Colombia only amounts to around a quarter of the economically 
active population. Third, there is an undersupply of social housing in Colombia which is 
the target of this programme. Since most Colombian migrants in London belong to the 
lower and lower-middle socioeconomic classes, the significance of the programme 
among this population has been negligible. Finally, the programme‘s reach is quite 
limited geographically and it is overtly focused in the countries that have historically 
absorbed the majority of Colombian migrants (the USA and Spain) while other places 
such as London with a significant presence of Colombians are lagging behind. 
 
5.5. Channelling remittances to ‘productive’ investment at the international level 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the Colombian government has embraced the migration-
for-development discourse emanating from the international development and aid 
agencies. The government has gone a step further than many other sending states and 
it has put its weight behind the institutionalisation of transnational housing investments 
by promoting and facilitating the expansion of the national property (and financial) 
markets to Colombians abroad. Its efforts to channel remittances towards ‗productive 
investment‘ have gone beyond the national context (through ‗Mi casa con remesas‘) 
and into the international arena through the promotion of housing / property fairs for 
Colombian migrants. Since 2005, the government has been sponsoring these fairs for 
Colombians in their main cities of destination in the global north, New York, Miami, 
Madrid and London; thus creating and sustaining a new transnational socioeconomic 
space.  
 
The fairs in New York, Miami and Madrid have taken place continuously since 2005. 
The fairs in London began in 2008. The fairs are organised either by CAMACOL, the 
national builders‘ association or by La Lonja, an umbrella organisation for property 
developers and agents. They are widely advertised in a variety of media outlets and 
usually make a heavy use of the Colombian flag. Figure 5.7 shows some promotional 
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material for the fairs organised in London in 2008, one by La Lonja (left) and one by 
CAMACOL (right).   
 
Figure 5.7: International housing fairs promotional brochures 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The government has been supporting these fairs since they began, sometimes 
financially but always logistically.  This support has been channelled through the 
Consulates and Embassies and Proexport, the government agency for the promotion of 
exports, tourism and foreign investment in Colombia. The consuls and ambassadors 
usually attend the fairs and some have even had the presence of the Colombian 
president, such as the fair in New York in 2005.  
 
The Colombian government has backed these international housing fairs for the same 
reason it has backed ‗Mi casa con remesas‘, as part of its efforts to channel 
remittances towards ‗productive investment‘.  The reasoning behind these policies is in 
line with the prevailing idea, among government officials and people directly or 
indirectly involved in the remittances business, that they have to be channelled towards 
‗productive use‘ (so that they can aid development) because they are being ‗wasted in 
consumption‘135. As Leo, the owner of an important construction company in Pereira 
who has participated in the fairs since they began eloquently put it:  
 
―The phenomenon that has occurred in the last few years and continues to 
occur today is that people send money to their family member and the money 
                                                 
135
 This conventional wisdom on remittances has been articulated not only in a variety of official 
documents but was also repeated by some of the key actors and other lay people I interacted 
with during the field research.  
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gets lost…and that is one of the persistent phenomena regarding 
remittances…so what we try to do through the fairs is to channel all that 
investment by the migrant so that it can be applied to the synergies of the 
regional economy and it is not spent only in bars and these types of things‖.  
 
Given the geographical dispersion of buyers and sellers, one of the motivations behind 
the international housing fairs is to ‗bring the market to the buyers‘. On the one hand, 
they provide a space for the demand (migrants) to meet the supply (builders).  On the 
other hand, they facilitate migrants‘ access to direct information and seek to generate 
trust based on the official backing of the government. Even though the fairs are 
reaching migrants directly, the family left behind still seems to be playing an important 
role in the housing investment decision. When asked about the advantages for a 
migrant of buying a house in one of the fairs instead of through the family member in 
Colombia, Leo went on to say:  
 
―Well, it would be like getting the groceries delivered to your door. It‘s about 
bringing the entire portfolio to them so that they (migrants) can have the option 
of choosing first hand what they think is the best option.  However, they are 
always, always communicating with Colombia. You are serving a family in the 
stand (at the fair) and they are immediately calling their relatives in Colombia – 
do you know this company? Why don‘t you go and take a look at what they 
have to offer?‖.  
 
This finding should not be surprising, after all similar dynamics have been observed in 
the implementation phase of ‗Mi casa con remesas‘. Given that the migrant resides 
abroad, the majority of housing investments tend to be made for the immediate benefit 
of the family members back home. Surveys conducted in some of these property fairs 
indicate that around half of the houses sold would be occupied by the family members 
of the migrant, around one quarter would be rented out and in the remainder 25%, the 
migrant would be the owner-occupier (Jaramillo and Mejía 2008). Another study 
conducted among Colombian banks that provide mortgages to Colombian nationals 
living abroad revealed that the majority of their clients overseas (between 62 and 80%) 
invest in homes for the primary use of their families in Colombia (Gomez et al. 2005). 
So, to what extent have these remittances for housing programmes been successful in 
easing the process of buying a house from abroad? What are the legal procedures that 
Colombians abroad have to follow if they wish to buy property without engaging with 
these programmes?  
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Buying a house from abroad: the current legal framework 
For legal purposes, Colombian nationals who reside overseas for more than six months 
are considered non-residents; therefore most migrants fall into this category. 
Colombian migrants who acquire property in the country have the option of registering 
(or not) the purchase as a foreign investment. This is the case regardless of whether 
mortgage credit is obtained through one of the country‘s financial institutions or 
overseas. Registering the transaction as a foreign investment guarantees the buyer 
favourable conditions for the eventual repatriation of the profits made from the 
property136. Nonetheless, this registration involves naming a representative in the 
country and a series of legal and administrative procedures that may impose additional 
costs on the buyer. Thus, most Colombians residing abroad do not register their 
property purchases as such.  
 
Any transaction involving the influx of foreign currency into the country, has to be 
channelled through one of the intermediaries in the exchange market such as banks, 
financial corporations and money exchange houses and they have to be reported to the 
Central Bank (Banco de la República). Housing purchases by Colombians abroad 
began to be recorded in 2005 under the numeral 1812 of the exchange market 
balance, ‗worker remittances for housing acquisition‘137. Since then, these transactions 
have grown slowly and have totalled around 800 million dollars. As shown in figure 5.8, 
the official estimate of the amount of remittances that enters the country to finance 
housing purchases is still a very insignificant proportion of the total amount of money 
that migrants send to their families back home, an average of 3.71%138.  
 
                                                 
136
 These may mean a capital tax exemption on entry and exit of the country.  
137
 The exchange market balance records the transactions in foreign currency in and out of the 
country. The numeral 1812 refers to ‗foreign currency sent by Colombian workers overseas for 
housing acquisition which is not registered as foreign investment‘ (Banco de la República 2009). 
138
 Calculation by author.  
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Figure 5.8: Remittances for housing purchases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
* Remittances for housing purchases until September 2009. 
Data sources: Remesas para adquisición de vivienda, serie estadística
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Graph by author. 
 
The small size of the official figure for remittances for housing purchases is hardly 
surprising given the different obstacles faced my migrants in the acquisition and 
financing of housing (see section 5.4), the centrality of migrant‘s family members back 
home in the process of choosing and buying of property and the fact that the statistic 
only records the housing purchases made by Colombians abroad through formal 
channels. This seems to be compounded by the fact that the many Colombians abroad 
feel overwhelmed by the process of acquiring property back home. A study conducted 
among Colombian migrants in the tri-state area of the US (New York, New Jersey and 
Connecticut) found that only 24 percent felt confident about the process of purchasing 
a house in their home country (Gomez et al., 2005). 
 
However, as explained in section 5.4, there are indications that investment in housing 
is a growing component of remittances expenditure and field research suggests that a 
significant number of Colombian migrants have invested in housing back home albeit 
using alternative channels (this will discussed in detail in chapter 6).  Against this 
backdrop, the next section draws on the author‘s participant-observation in a 
housing/property fair for Colombian migrants in London. It explores the workings of the 
fair, the degree to which migrants in London engaged with it and the ways in which this 
new transnational socioeconomic space is being articulated.   
                                                 
139
 Maria M. Collazos, personal communication via email. 
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5.5.1. International property fair: „Donde vivir e invertir en Colombia‟ 
‗Donde vivir e invertir en Colombia‘ – Feria de la vivienda y otras edificaciones (Where 
to live and invest in Colombia – Housing fair (and other buildings) was the second 
international housing fair for Colombian migrants in the United Kingdom140. It took place 
in London between 27th and 28th September 2008 in the midst of the global credit crisis.   
 
The fair was organized by Colombia‘s Association of Builders (CAMACOL) in 
collaboration with the Colombian Consulate and Embassy in the UK, through the 
ColombiaNosUne programme. It was officially sponsored by the Colombian Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and Environment, Housing and Territorial Development, Proexport 
and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).  See figure 5.9 for a snapshot. 
 
Figure 5.9: ColombiaNosUne stand  
 
 
Photograph by author. 
 
The fair was widely advertised throughout the city via poster displays in the areas with 
high concentration of Colombians such as Elephant and Castle and the Seven Sisters 
Market, publicity in the main Latin radio stations and Spanish newspapers in London 
and via the internet in programmes such as ‗En Contacto - TV Magazine‘.  The 
promotional material of the fair was similar to the one used in other places such as 
Miami and New York.  As shown in figure 5.10, the London event was advertised as a 
fair for „people who are far away from home and want to invest in their motherland‟. 
 
                                                 
140
 There had been another much smaller fair in London in May 2008 organised by La Lonja.  
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Figure 5.10: Donde vivir e invertir en Colombia – banner 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph by author. 
 
The fair had the participation of twenty Colombian property developers; two financial 
institutions, BBVA and Davivienda (one of country‘s biggest and oldest housing 
financing institutions) and an international mortgage credit corporation (see figure 5.11 
for a snapshot).  
 
Figure 5.11: Donde vivir e invertir en Colombia – stands  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph by author.  
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All types of properties were on offer, from social housing units to luxury homes. There 
were housing solutions available for all budgets, from COP$34 million (£9,000) to 
COP$475 million (£134,000).  It became evident throughout the event that migrants 
from all socioeconomic backgrounds were present at the fair. 
 
Davivienda and BBVA (Colombia) are the only Colombian financial institutions that 
have brokers in London and therefore can lend directly to Colombian migrants in the 
city141. On the day of the fair, they were pre-approving mortgages in minutes. The credit 
conditions were the same as those available to Colombian residents: financing up to 
70% of the market value of the property, amortisation periods between 5 and 30 years 
and fixed or inflation-adjusted mortgage payments. However, unlike credit provided to 
Colombian residents in the national financial system, migrants were not required to 
have a guarantor.  
 
The documents needed to obtain a mortgage were: 
- Colombian ID 
- Proof of legal status in the UK (citizenship, residence permit or work visa) 
- Proof of the ability to pay the mortgage such as a job contract  
- Payment slips for the past 3 months or P60 
- Bank statements for the past 3 months (if available) 
- Credit history in the country of residence. 
- Receipts of the remittances sent to Colombia in the previous 6 months  
 
When asked about the need for legal status to access credit, a representative of one of 
the banks replied: ‗we cannot finance a house for a person who is not legally in the UK, 
but there are other options with other Colombian financing institutions, maybe with the 
CCFs‘.  However, additional information collected in the field proved that this is not the 
case: CCFs do not lend directly to migrants because they do not have the installed 
capacity to do so142 and all the other financial institutions that offer credit to Colombians 
abroad such as Bancolombia also demand it (Jaramillo and Mejía, 2008).  As stated in 
section 5.4, one of the greatest obstacles for migrants to acquire housing is their 
inability to access housing finance. Clearly many of these requirements are out of 
reach for many Colombians in London who lack the necessary legal status and 
therefore, some of the other requirements such as a job contract and credit history.  
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 Credit for migrants is legally provided by the Colombian financial institution. The broker only 
facilitates the transaction by conducting the credit check and verifying all the requested 
documents.  
142
 See section 5.4.1. 
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During the fair, a number of presentations that tackled different issues related to 
investing in Colombia took place.  One of the interventions was made by the General 
Manager of CAMACOL, Eduardo Loaiza. He highlighted the important role that the 
government‘s support has played in the success of the international fairs that had taken 
place since 2005 in other cities in the global north. The emphasis of the talk was on 
how much the Colombian economy and the security situation had improved in the 
country in the last five years. The presenter also boasted about the economic 
multiplying effect of the construction sector. He emphasised the fact that investing in a 
house in Colombia creates jobs because 94% of the construction inputs are 
manufactured in the country. He also insisted that the use of formal channels to access 
housing finance was key in aiding the recovery of the sector and of the economy as a 
whole.  
 
Another key intervention during the fair was that of the Colombian ambassador in the 
UK, Noemi Sanín and the Colombian consul in London, Any Vásquez. The 
ambassador gave a speech at the end of the first day of the fair. She opened her 
intervention by singing the national anthem (see figure 5.12). 
 
Figure 5.12: Colombian ambassador singing the Colombian national anthem 
 
   Photograph by author. 
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The ambassador highlighted the change in government policies towards Colombians 
living abroad, particularly the creation of the ColombiaNosUne project by saying: ‗unlike 
before, the Colombians who leave the country now still remain a part of it‘. She went on 
to say: ‗thanks to the Democratic Security Policy of our president, Alvaro Uribe, we 
have regained the trust of foreign investors and this has made our economy grow, has 
helped create more jobs and has improved the image of our country‘; ‗it is worth buying 
property there‘. She continued: ‗just a few years ago, sending remittances to Colombia 
was very costly and sometimes they even got lost on the way‘; ‗now these funds (4.300 
millions of US dollars per year) are sustaining the Colombian economy‘; ‗we 
understand that money being sent to the country is not the leftover income of the 
migrants, it is in fact a big portion of the little money they earn‘. ‗These fairs came about 
because we wanted to give Colombians overseas the opportunity to invest in the 
country without having to leave the country where they reside‘. ‗Many people would like 
to go back to Colombia, but they would like to have their own house to go back to‘. 
‗Migrant workers are very brave people, and the only certain thing about international 
migration is that every time a person leaves (regardless of the reason), there is a 
broken family‘. ‗We‘re very proud of our fellow Colombians living abroad‘.  
 
The issues highlighted in both of these interventions were the running themes 
throughout the fair. There was a constant emphasis being placed on the contribution of 
the housing sector to the country‘s economic stability and how migrants could 
contribute to it by buying property in the country while alluding to migrants‘ loyalty to 
their families back home and a potential return to a future in the ‗new‘ Colombia. Also, 
emphasis was placed on the efforts made by Uribe‘s government to incorporate 
migrants into the nation not only by bringing these ‗magnificent‘ opportunities to them 
but also by mobilising all the state resources to facilitate the maintenance of their 
transnational connections with the homeland. In this vein, other products and services 
for Colombians abroad were also being advertised in the fair, either in specific stands 
or via fliers. They were all-encompassing and ranged from pensions, health and 
education to furniture, financial products and car loans.  
 
According to the press release on the fair‘s website143, the London event was a 
success: more than 1,000 Colombians attended the fair and the sales made surpassed 
those of the fair that took place in Miami also in September 2008. The total amount 
sold in the London fair (US$8 million) was almost the same as the amount sold in the 
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 http://www.feriascamacol.com/  
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New York fair in the middle of September 2008 (US$9.7 million). This was quite 
remarkable, given the long history of Colombian migration to the US. In the words of 
one of the organizers: ‗this is a very significant amount of money, given that more than 
1 million Colombians reside in New York as compared to the 140,000 Colombians in 
London. This is one more indication that the Colombians in the UK have a higher 
purchasing power‘. Because of these good results, a second fair in London was 
immediately announced for 2009.  The announced fair organised by CAMACOL did not 
take place in 2009. 
 
However, the Bogotá-based organisation for property developers and agents, La Lonja, 
organised fairs in London and Madrid in June 2009. According to the fair‘s website, 
despite the difficult economic situation in both countries, the events were a success 
which proved that Colombians abroad maintain strong ties with their homeland. 
However, according to Leo, the owner of an important construction company in the 
coffee region that participated in both of these fair, the picture was not so rosy: 
 
 ―The fair in Madrid went reasonably well but the one in London was an 
absolute failure…in the two days of the fair, no more that 100-150 people 
attended. I attribute this to the bad organization and timing of the fair and of 
course, to the world economic slowdown. Migrants are having difficulty keeping 
their jobs and there has been a drop in the remittances sent home…that is a 
clear indication that our fellow countrymen around the world do not have the 
same possibilities they had two years ago‖. 
 
This may not be so bad for business after all because in times of economic crisis, 
migrants feel an acute urge to return home, he added:  
 
―In any case, we have to continue working to capture that market, especially 
now because with the economic slowdown and harsher immigration laws, you 
see an even greater desire to return home…so we have to make things easy for 
them (migrants) to return but to return to their own home‖.  
 
Regardless of the economic situation, field data suggest that the desire to return home 
is one of the main motivations behind migrants‘ housing investments (this will be 
explored in chapter 6). The government and the property developers are quite aware of 
it. The fairs‘ promotional material and the discourses articulated by the fairs‘ organisers 
and exponents make it evident that this is one of the most important issues being 
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exploited in the international property fairs. When asked about migrants‘ motivations to 
invest in property in Colombia, Leo commented: 
  
―We know that one of the main motivations for migrants to invest in housing is 
the wish to return home…none of the fellow countrymen with whom I have 
chatted in the fairs, none, has expressed a desire to stay in the countries where 
they currently reside…all of them wish very deeply to improve their lives, their 
incomes so they can go back to their country to lead a more comfortable life; to 
acquire what the opportunities did not allow them to (acquire) here (in 
Colombia). The majority of people want to return, they want to have something, 
even if the possibilities of returning are remote‖.  
 
As will be explored in chapter 6, regardless of whether the desire to return home is 
ever materialised, it seems that the very condition of being a migrant worker is, for the 
majority, the only avenue for realising the dream of homeownership. Although people 
from all socioeconomic backgrounds attend the fairs, the majority of their sales are 
made to migrants from the lower-middle and middle income strata. In addition, for the 
majority of the buyers, this is their first home and is bought for the benefit of the 
immediate family members144.  
 
The direct sales reported by the fairs‘ websites indicate that they have generated a 
significant source of income for the companies involved; US$8 million in London and 
US$9.7 million in New York for 2008. However, the international fairs have not 
prompted the kind of immediate boom that the companies involved expected. One of 
the reasons to explain this relatively small success of the fairs has to do, once again, 
with the fact that many migrants still prefer to make the purchases through their family 
members in Colombia. As Leo, the long-term member of CAMACOL explained:  
 
―It is not like we can say that there has been a boom in the sector as a 
consequence of the fairs, no. It helps to have access to that market; it is a 
strategy that is worth continuing. Apart from the direct sales abroad, it is difficult 
to assess exactly what portion of our sales is generated by the fairs. We know 
that many of the people who come here (to our office) have been sent by their 
relative who lives abroad (and may have gone to the fair) and are buying for 
them. If that is taken into account, maybe around 10% of our annual sales may 
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 Leo, owner of a construction company in the Coffee Region of Colombia.  
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be explained abroad, that is probably not so far from the regional and national 
average‖.  
 
Another reason for the rather small success of the fairs so far seems to be linked to the 
fact that only a relatively small portion of the country‘s construction and financial 
industries participate in them, around 30-40 companies in total. Whether this is due to 
income or logistical constraints is not clear. What is clear is that the practicalities of 
buying a house entail much more than a single visit to a fair. Many construction and 
financial companies have realised this and instead of focusing on the fairs are now 
trying to establish branches or alliances with other companies in London, Madrid, New 
York and Miami in order to reach a greater segment of the migrant population145. 
 
Despite all the support provided by the government, there is a feeling among some 
people in the construction sector that the government has not done enough to support 
these fairs. They believe that given the important role that the sector plays in the 
national economy, much more should be provided in terms of financial incentives so 
that a greater number of companies can participate in the fairs. Many of the 
participating companies have come to realise that the market abroad is much bigger 
than initially thought and that this is one of their strategic fronts for potential growth. 
Leo, summed it up this way:  
 
―I really think that the fairs are a strategic front for the commercialisation of 
housing…those clients there, all those people who require attention there, the 
numbers are staggering…I think that more incentives should be given by the 
local and national government to help housing developers attend the 
fairs…what we are doing is generating investment in the country…the 
government should sponsor more, subsidise the fairs so we can go en masse‖.  
 
Although the Colombian government has continued supporting the international 
housing fairs but has not officially provided additional help for property developers to 
attend them, they continue to take place. In 2009 and 2010, CAMACOL organised 
‗Donde vivir e inverter en Colombia‘ fairs in the Tri-state area of New York-New Jersey-
Connecticut and has announced fairs in Miami, New York and Houston in 2011. La 
Lonja organised ‗Invierte en Casa‘ fairs in Madrid and London in 2009 and 2010 but 
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 This was echoed by people in the construction industry, the financial sector and also by the 
representative of ‗Mi casa con remesas‘. 
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has not announced fairs for 2011. Both entities have also began organising national 
property fairs in Bogotá, Medellin and Pereira.  
 
5.6. Concluding remarks 
Housing policy has been historically used by the Colombian government to favour 
specific sectors of the economy such as the construction and financial industries.  This 
has been justified by promoting the construction sector as one of the most dynamic 
forces in the national economy and as an efficient tool for employment generation. The 
re-positioning of the financial sector as the main medium to access housing, public and 
private, is just one of the latest instances of the state‘s use of housing policy as a 
political tool. 
 
Despite the numerous changes introduced since the 1970s with the aim to boost the 
construction sector and position housing finance at the centre of the sector‘s revival as 
an engine of growth, Colombia‘s housing finance market remains shallow at best. The 
rigidity of the requirements and low levels of formal employment and economic activity 
have meant that in practice, housing finance remains out of reach for the majority of 
Colombia‘s population, who belong to the lower and lower-middle income strata. 
Furthermore, although there are indications that investment in housing is a growing 
component of remittances expenditures, the official estimate of the amount of 
remittances that enters the country to finance housing purchases is still a very 
insignificant proportion of the total amount of money that migrants send to their families 
back home.  
 
Despite the fact that the government has put all its weight behind creating and 
sustaining a new transnational socioeconomic space by rendering migrants as financial 
subjects abroad through programmes aimed at channelling remittances to ‗productive 
investment‘, the overall impact of these programmes has been relatively small146. In the 
case of ‗Mi casa con remesas‘, a number of structural constraints in the programme‘s 
design and implementation has prevented it from having a wider impact, especially 
among Colombians in London. First, for the most part, migrants face exclusion from the 
programme based on their legal status in the country of destination. Second, to access 
the programme, the family member of the migrant has to be affiliated to one of the 
national ‗Cajas de Compensación Familiar, CCFs‘ but membership in a CCF is usually 
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 Many of the initiatives established by governments of other countries such as El Salvador 
and Brazil to foster business development by home companies at home and abroad have also 
had limited success (for a description of these programmes, see Levitt 2001b).  
 
 141 
 
restricted to people employed in the formal sector of the economy, which in Colombia 
only amounts to around a quarter of the economically active population. Third, there is 
an undersupply of social housing in Colombia which is the target of this programme. 
Finally, the programme‘s reach is quite limited geographically and it is overtly focused 
in the countries that have historically absorbed the majority of Colombian migrants (the 
United States and Spain) while other places such as London with a significant 
presence of Colombians are lagging behind. 
 
In the case of the international housing fairs, although there are no legal limitations that 
prevent Colombian nationals residing abroad from acquiring housing in Colombia, in 
practice it is quite a difficult, discouraging and sometimes overwhelming process. Not 
only do they have to incur great additional costs throughout the process but also in 
many instances, they find themselves unable to prove that they have the capacity to 
meet the mortgage payments, frequently due to their lack of legal status in the 
countries of destination. In addition, because the majority of housing investments tend 
to be made for the immediate benefit of the family members back home, migrants‘ 
relatives continue to play a central role in the choosing and buying of property in the 
local/national market and hence, the practicalities of buying a house entails much more 
than a single visit to a fair. These are the issues explored in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Alternative Strategies of Accessing Housing: Colombian 
Migrants in London and their Households in the Coffee Region 
of Colombia 
 
This chapter will chart the alternative strategies and experiences of accessing housing 
articulated by Colombian migrants in London and their households in the Coffee 
Region of Colombia. In particular, it will reveal the motivations behind the use of 
remittances to finance housing investment and the different ways in which these 
transactions take place over the transnational space. It does so by drawing on 
empirical data collected at both ends of the migration network while incorporating other 
theoretical and secondary data that serve to complement these empirical findings. This 
approach enables this thesis to contrast the different narratives being articulated by the 
different actors and to provide a more nuanced understanding of what investment in 
housing is about and how it is materialised. 
 
The chapter demonstrates that the Colombian government‘s emphasis on establishing 
a link between remittances and development – by rendering migrants as financial 
subjects and channelling their remittances to housing investments – ignores the 
qualitative effects that these investments have on the everyday lives of migrant 
households. In addition, the fact that migrants continue to rely on their family members 
back home for the materialisation of the dream of homeownership points to the role 
that these investments play in the maintenance and reproduction of family relations 
across the transnational social field. The findings suggest that Colombian migrants in 
London are not embracing their newly-assigned financial subjectivities but are instead 
using alternative channels for housing acquisition and financing. It also shows how they 
had been doing this prior to the government‘s establishment of formal channels for this 
purpose. These housing investments are not ‗productive‘ in the sense articulated by the 
government, as new-mortgage-financed housing but instead take the form of local-
level, gradual, housing upgrading or building and are financed with the monthly 
remittances sent by migrants which generally bypass the formal banking system.  
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6.1. Setting the scene for migrants’ transnational housing investments  
Reasons for remitting 
Although there is a considerable amount of literature on remittances behaviour on the 
part of migrant workers worldwide (cf. Adams Jr and Cuecuecha, 2010; Agarwal and 
Horowitz, 2002; Rapoport and Docquier, 2005; Shahbaz and Aamir, 2009; Stark and 
Lucas, 1985, 1988), there remains little statistical evidence to support the claims they 
have made (Connell and Brown, 2004; Stark and Lucas, 1985). Brown (2006) tends to 
distinguish between altruistic and non-altruistic behaviour. Specifically, money sent on 
the basis of altruism tends to be used to complement the migrant family‘s income 
and/or to help family members overcome adverse events such as natural disasters or 
financial crises. In contrast, remittances sent for non-altruistic reasons tend to be used 
for expenditures that reflect the self-interest of the migrant such as investments in 
housing or businesses and/or to compensate family members who have been left with 
the responsibility of caring for the migrant‘s assets or family members (Brown 2006).  
 
Beyond altruistic concerns, Stark and Lucas (1988) have argued that remittances are 
part of a migrant household‘s inter-temporal, informal, cooperative, self-enforcing (by 
way of feelings of mutual obligation) contractual agreement that serves as a family 
strategy for income-risk reduction,  while Poirine (1997) views remittances as part of an 
informal loan agreement between migrants and their family members in which the 
migrant compensates the family for their investment in her/his education.   
 
Empirical studies about migrant workers in the UK have shown mixed results. On the 
one hand, a study conducted among low-paid migrant workers in London, many of 
them from Latin America, found that „generally, migrant workers attributed their 
remittance to altruism – particularly, the need to assist their families in meeting daily 
subsistence requirements, such as paying rent, food, utility and sometimes medical 
bills‟ (Datta et al., 2007: 52). Similarly, a study of South Americans in London and the 
north of England found that migrants internalised remitting as one of the multiple 
strategies associated with maintaining a transnational family and so were driven to 
remit money, goods and services because they felt a sense of duty and obligation 
toward those left behind (Mas Giralt and Bailey, 2010). On the other hand, a study 
conducted among Latin American migrants in London found that most migrants sent 
money home both because they needed (and felt obliged) to support their families back 
home and also in order to accrue savings or make investments (McIlwaine, 2007). 
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As will be shown throughout this and the next chapter, the reasons behind the sending 
of remittances by Colombian migrants in London are complex. They combine altruistic 
and self-interested reasons but also go beyond this dichotomy. Thus, the motives 
behind the sending of remittances seem to be driven not only by loyalty to the extended 
family back home but also by calculated investments to facilitate the eventual return 
and/or to diversify the family‘s sources of income. In particular, it is argued that the 
sending of remittances to finance housing investments is a key strategy to maintain 
and reproduce the family across the transnational social field and these in turn, 
generate other intended and unintended economic outcomes that reconfigure the 
livelihoods of these transnational migrant households.  
 
Transnational housing investments  
As was revealed in the previous chapter, despite the fact that the government has put 
all its weight behind creating and sustaining a new transnational socioeconomic space 
by rendering migrants as financial subjects abroad, through programmes aimed at 
channelling remittances to housing, the overall impact of these programmes has been 
relatively small. The limited success of these programmes lies in the fact that 
Colombians residing abroad who wish to buy property through one of the programmes 
promoted by the government are faced with a number of requirements that prevent 
most of them from accessing housing. These include having legal status in the country 
of destination, being formally employed and/or the ability to prove that they have the 
capacity to meet mortgage payments. These requirements have a particularly negative 
effect on Colombians in London, who are for the most part, low-income migrants. Given 
that only one of the 21 migrants interviewed for this study lacked legal documents to 
live and work in the UK, this socioeconomic reality may indeed provide some clues for 
this group‘s lack of engagement with these remittances-for-housing government 
programmes. In particular, the high cost of living in London means that many 
Colombians might find themselves unable to prove that they have the capacity to meet 
the mortgage payments in London but also particularly in Colombia (where the banks 
that provide the loans for these programmes are based).  
 
Certainly the inability of the poor to access formal credit is a problem that is particularly 
acute in Latin America. As Orozco (2008:331) has noted, „in most of the world, banks 
are reluctant to cultivate the poor as customers. There are many reasons for this dearth 
of banking the poor: relatively low profit margins, perceptions – often unrealistic – of 
risk, and a lack of government incentives or requirements. This general trend is 
 145 
 
exacerbated in Latin America, where banks traditionally concentrate on serving the 
agro-exporting elite‟. 
 
Nonetheless, investment in housing is a growing component of remittances 
expenditure147, despite the fact that the official estimate of the amount of remittances 
that enters the country to finance housing purchases is still a very insignificant 
proportion of the total amount of remittances sent by Colombians abroad.  Between 
2005 and 2009, remittances for housing purchases were an average of 3.71%148 of the 
total amount of money that migrants sent to their families back home. 
 
Of the 21 migrant households based in the coffee region, 15 had used remittances to 
invest in housing. For the most part, these houses were acquired or built for the 
immediate enjoyment of the migrant‘s nuclear or extended family.  However, this 
chapter argues that these remittances for housing investment are not being captured 
by the official statistics because these migrant households are using alternative 
channels for housing acquisition and financing. So what were the main motivations 
behind these housing investments?  
 
6.2. Why do migrants invest in housing? 
Although there are many different and very personal reasons behind migrants‘ desire to 
send remittances and engage in transnational housing investments in their localities of 
origin, some common elements can be identified among the Colombian population in 
London. Transnational housing investments by Colombians in London are tightly linked 
with their condition as migrants. Based on real and perceived inequalities in 
socioeconomic opportunities, one of the main motivations for these Colombians to 
migrate is to improve their family‘s overall welfare and provide them with the 
socioeconomic comfort level that they could have not otherwise afford had they 
remained in Colombia. Housing is one of the many mechanisms that migrants use to 
achieve this goal.  In this sense, for many, materialising the dream of homeownership 
is only attainable after migration, given the higher purchasing power that the exchange 
rate differential between the UK and Colombia provides and the comparatively lower 
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 A study conducted between 2004 and 2005 among Colombian migrants in twenty different 
countries found that 54% of migrants are interested in investing in housing in Colombia, as 
opposed to cars, 11%, or the stock market, 8% (Gaviria and Mejía 2005). Another study 
conducted in 2004 found that close to 10% of remittance recipient households in the country‘s 
Eje Cafetero used a portion of remittances to finance housing acquisition and 40% used them to 
fund housing expansion and/or improvements (Garay and Rodriguez 2005a). 
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 Calculation by author. Data sources: Remesas para adquisición de vivienda, serie 
estadística & Serie mensual de remesas de trabajadores, Banco de la República (2010).  
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cost of property in Colombia149. When asked about whether her family‘s situation had 
improved as a consequence of migration, Nancy, a 47-year-old Colombian who is 
employed as a domestic/commercial cleaner in London replied: 
 
―Oh, immensely…we have all been able to buy houses in Restrepo (Valle del 
Cauca), my hometown (since we migrated)… Not only that, but my brother 
bought a house for my mom too. He is also here in London. We would have not 
been able to do it there because we simply had no means…‖  
 
When I spoke to Nancy‘s sister (Ana) in Cali, she also highlighted the fact that her 
siblings had only been able to buy their houses a few years after they had been living 
and working in London. So I asked her: you said that your siblings left some houses 
here. Did they have them before they emigrated or did they buy them after they left? 
 
―Oh, no, no, they bought them while there, imagine if not how else? That would 
have been impossible. When my brother left, his intention was for all of us (my 
sisters and I) to join him later because things were pretty difficult here when 
they left. Now they have their houses here, one each, in Restrepo. They have 
lived there (in London and Spain) for about 12-15 years and they bought those 
houses about 4-5 years ago‖.  
 
Thus, these transnational housing investments are part and parcel of migrants‘ 
perception of migration as a vehicle to materialise their dreams. These dreams are 
related to economic progress and greater welfare and are underpinned by a general 
sense of lack of labour opportunities in the Colombian labour market and the need to 
search for a better future for themselves and their families. Carmen‘s comments bring 
these issues to light. Carmen is a 62-year-old returned migrant now living in Pereira. 
Carmen‘s daughters and son have lived in London for 15 years. I asked her why she 
decided to migrate to London 20 years ago:  
 
―I went to London because of the tough economic situation I was in. I am a 
widow and I had four small children. They were going to school then but I 
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 Other studies have found that there is a higher propensity to invest in housing among 
households receiving remittances. For example, Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) found that 
Guatemalan households receiving international remittances spent 81% more on housing that 
what they would have spent in the absence of remittances. In the Coffee Region of Colombia, 
the percentage of households that live in slum and other informal housing is smaller for 
remittance-recipient households than non-remittances recipients (Garay and Rodríguez 
2005b:51).  
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wanted to send them to university but I was not able to. I used to work as a 
sales person for a company that commercialised appliances but the money that 
I made was not enough to raise 4 children. My children realised that they had 
no future here in Colombia. They left seeking a better future. I was there then 
and I told them: you come here, save some money and then we can all go back 
to Colombia, but that was not possible. I returned, then my son and his wife 
came and tried it out but they had to go back, they managed to get some jobs 
here but the money they made was barely enough to survive. Here it is very 
difficult. In any case, I think that migrating and helping them to migrate was the 
right thing to do. That is how I was able to buy my house. I feel much 
appreciated by my children, they send me money whenever I need it. They 
want me to live comfortably‖.  
 
Thus, greater socioeconomic aspirations combined with the higher purchasing power 
that their migrant conditions bestows on them, translate into higher rates of 
homeownership among these migrant households. So, what are the other more 
specific attitudes and motivations behind the use of remittances to finance housing 
investment among Colombian migrants in London and their households in the 
Colombian Eje Cafetero? And how do these intersect with the socio-political and 
economic context of the country? 
 
6.2.1. Owning a house does not equate with wealth but not owning one equates with 
poverty? 
The attitudes and feelings towards home-ownership predominant in Colombian society 
are encapsulated in the question above. As will become evident in the interviews 
presented here, the perception that ‗owning a house does not equate with wealth but 
not owning one equates with poverty‟ is quite evident in migrant households‘ 
discourses about home-ownership. Colombian migrants in London invest in housing as 
a strategy to secure the basic welfare of the family. Migrant households expressed time 
and again that their motivations for investing in housing were linked to satisfying an 
immediate basic need and to avoid having to pay rent. Housing is thought of as the one 
thing needed to guarantee a decent standard of living. Because of the precariousness 
of the welfare system in Colombia and the employment conditions of the majority, 
people feel that if everything else goes wrong, they would at least have secured a roof 
over their heads. Thus, in an environment in which social, political and economic 
instability are the norm, housing appears as the most basic element to guarantee the 
family‘s social reproduction. Graciela‘s comments illustrate these feelings. Graciela, a 
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57-year-old resident of Pereira, whose sisters have lived in London for 15 years, 
summed it up this way: 
 
―Since they left we have bought the house where we live and a plot of land in 
which we want to build another house. I think that for a family, the house is 
essential. That is what we fought for since they left, for buying a house. 
Because we always lived together, we always made the decisions together 
(even when we decided who was going to emigrate). We have had the house 
for 10 years now. Five years after they left, we bought the house…the most 
important thing is that we don‘t have to pay rent anymore and also with the 
house, at least we have secured a roof over our heads‖.  
 
These ideas about the role of a house in the reproduction of the family are quite an 
important ingredient in housing investment decisions on the part of migrants, especially 
when they have left elderly parents behind. A house guarantees not only the security 
but also the comfort and tranquillity of these elderly members of the family. As Liliana, 
an 82-year-old resident of Pereira, whose son and daughter have lived in London for 
16 years, explained:  
 
―I used to live in a small town (pueblo). Three years ago, my son told me that he 
wanted me to live in the city, to have more comfort, a better quality of life. We 
saw this flat with him (when he came to visit) and he liked it because he said: I 
want my mum to have everything close by, the church, the hairdresser, the 
drugstore, the supermarket, everything…I want her to have everything within 
her reach, at her disposal…and well I was already thinking about moving here‖. 
 
Similarly, the story of Nancy and Ana‘s family reflects this. Nancy has resided in 
London for 12 years and her brother migrated 19 years ago. I asked Nancy how her 
family‘s housing situation in Colombia had change post-migration. She replied:  
 
―My mother‘s life changed quite a lot since my brother left Colombia. My mother 
did not have a house and my brother bought her one (with remittances)…My 
mum did not have any necessities but she did not own anything because 
everything belonged to my grandparents…my mum lived with them. When my 
grandmother died, my brother bought my uncles‘ part of the house and that‘s 
where my mum lives today. She is alone but at least she has tranquillity‖. 
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Nancy‘s word seems to imply that having a place to live is not enough to guarantee the 
family‘s comfort and tranquillity. Thus, for these migrant household not owning a house 
was perceived as a source of instability. Although Nancy‘s mother lived in a property 
that was partially hers, the fact that there were other co-owners meant that the property 
could not be counted on in the future. Thus, becoming the sole homeowner was what 
drove Nancy‘s brother to buy a house for their mother so that her tranquillity and long 
term stability could be guaranteed.  
 
When I met Nancy‘s sister, Ana, in Cali, this is what she had to say about her mother‘s 
situation:  
 
―The changes for my mother have been quite significant. She can now do many 
of the things she could not do before, thanks to the help she receives from my 
siblings. She has peace of mind, especially about the house, because she was 
very attached to it (that is where she grew up). Of course, she would rather 
have them around here but she always says: if they had not left, what would 
have happened to us?‖ 
 
In essence, remittances have not only produced material progress but also betterment 
in the quality of life and general wellbeing of the migrants‘ family members. This was 
also exemplified by Margarita‘s family. Margarita is a 40-year-old hairdresser, resident 
of Anserma, whose brother has lived and worked in London for seven years. She 
summarised the benefits that the remittances her brother sends have had on her 
immediate family‘s live:  
 
―My brother was always thinking about building a house for my mother. He is 
now buying a plot to build a house for my mum. He bought from us (all his 
siblings) a piece of land that we inherited from my father and had a great 
sentimental value for him…we were going to lose it because we did not have 
the means to keep it up…he always thinks of us, he is always worried about our 
wellbeing. She misses him but she says that his emigration has been for the 
best. Just imagine: my brother who is in Spain has his own big family to 
maintain, my other bother is unemployed and I just barely make enough for my 
family. There is no question that my mum now has tranquillity, she does not 
have to be worried about money all the time‖.  
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So migrants‘ ability to send remittances not only allows the migrant to provide for 
her/his family‘s immediate needs but their use to finance housing has other more 
intangible benefits such as providing the family with medium to long term stability. As 
these interviews illustrate, the family not only plays a central role in the decision to 
migrate but also in conditioning, directly or indirectly, the use of remittances. So far, the 
motives behind the use of remittances to finance housing investments have been 
related to more altruistic reasons such as loyalty to the immediate family back home 
and migrants‘ commitment to improving their family‘s overall welfare and providing 
them with socioeconomic comfort. Given that expenditures in housing are life-
enhancing and migrants perceive them as a source of stability, it should not be 
surprising that this is one of migrants‘ priorities post-migration.  
 
But migrants‘ desire to invest in homes in their localities of origin is also linked to non-
altruistic reasons such as calculated investments to facilitate their eventual return150. 
Although, the dream of returning home may never materialise, investing in housing 
serves an immediate and a future purpose. As the following three quotations illustrate, 
housing not only fulfils the immediate basic need for shelter of the family members left 
behind but also provides a certain degree of security in the future in case things go 
wrong in London. Carmen‘s daughters and son have all invested in housing in 
Colombia. When asked about their motives, she replied:  
 
―…The thing is that my daughters dreamed of returning to Colombia and they 
still do, that is why they invested in those houses because they wish to return 
one day‖.  
 
Similarly, Jose Luis, a 76-year-old resident of Anserma, Caldas, whose daughter and 
son have lived in London for about 15 years explained: 
 
―Naturally, they have invested here. Each of them has bought a house. My 
daughter in London bought a plot and built a house. They wanted to have 
housing for sure for when they return because in any case, this is our 
country….so to have a little something to come back to‖. 
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 As was explained in chapter 5, this is one of the most important issues being exploited by the 
‗Mi casa con remesas‘ programme and the international housing fairs.  
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These sentiments were also echoed by Ana when referring to her siblings‘ investments 
in their hometown of Restrepo, Valle del Cauca. Ana‘s sister, Nancy, and her brother 
have resided in London for more than 10 years:  
 
―They invested here because they thought (well they say) that they do not know 
what can happen to them in another country and so if they have to come back 
here in the future, they have their own place…with that (house) at least they 
have a roof over their heads for sure151‖. 
 
What is evident from these comments is the fact that regardless of how long migrants 
have lived in London, many still wish to return some day. To the question of whether 
they wished to return to Colombia, most migrants conveyed the feeling that they were 
not prepared to spend their last days away from their homeland. However, given that 
most already had their children in London and were aware of the difficult 
socioeconomic and political situation in Colombia, returning was a real possibility only 
when it came time to retire. Because they envision there will be limited employment 
opportunities in their places or origin, these investments in housing are thought of as a 
strategy to guarantee that this basic necessity would be secured in old age.   
 
Diana, a 51-year-old Colombian who has lived in London for 20 years working as a 
cleaner, summarised these feelings:  
 
―Well there are things that although you live here (in London) for many years, 
you still yearn for from there (Colombia) and you would like to be there…that is 
one of the reasons that made me think about going back to Colombia, but I did 
not do it because I thought that it is really difficult to help the family when you 
live there and my mother had already worked a lot and she was tired. The 
situation for the people that are still in Colombia is quite difficult…My cousin 
who is an agricultural engineer and works in a sugar refinery told me that 
production at the plant had stopped and there were a lot of people going hungry 
because they had not been paid for a few months. In any case, I would like to 
go back in 15-20 years, that is why I bought a house, I don‘t know, to have a 
place to go back to. Well, you never know but I would like Colombia to 
change…‖ 
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 This is exactly what Nancy said when I spoke to her in London. 
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This was also echoed by Mariela, a 52-year-old migrant from Cali that came to London 
in the mid-1980s:  
 
―Well, yes I would like to return, but I am afraid of the insecurity, the violence, 
the high unemployment, all the problems that the country has. I always think 
that if the situation in my country was different, I would have returned already, 
even now that my children are here‖.  
 
Another common issue that emerged as a powerful reason to engage in transnational 
housing investments was the idea that houses are a good mechanism for wealth 
accumulation because they are a tangible store of value152. In some cases, this 
investment is seen as a solution for preventing the money they send being ill-spent in 
conspicuous consumption. This was a powerful reason for Viviana, Diana‘s sister, to 
invest in housing. She is 54 years old and has lived in London for 16 years, also 
working as a cleaner. Viviana had returned to Palmira temporarily to take care of her ill 
mother. She explained: 
 
―When I left, I left an open bank account. I was sending money every month to 
be saved. I had left the account in my brother‘s name but he emigrated to 
Spain, so he left the account to my nephew…And he was living the life, he was 
buying aguardiente153 with the bank card…My relatives told me that I had to 
come to invest that money in something because I was going to be left with 
nothing, so that is when I came and bought the house‖.  
 
So, these migrants perceive investing in houses as making a financially rational 
decision to accumulate wealth through an investment in a ‗safe‘ asset. This should not 
be surprising given the socioeconomic and political uncertainty that reigns in Colombia 
and perhaps migrants‘ lack of acumen in investing in financial instruments and 
markets. Also, the limited dynamism that tends to characterise the areas of the country 
far from the centre of economic activity (Bogotá) may mean that sometimes, there are 
simply no other better alternatives for investing. In addition, because once they are 
made, these investments do not need constant support, like a business would, 
migrants invest in houses as a good mechanism for storing the value of their savings.  
 
                                                 
152
 The representative of ‗Mi casa con remesas‘ stated that this was one of the main reasons 
given by the people who wanted to sign up for the programme. 
153
 Aguardiente is Colombia‘s national spirit. It is made of distilled sugar cane and aniseed.  
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In summary, the motives behind using remittances to finance housing investments by 
Colombians in London are multiple. Migrants perceive that houses fulfil a wide range of 
roles such as improving their family‘s immediate welfare and quality of life and 
guaranteeing the security and comfort of their loved ones. Other roles include being 
calculated investments that would facilitate migrants‘ eventual return (mostly at the time 
of retiring) and serving as a tangible store of value. The running theme along these 
motives is migrants‘ perception that owning a house is the minimum one must have in 
order to guarantee the maintenance and reproduction of the family from a distance. 
Thus, owning a house is not perceived as a luxury that can only be afforded by the rich, 
but it is a sign that a person has been successful in guaranteeing a fixed space for the 
family‘s social reproduction. This is particularly important in the context of the formation 
of new subjectivities under neoliberalism. As Mitchell et al. (2004: 3) have suggested, 
the current regime of accumulation devolves „more and more „choice‟ to a seemingly 
ever more autonomous individual who must rationally calculate the benefits and costs 
of all aspects of life‟. Furthermore, this ideological devolution „infiltrates and articulates 
with other commonsense understandings in society‟ (page 4), in a way that redefines 
the meanings of social reproduction. The very material and practical reasons which are 
encapsulated by the phrase ‗owning a house does not equate with wealth but not 
owning one equates with poverty‘, seem to be the driving force behind transnational 
housing investments by Colombian migrants in London. These attitudes and feelings 
towards home-ownership are rooted in the specific and highly volatile nature of the 
social, economic and political structures predominant in Colombian society154.  
 
6.2.2. Buying a house: an incentive to migrate? 
As mentioned before, transnational housing investments by Colombians in London are 
part and parcel of migrants‘ perception of migration as a vehicle to materialise their 
dreams. So, another important reason for investing in housing is that of fulfilling one of 
the purposes of migrating155. As many migrant households explained, buying a house 
or improving the existing one was their relatives‘ main incentives to migrate. The 
following interview quotations illustrate these trends. Lina is a 54-year-old resident of 
Zaragoza (Valle del Cauca) whose sons reside abroad. One has resided in London for 
14 years and the other has lived in Spain for 6. I asked her about their motivations to 
migrate and she replied: 
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 These issues have been explored in chapter 3. 
155
 This finding is, of course, not exclusive to Colombian migrants. Van der Horst (2010) found 
that building or buying a dwelling in Turkey was one of the primary goals of going abroad for 
Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. Albeit these houses were regularly built for 
holiday/retirement and not for the immediate family to occupy.  
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―My sons wanted to upgrade this house. This used to be a big, wattle and daub 
house. We demolished it and built two new ones, mine and this one (my 
mother‘s). My sons refurbished mine, they built a fitted kitchen, built-in closets, 
etc….they polished it. Then we built this one from scratch. That was their major 
motivation to go there (migrate). My eldest son always said that he wanted to 
refurbish our house and also buy a new car for his father‖.  
 
The drastic physical changes to housing structures like the ones described by Lina are 
quite evident in small towns around the Coffee Region of Colombia, where wattle and 
daub used to be the traditional and most common building material. As will be explored 
in chapter 7, this is an indication that these investments in housing have gone beyond 
the initial goal of guaranteeing shelter for the family but are an expression of migrants‘ 
material success and aspirations. 
 
Another related incentive for investing in housing among Colombian migrants in 
London had to do with fulfilling the goal of recovering the house that had been lost due 
to the profound economic and mortgage crises of the second half of the 1990s and/or 
because the house had to be mortgaged to pay for the trip abroad156. As stated in 
chapter 5, Colombia experienced a severe mortgage crisis in the late 1990s. The crisis 
not only affected the financial and construction sectors, but it had devastating social 
effects because a large segment of the population found themselves unable to meet 
their mortgage payments and lost their houses. As Yair, a 31-year-old returned 
migrant, resident of Pereira, whose mother migrated to London in 1997 eloquently put 
it:  
 
―Honestly, things were very tight. The house had to be mortgaged and my mum 
was constantly worried about that. She did not sleep, it kept her tormented, 
worried. She was desperate and did not know what to do. So, one day she said 
that she was arranging her documents to leave and effectively she did. Now, we 
have recovered the house. This is the house where we have always lived but 
we paid the mortgage off‖.  
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 Some of the key actors interviewed also mentioned that this was one of the issues that 
migrants repeatedly cited as the reasons to invest in housing either through the Mi casa con 
remesas or the international housing fairs.  
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Judith‘s family had a similar experience. She is a 24-year-old resident of Pereira whose 
mother has lived in London since 2001: 
 
―My mom left in 2001. She came back two years later because she could not 
get papers in London, she came back empty handed and she was desperate to 
see us. My aunt helped her with a man who wanted to marry her for the papers. 
We had our own house…they got married here but she had to sell the house to 
be able to pay for the visa and all the stuff she needed to go back to London. 
God permitting, this October she will buy a house. She had not been able to 
buy one before because she had to spend a lot of money taking my sisters to 
London and then she needed time to save‖. 
 
This indicates that a powerful reason for migrants to invest in housing is linked to 
recovering the socioeconomic status that they had previous to the crisis of the 1990s 
thus, migration was a means for preventing downward social mobility. In Colombia, as 
in many other parts of the world, home-ownership is perceived as a marker of a 
person‘s socioeconomic status. When that status is threatened, people often see 
international migration as a way to maintain it, recover it, and/or improve it. In this 
context, the materialisation of home into housing is linked not only with satisfying the 
family‘s basic need for shelter but also with a person‘s position within society. As 
Kellett, reminds us, „At one level [the home] it is concerned with the domestic spaces 
and activities of everyday life, and simultaneously it has broader dimensions which 
relate to issues of identity, economic and social positions‟ (Kellett, 2002: 18). 
 
So how is it that migrants are going about materialising the dream of homeownership? 
The following section outlines the ways in which Colombian migrants in London are 
using remittances to finance housing purchases and the ways in which these 
transactions take place over the transnational field.  
 
6.3. Materialising the dream: buying a house across the transnational field 
In Latin America, remittance resources tend to „go to immediate family members...They 
are not the only beneficiaries but are rather the main administrators of foreign income‟ 
(Orozco, 2008: 313). Housing investment practices among Colombian migrant 
households in the Eje Cafetero also follow this logic. As mentioned in section 6.2, the 
family members of Colombian migrants in London are not only the main beneficiaries of 
remittances but also play a crucial role in remittance-spending decisions. Thus, 
housing investments by these migrants tend to be made through a family member in 
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Colombia, who is given the responsibility of finding the property or piece of land, buying 
(or overseeing the building) and administering the property157. As Carmen, the returned 
migrant introduced in the previous section, explained: 
 
―My son wanted to buy something. About 7 years ago, my sister told me that 
there were some plots for sale in a strategic area in the Coffee Region. I went to 
see them and I liked it, so my son bought a plot. We have a cottage with a pool 
and Jacuzzi in a posh condominium, which I administer. We rent it for the 
season and usually, I reinvest the money in the property so my son does not 
have to send money from London for its maintenance‖.  
 
Because of their proximity and knowledge of the local market, the family member is the 
one who usually identifies the potential investment opportunity and advises the migrant 
to buy. They are also the ones who take care of negotiating the sale price and the legal 
procedures involved in acquiring the property, whether that is an empty plot or a 
finished house. Carmen went on to comment about her daughter‘s investments: 
 
―As with my other children, I am the one in charge of everything because they 
deposit all their trust in me. I tell them of good houses I see that I consider as 
good investments, because modesty aside, I have business vision. My daughter 
bought one in a gated community that I indicated‖.  
 
The element of trust mentioned by Carmen was an important factor in many other 
migrant families‘ discourses around housing investment. Ana, who as mentioned 
before, has a sister and brother in London, commented on their investment decisions:  
 
―My brother and sister deposit all their trust in my mother. So, for example, if 
she sees a cheap plot, she would ask them if they are interested. In that 
manner, they have bought plots and built houses. Usually, they tell my mom 
what they want more or less and she decides how to build. She takes care of 
everything, of finding the architects, the building materials, everything‖.  
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 This does not seem to be the case among other migrant communities. Smith and Mazzucato 
(2009) found that Ghanaian migrants in Amsterdam keep their housing investments in the 
capital city hidden from their extended family in the village. They rely on friends or other 
relatives (who can be trusted to keep the secret) for these transactions.  
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These dynamics are important expressions of the transnationality of these migrant 
households. In order for these transactions to take place, there is a constant flow of 
information and resources that goes back and forth between Colombia and London. 
Whether these transactions involve the purchase of a plot, a finished house or 
improving the existing house, the decisions about what to buy and how to build are 
taken jointly, so the investment process is quite transnational in nature. As the next two 
quotations clearly illustrate, the transnational nature of these housing investments has 
been facilitated by new developments in information and communication technologies 
such as the low cost of phone calls and the internet. Yair, the 31-year-old returned 
migrant recounted the improvements made to the house that his mother recovered a 
few years after having migrated to London:  
 
―This house was remodelled. Once the mortgage was paid off, she started 
sending money to remodel. New doors have been installed, the tiles of the 
bathrooms and the floors were changed and the house has been painted. Also, 
the third floor was added and the other two were polished. To do all these 
changes, I used to send photos to my mother and she would say if she agreed. 
I used to choose the things and then I would show her, so we both made the 
decisions‖.  
 
Oriana‘s household had a similar experience but she made a more explicit account of 
how new technologies such as the internet had facilitated the transnational investment 
process. Oriana is a 67-year-old whose daughter has lived in London since 2006: 
 
―My daughter used to send us money for the rent. One day she told her dad to 
look for a small plot because she wanted to build us a house. And sure enough, 
she bought the plot and because he works in construction, he built the house 
himself. First, she wanted to see the plot, so he sent her photos. Then she 
would tell him what she wanted and he would build it. Once construction began, 
my husband sent photos to her…he was building and sending photos, building 
and sending via internet‖. 
 
As explained in chapter 5, this crucial role that family members play in the acquisition 
of housing by Colombian migrants has emerged as an impediment to the success of 
the international housing fairs which have sought to bridge the geographical gap 
between the supply and demand of housing. But this should not be surprising given 
that, as shown in section 6.2, the majority of these housing investments are made for 
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the immediate benefit of the family members back home. So how are migrant 
households financing these investments?  
 
The money for these investments in housing / property is usually sent by migrants in 
London in the form of regular remittances, together with the amount sent monthly for 
the maintenance of the family. This means that the majority of these housing 
investments are not registered as such and therefore, are done bypassing the formal 
banking system. These dynamics may explain why although investment in housing is a 
growing component of remittances expenditure, the official estimate of the amount of 
remittances that enters the country to finance housing purchases is still a very 
insignificant proportion of the total amount of money that migrants send to their families 
back home (see section 5.5 in chapter 5). Although an increasing number of families in 
the Coffee Region are, directly or indirectly, being connected with financial institutions 
because they received their remittances through banks, they are not financing these 
housing investments by borrowing from these banks.  
 
The experience of Oriana‘s household is a clear example of how these housing 
transactions are being financed and how they take place over the transnational space. 
Oriana used to live in a rented house. In 2007, a year after her daughter migrated to 
London, they bought a plot and built a house, one floor at the time. To this day, 
improvements continue to be made to the house. Oriana‘s house is located in a 
popular neighbourhood in Dosquebradas, a municipality in the Coffee Region. On the 
question of how was the process of acquiring the house she explained: 
 
―So, we bought the empty plot and we then built the house. We did it all 
ourselves, without intermediaries, no construction company, no banks. My 
daughter sent the money for the plot directly to us and we made the deal. Then 
we built the house little by little with the money that she sent every month. 
That‘s how we built it‖. 
 
A similar story was reported by María, a 42-year-old resident of Pereira, whose sister 
has lived illegally in London for 10 years. María summarized her sister‘s experience of 
accessing housing while living abroad, five years after having migrated:   
 
―My father was the one who found the plot. He said to my sister: ‗there is a 
small plot for sale, it is cheap, look and see if you have enough savings to buy 
it. You do not have to build it now; you can start sending money and build it little 
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by little‘. And sure enough, they first laid the foundations and then it took them a 
long time to build the first floor, but they built the whole house little by little…she 
sent  money every time she could‖. 
 
Graciela‘s experience also highlights the alternative strategies employed by these 
migrant households to access housing: 
 
―To buy the house, I simply started to save some of the money that my sisters 
sent me. They knew that I was going to buy the house. Every month, with the 
regular remittance, they sent me a little bit extra so that I could save. I made the 
down payment in instalments and then I made bigger payments so that I could 
get the house‖.  
 
Figure 6.1 exemplifies the sort of housing that is built with remittances.  
 
Figure 6.1: Popular Neighbourhoods in Pereira  
Photographs by author 
 
The alternative strategies being articulated by Colombian migrants in London around 
investing in housing with remittances are underpinned by migrants‘ perceptions of the 
Colombian government. Most migrants perceived the government as corrupt and 
lacking the ability and interest to solve the social and economic problems that pushed 
them to leave the country and to help them navigate their new society and/or improve 
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the hard socioeconomic reality most of them are faced with in London158. Since the 
programmes for channelling remittances to housing are sponsored and disseminated 
by the Consulate, this may be an important factor in understanding why many migrants 
may be discouraged from participating in them. When asked about the government‘s 
support for Colombians in London, Ana Aura, a 45-year-old migrant woman who has 
lived in London for 22 years, summed up the situation well: 
 
―Look, I went to a meeting in the Colombian consulate when the Minister of 
External Relations came from Colombia. It is really sad to see that the 
government has no vision…they want us to tell them what we are going through 
(our problems) are but at the end they will do nothing because it is about politics 
and there is no money. It was sad to see that they have no plan to reintegrate 
us to our society (for our return home). They think that we are a money-making 
machine and they want us to invest, buy and improve the country but remain 
abroad or if we return, they don‘t care…‖  
 
Migrants also feel that there is no government support for Colombian citizens abroad, 
there is no government presence in their communities and a total disconnect exists 
between the actions of the consulate and the needs of the population in London. In 
addition, many complained about the bad treatment and service they received at the 
consulate. As Alejandra, a 53-year-old migrant who has lived in London since 1991 
complained:  
 
―The little that I know is that there is no support from the government. I do not 
see that they are really concerned about what happens to us. Actually, when I 
wanted to bring my son from Colombia, I received a very bad service in the 
consulate‖.  
 
This sentiment is well known to the people who work in NGOs that provide services to 
the Latin American community in London. When asked about the government‘s 
presence in the Colombian community, Daniela, a worker from a Latin American 
organisation replied:  
 
―I do not feel that there is a presence of the Colombian government in the 
community. Perhaps the embassies are now trying to get in touch with 
                                                 
158
 This perception of the government seems to partially explain the relatively small engagement 
of Colombians abroad in transnational political activities (see chapter 3, section 3.2.2). 
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organisations like ours. However, a few years ago I went to the Colombian 
consulate and spoke to the consul and the question that he asked me was: 
what have those liars come here to say about Colombia?‖ 
 
In summary, the majority of Colombian migrants in London interviewed for this study 
have invested in housing in Colombia after having migrated. None of them has 
accessed housing through the government-sponsored programmes, ‗Mi casa con 
remesas‘ and the international housing fairs or by borrowing from a bank. They have all 
accessed housing using alternative strategies and channels with the help of their family 
members back in the Coffee Region of Colombia. Some migrants have saved the 
money in London and others have sent the money to the family member in Colombia to 
be saved there. In both cases, the money for these investments is sent to Colombia, in 
small amounts, with the remittances that are sent for the maintenance of the family 
every month. Whether these transactions involve the purchase of a plot, a finished 
house (usually used) or improving the existing house, the decisions about what to buy 
and how to build are taken jointly, so the investment process is quite transnational in 
nature. During this process, resources and information constantly flow across the 
transnational field and this has been facilitated by new developments in information 
and communication technologies such as the low cost of phone calls and the internet. 
These alternative strategies are underpinned by migrants‘ generally negative 
perception and mistrust of the government, which may be fuelling migrants‘ limited 
engagement with the programmes designed to channel remittances towards housing.   
 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the global financial crisis had a significant negative impact 
on the amount of remittances that migrants send to their families back home. In 
particular, the volume of remittances to Colombia decreased by almost 15% in 2009. 
So, how were these migrant families affected by the global downturn? If so, how have 
these developments affected their housing investment decisions?  
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The world financial crisis and transnational housing investment 
At the time of conducting field research in Colombia in the summer of 2009, the 
negative effects and instability produced by the global economic downturn were 
becoming quite apparent and everybody was talking about it, from the government 
officials that appear on television to explain the high rates of unemployment to the 
social scientist and migrant families I interacted with on a daily basis.  
 
Migrant households spoke about how the crisis has had a direct negative effect on 
them, not only because the amount of money that they received regularly in the form of 
remittances had decreased but also because their purchasing power had fallen through 
the decline in the value of the British pound. When asked whether her sisters in London 
had been affected by the crisis, Graciela put it plainly:  
 
―Yes, we have been affected by the crisis because they have been affected 
there. So if they are affected, we are affected. They work fewer hours than they 
used to…things are very though in London now‖.  
 
Oriana‘s daughter, who works as a cleaner in London, has also been directly affected 
by the crisis. The 67-year-old woman explained:  
 
―Yes, my daughter has been affected because she recently told me that things 
were difficult there. She used to have three jobs but now she only has two. She 
also said that the pound was very low and that she had not been able to send 
much because she was losing a lot when sending the money‖.  
 
In cities such as Pereira, there has been a marked decline in internal demand 
associated with this decrease in remittances and high unemployment (which has 
arguably increased due to large number of Colombians abroad returning home159). So, 
in areas with high rates of emigration such as the Coffee Region, the downturn has 
caused distress among migrant and non-migrant households alike. Families such as 
Graciela‘s have been directly and indirectly affected by the crisis. She has a small 
business in the city centre of Pereira and has seen her sales deteriorate since the crisis 
started:  
 
                                                 
159
 Although there are no statistics to prove that this has been the case, on May 29
th
 2009, the 
Colombian Ministro de Hacienda (Chancellor of the Exchequer) appeared on the national TV 
news, CARACOL, to say that one of the main reasons for the higher than average levels of 
unemployment in the coffee region was a massive return of migrants, particularly from Spain.  
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―Here in Pereira, the economic crisis has been felt quite a lot because the 
people who are there (the migrants) are sending less money and there are no 
jobs here. Many people depend on those remittances. One can see that, a lot of 
businesses have had to close…So, clearly people are spending much less and 
our sales have decreased‖.  
 
This brief section brought to light how the global economic downturn has directly 
affected Colombians in London and consequently, their family members in the Coffee 
Region of Colombia. The crisis has not only had a direct negative impact on the 
amount of remittances that they receive but also on migrant households‘ purchasing 
power. Because of high rates of migration in the Coffee Region, the crisis has also 
produced spin-off adverse economic effects that have impinged on migrant and non-
migrant households alike. The uncertainty regarding the long term effects of the crisis 
on migrants means that it is difficult to predict exactly how these housing investment 
decisions are going to be affected.   
 
6.4. Concluding remarks  
Although the Colombian government has deployed a number of different tools to 
expand the national housing and financial markets to Colombian migrants and the 
majority of migrants interviewed for this study have invested in housing in Colombia 
after having migrated, none of them has accessed housing through the government-
sponsored programmes or by borrowing from a bank. In this sense, this chapter 
showed that Colombian migrants in London have not embraced their newly-assigned 
financial subjectivities but are instead using alternative strategies for housing 
acquisition and financing. These housing investments are not ‗productive‘ in the sense 
articulated by the government, as new-mortgage-financed housing but instead take the 
form of local-level, gradual housing upgrading or building and are financed by the 
monthly remittances sent by migrants that generally bypass the formal banking system.  
 
The alternative strategies to access housing are underpinned by migrants‘ generally 
negative perception and mistrust of the government to solve the social and economic 
problems that pushed them to live Colombia and/or improve the hard socioeconomic 
reality they are faced with in London.  For these migrants, investing in housing is seen 
as a strategy to guarantee a space for the reproduction of the family but also as a 
calculated investment that may facilitate their eventual return. Thus, housing fulfils 
multiple roles such as fulfilling one of the goals of migrating and directly improving the 
family‘s welfare as well as providing a sense of present and future stability and 
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security. In this sense, housing investments have material but also important qualitative 
effects on the everyday lives of migrant households. The fact that migrants continue to 
rely on their family members back home for the materialisation of the dream of 
homeownership and that the investment process is quite transnational in nature 
elucidates the role that these investments play in the maintenance and reproduction of 
family relations across the transnational social field. As the next chapter will show, the 
process of maintaining these family relations across space also generates other 
intended and unintended socioeconomic outcomes that may reconfigure the long term 
livelihoods of these transnational migrant households.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Remittances and Housing: Intended and Unintended Social and 
Economic Outcomes  
 
The previous two chapters analysed the official narratives around investment in 
housing articulated by the Colombian government and compared them with the 
alternative strategies and channels used by migrant households to access housing. 
This chapter explores other intended and unintended social and economic outcomes 
that are generated by remittances and their use to finance housing investments. The 
chapter is divided into three parts. First, it draws attention to the intended and 
unintended economic outcomes that arise in the process of maintaining and 
reproducing family relations across the transnational social field and it examines how 
these shape the long term livelihoods of migrant families in the Coffee Region. Second, 
it documents the changes in landscape that have taken place in the Coffee Region of 
Colombia as a result of the changing economic geographies that have accompanied 
the high rates of emigration from the region. Lastly, it contextualises migrant families‘ 
reproduction strategies by exploring the personal sacrifices and social cost that 
underpin the sending of remittances.  
 
Based on empirical material collected at both ends of the migration network, this 
chapter questions the premises that underpin the migration-development discourse. It 
does so by providing a more nuanced interpretation of development to account for the 
socioeconomic spinoffs that occur in the process of migrant households‘ attempts to 
produce and reproduce their livelihoods over the transnational social field. 
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7.1. Remittances and housing investments: shaping livelihoods  
Migration has been recognised as one of the main strategies that families employ for 
the production and reproduction of their livelihoods (King, 2011; Kothari, 2003a; 
McDowell and de Haan, 1997; Sørensen and Olwig, 2002). The production of 
livelihoods involves capital assets, social relations and organisations and the ability of 
individuals to access and employ them in order to generate income and support 
households. The ability to access these resources differs across time and space and 
sometimes it may require the movement of labour and capital (Bebbington, 2000; King, 
2011) . In this sense, the sending of remittances can be seen, in the broader context of 
transnational family relationships, as part and parcel of these livelihood strategies. As 
Sørensen and Olwig (2002: 1) remind us: people „do not necessarily migrate to start a 
new life elsewhere but rather to search out new opportunities that may allow them to 
enhance and diversify livelihoods practised and valued back home‟. Thus, there is a 
strong interdependence between those who migrate and those who stay behind so that 
migrant households engage in a wide range of activities for the maintenance and 
reproduction of family relations across the transnational social field.  
 
All the migrants in London interviewed for this study, send remittances for the 
maintenance of their families in the coffee region of Colombia. As stated in chapter 6, 
the reasons behind the sending of remittances by these Colombian migrants in London 
are complex and go beyond the altruistic and self-interested dichotomy articulated in 
the literature. In particular, the sending of remittances, to finance housing investments 
or for other purposes is a key strategy to maintain and reproduce the family across the 
transnational social field. Given the transnational nature of these migrant households, 
family relations are crucial for producing and reproducing the socioeconomic strategies 
that sustain these networks. These family reproduction strategies in turn, generate 
other intended economic outcomes that ultimately reconfigure the livelihoods of these 
transnational migrant households by de-linking (at least partially) the family‘s 
subsistence from the migrant‘s remittances. The sending of remittances also generates 
other unintended economic outcomes that extend to the migrant‘s wider social network. 
These intended and unintended economic outcomes may also contribute to the 
development of the local economy, albeit not through the mechanisms favoured by 
proponents of the neoliberal-inspired migration-development nexus. Thus, these 
findings overshadow the current policy-makers‘ preoccupation with the use of 
remittances for ‗either‘ consumption ‗or‘ investment‘. In particular, the evidence 
presented in this chapter provides a more nuanced interpretation of development to 
account for the socioeconomic spinoffs that occur in the process of migrant 
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households‘ attempts to produce and reproduce their livelihoods over the transnational 
social field. Thus, it highlights the conceptually narrow nature of the migration-
development discourse and its failure to recognise the economic and social dimensions 
of migrant households‘ diverse livelihood strategies and their impact on the 
development process. Furthermore, the remittances-for-development programmes 
promoted by the major international lending and aid agencies and embraced by the 
Colombian government, are based on a set of narrow, prescriptive and economistic 
practices that exult migrants‘ role as consumers and producers of wealth. These 
programmes privilege easily quantifiable general measures of development and ignore 
local structural and institutional specificities and the intrinsic linkages that exist between 
geography, political economy and society and development processes. 
 
So, how are Colombian migrants in London and their households in the coffee region of 
Colombia using remittances and housing investments to bring about changes in their 
livelihoods in the long term? 
 
7.1.1. Remittances and housing investments: intended economic outcomes 
As part of the process of maintaining and reproducing the family across the 
transnational social field, the migrant families interviewed for this study are using 
remittances to invest in housing as a livelihood strategy to generate additional sources 
of income for the family. This strategy takes two main forms. The first strategy is to 
consolidate an additional income stream from the migrant‘s family home by building 
additional rooms for rent, housing for housing, or setting up small businesses. The 
second strategy involves using the earnings from renting other property (previously 
financed with remittances) as an income supplement that is de-linked from migrant 
remittances.   
 
Generating income within the home: housing for housing 
The case of Carmen‘s family illustrates the functioning of the first strategy quite well. As 
stated in chapter 6, Carmen is a returned migrant now living in Pereira, whose 
daughters and son live in London. Carmen bought her house about ten years ago with 
the money she saved while working as a cleaner in London. Although Carmen receives 
remittances and a small pension, she wanted to create her own source of income, as 
she put it, in order not to become a burden for her children. She summarised her 
situation this way: 
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―This house was remodelled. The ceiling and the façade were changed and the 
whole house was painted. I also built a studio flat thinking that I can have my 
own income, instead of depending on the money my children send me because 
I do not work anymore. To remodel the house, I spent COP$21 million160 of 
which my children gave me 15 million, I had 4 million and I borrowed 2 
million…It has been a year since that was finished and now I have a young 
professional living there‖.  
 
The case of Yair‘s family also illustrates this housing for housing strategy. He is a 
returned migrant from London living in Pereira whose mother left to the UK 12 years 
ago. I asked him about what sorts of changes had been made to the house with the 
remittances his mother sends. He replied:  
 
―This house was remodelled…the third floor was added and the other two were 
polished. We [my mum and I] wanted to make that investment so we could rent 
one of the floors and make some extra money. Now, my grandmother, uncle, 
niece and I live in the two top floors and rent out the first floor.  It is not much, 
but at least we have the extra fixed amount coming in every month because my 
salary is not enough to cover all the household expenses‖.  
 
The experience of Carmen‘s and Yair‘s family highlights one important issue being 
overlooked by the migration-development discourse. Because of its emphasis on the 
use of remittances for ‗productive‘ investment as a potential development tool for 
migrants‘ countries of origin, this discourse overlooks the real contributions that migrant 
remittances make to the local economy. In particular, these housing for housing 
activities are not simply an ‗unproductive‘ livelihood strategy that migrant households 
engage in to make ends meet or supplement their income, they generate an increased, 
albeit small, demand for goods and services that are produced by local businesses, in 
this case, by the construction industry.  
 
In Colombia, building additional rooms for rent in the home and/or renting the spare 
rooms in the house is a very common strategy to diversify a family‘s earnings, 
especially among low income urban households. And there is a growing demand for 
this sort of living arrangement. As explained in chapter 5, since the transition from a 
rural to an urban society in the 1950s, growing numbers of people in Colombia have 
                                                 
160
 £1 is worth around COP$3,000. COP$21 million is equivalent to around £7,000. 
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moved to the cities in search of jobs and the country‘s housing deficit has widened in 
recent years. Because this strategy does not tend to require great amounts of capital 
investment, requesting costly building permits and/or high levels of education, one can 
see why this may be an effective way for low-income migrant households to diversify 
their sources of income. Thus, remittances are providing these migrant families in the 
Coffee Region with the capital resources needed to take advantage of this national 
trend. Despite the fact that these migrant remittances are being channelled to the 
construction industry (as the government programmes seek to do) and these housing 
for housing activities make an important contribution to migrants households‘ improved 
wellbeing and living standards, they are not considered ‗productive‘ investments 
because they are not producing any formal linkages with the financial industry.  
 
Generating income within the home: home-businesses 
Setting up small businesses with the use of remittances was another common 
livelihood strategy among migrant households in the Coffee Region. As explained in 
chapter 3, this region was particularly hard hit by the economic and socio-political 
crises of the 1990s and the dissolution of the international coffee agreement had some 
dire socioeconomic consequences, especially in terms of the economy‘s ability to 
create jobs, which continues to be felt today. In the face of this reality, some migrant 
households considered setting up a business with remittances an effective strategy not 
only to provide an income for the family and ease the burden on the relatives in 
London, but also as a means to employ other family members who, given the limited 
employment opportunities, could not get a job elsewhere.  
 
The case of Andrea‘s family is a clear example of these trends. Andrea lives in London 
with her daughter, sister and two nephews. Her 57-year old sister, Graciela, lives in 
Pereira with her two nephews, Arturo and Javier, who are in their early thirties. When I 
interviewed them in Pereira in the summer of 2009, the city had the highest 
unemployment rate in the country, close to 20%. When Graciela‘s sisters migrated to 
London in 1994, they agreed as a family, that she would stay behind to take care of 
their children (5 in total) and their mother, so she did not work outside of the home for 
many years. Andrea and her sister managed to bring 3 of the 5 children to London but 
Arturo and Javier could not obtain a residence permit because they were over the age 
limit for family reunification. Arturo and Javier were enrolled at the university in Pereira 
but stopped studying to go to London. They lived and worked in London and studied 
some English for six years, while they waited for the Home Office‘s decision, but had to 
return to Colombia two years ago (in 2007). When they returned, they were unable to 
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find jobs and because of Arturo‘s passion for cooking, they decided to open a 
restaurant. Andrea had told me the family story when we spoke in London in December 
2008 and Arturo supplemented it in Colombia:  
 
―When I was in London I had the opportunity to buy some land and that has 
helped a lot. We [my brother and I] also tried to set up a business when we 
were there (raising chickens) but it was a failure. It is difficult to be on top of 
things like that when you are so far away. We returned two years ago and we 
help each other (the ones here and the ones there). Now we have this 
business, we all contribute to it. Although it has not been easy, it provides us, 
as a family, with an income so that the family in London does not have to send 
a lot from there‖.  
 
The strategy of setting up businesses with remittances was so common in 
neighbourhoods with high rates of migration such as Cuba161 in Pereira, that I 
encountered it by chance. On 26th September 2009, I went to a beauty salon for a 
manicure in Corales (Cuba). The following paragraph is from my field notes:  
 
―At the beauty salon, I was talking to the owner, Cielo, about her neighbourhood 
and I asked her about her business. She told me that she had been able to 
formalise her business with the help of her mother who had lived in London for 
12 years. She used to provide beauty services in people‘s homes but that did 
not provide her with a steady income. Her mother helped her with the financing 
of the house and the business set up. She said that this was quite common in 
her neighbourhood because everyone had a family member abroad. She also 
said that she could now support her family and that one of her daughters helped 
her with the running of the salon‖.  
 
The layout of Cielo‘s beauty salon resembles the typical family business found in the 
Coffee Region:  the store is usually operated from the lower level of the house while 
the family resides in the upper level. As can be appreciated in figure 7.1, this was a 
very common sight in Cuba162:  
                                                 
161
 Cuba is the biggest popular neighbourhood in Pereira. It is home to around 20% of the city‘s 
population. 
162
 Although I did not interview the owners of all these small businesses, a community leader of 
the neighbourhood insisted that the majority of them had been financed with remittances. 
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Figure 7.1: Small family businesses in Barrio Cuba, Pereira 
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So, these migrant families‘ strategy to set up small businesses with remittances was 
primarily a response to the hard economic reality of the region, especially the inability 
to access formal employment. This strategy allowed many not only to employ other 
family members and provide an additional source of income for the family, but also 
served as a mechanism to decrease the family‘s dependence on the remittances they 
receive from their relatives in London. Although from an economic point of view these 
small businesses contribute to the development of the local economy, through the 
generation of employment and tax revenues and increased family incomes to finance 
consumption, ultimately, they cannot remove the structural constraints that have 
historically inhibit the development process of these localities. In practical terms, the 
social and productive base of an economy significantly defines the ways in which 
remittances will effectively function in that economy. The Colombian government‘s 
embrace of the migration-development discourse by emphasising the contribution that 
migrants can make to their places of origin and its insistence on the centrality of 
financial markets for households‘ socioeconomic reproduction is an attempt to shift its 
responsibility for economic development to its citizens at home and abroad. It is also an 
ideologically-inspired mechanism that aims to obscure the more severe problems that 
underpin the lack of development in migrants‘ places of origin. 
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Generating income outside the home: capitalising on housing investments 
The second livelihood strategy among Colombian migrants in London and their families 
in the Coffee Region is to generate additional sources of income from earnings created 
outside of the family‘s home. It entails using the income created through the renting out 
of other property, previously acquired with remittances, as an income supplement. 
These monies do not cross national borders. They are used for the upkeep of the 
property and serve to supplement the monthly remittances that migrants send for the 
maintenance of the family.  
 
Carmen‘s story illustrates these dynamics. The properties that Carmen‘s children 
acquired while living in the UK are now rented and she administers them. One is a 
cottage with a pool and Jacuzzi in a posh condominium which, as Carmen put it, “I 
administer and reinvest the money in the property so my son does not have to send 
money from London for its maintenance”. The other property is a house in Pereira. 
Carmen keeps the rent it produces as extra income, to be able to eat better, travel and 
save. In Carmen‘s words:  
 
―My daughter for example, instead of sending me money every month, she tells 
me to keep the rent of her flat. I spend all that money. I eat a lot of fruit, 
vegetables and white meat, all of which are expensive. The rest I spend 
travelling around here and I also save a little. I have also visited them in London 
5 or 6 times‖ 
 
The case of Viviana‘s family was similar. Viviana, is a 54-year-old who had returned 
temporarily to Colombia, from London, to take care of her ill mother. Her sister Diana 
also lives in London. I asked Viviana about her motivations for investing in property in 
Colombia, she replied:  
 
―My sister Diana bought this house for mum. I bought a house 9 years ago to 
have some extra money coming in, some money guaranteed. I opened a bank 
account where the money for the rent is deposited. We all contribute for the 
maintenance of mum but sometimes I barely have any money left to send from 
London, you know how expensive it is to live there and what you earn, you 
spend because everything is expensive…so, sometimes I have to use some of 
the money that the house produces here, when I cannot send, then I tell my 
mum to withdraw the money from that account‖.  
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As is the case with the aforementioned livelihood strategies employed by migrant 
households, the economic dynamics illustrated by Carmen and Viviana are also not 
being captured by the ‗productive‘ forms of investment favoured by the migration-
development discourse. On the one hand, the additional income that is generated 
through the renting of property is not only improving migrant families‘ wellbeing but is 
also producing a multiplying effect in a variety of local industries through higher 
demand for goods and services. On the other hand, these monies are also rebalancing 
the transnational flows originating in London and indirectly benefiting the British 
economy by leaving migrants with more disposable income to spend locally.  
 
And for some migrant households, the monies derived from the renting of property are 
the only help that migrants are able to provide for their families back home. Among low 
income families, these monies may be critical for the family‘s survival because they 
may constitute their sole source of income. Mariela is a 52-year-old single mother of 
three who lives in London. Her sister lives in Cali and takes care of their disabled 
brother. They are the only members of Mariela‘s nuclear family left in Colombia. Their 
case clearly illustrates this situation:  
 
―My flat in Colombia is rented. When I first came here, I used to send money 
and give them a third of the rent from the flat. I have not been able to send 
money for a while because I have been on benefits since I separated from my 
husband. So, I decided to give my sister, half of the rent I receive for the flat 
and the rest is used to pay the property tax and the administration fee. They 
practically live on that because my family is very poor‖ 
 
The importance of these remittances-related but internally-acquired funds cannot be 
underestimated. These new sources of income have in effect, proved crucial for the 
survival of the family during the current global economic downturn. Thus, in a sense, 
the basic premise on which many migrants base their decision to invest in houses, that 
they are a ‗safe‘ asset, has paid off. Because of the nature of the small scale activities 
that produce these funds (and the steady demand for them), they have not been 
subjected to the vicissitudes of the market and have proved an effective way to cope 
with unexpected economic shocks. Some migrant families talked about how important 
this stream of income has become for the economy of their household. Oriana‘s story 
puts this into perspective:  
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―My daughter used to send us money for the rent, religiously. Then we built this 
house. First we built the first floor and that‘s where we lived. Once the second 
floor had been built, she said that we should move there and rent the first floor. 
When the crisis started, she said that she would not be able to send the same 
amount of money because she used to have three jobs but now she only has 
two, so we needed to take the money from the rent to make ends meet‖.  
 
In summary, the Colombian migrants in London and their families in the coffee region 
interviewed for this study have purposely engaged in a set of strategies that seek to 
diversify the sources of income that sustain their livelihoods. These strategies tend to 
capitalise on the housing investments previously financed with remittances and take 
the form of building additional rooms for rent and/or setting up small businesses in the 
migrant‘s family home. They also involve using the earnings from renting other property 
as an income supplement. These strategies serve as a mechanism to guarantee the 
maintenance and reproduction of the family across the transnational social field by 
creating employment opportunities for the family and/or supplementing the family‘s 
income in case of unexpected changes in migrants‘ ability to remit. These additional 
sources of income ultimately reconfigure the livelihoods of these transnational migrant 
households by de-linking (at least partially) the family‘s subsistence from the migrants‘ 
remittances. These livelihood strategies have produced significant improvements in 
migrant households‘ wellbeing and living standards and have aided the local 
development process through the multiplying effects they have on local industries, 
primarily via higher demand for goods and services. However, because of the form 
they take and the fact they are not producing any formal linkages with the financial 
industry, they have not been taken into account by the ‗productive‘ forms of investment 
favoured by the migration-development discourse.  
 
So, are these dynamics unique to migrant households in the coffee region of 
Colombia? How do these experiences compare with those of other migrant 
communities in Latin America and other parts of the world? 
 
Multifaceted uses of remittances: the wider context 
The use of remittances to engage in strategies that aid the long term maintenance and 
reproduction of livelihoods has been documented among migrant households in many 
other sending countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa. For example, Montoya 
Zavala (2006) has documented the use of remittances to finance small business 
ventures from taxi services and hairdressers to cafeterias, restaurants and hotels in the 
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Dominican Republic, El Salvador, India, Pakistan, Morocco and Tunisia. Sørensen 
(2005) found that some Colombian migrant families with relatives in Italy rely on renting 
rooms in the home, that had been built with remittances, to supplement their income, 
while Verrest and Post (2007) have shown how low-income migrant households in 
Suriname combine remittances and home-based economic activities as livelihood 
strategies to make ends meet. Also, Laurie (2005) has documented how rural migrants 
in Cochabamba, Bolivia established home-based clothing workshops that relied on 
kinship relations with paisanos for their reproduction. But this integration of economic 
activities within and around the dwelling is a feature that has also been previously 
observed among non-migrant families. In Colombia, Kellett (2002) found that a 
significant number of low-income households in Santa Marta used the home as a place 
of sustenance, that is as the centre for production activities, as well as the domestic 
reproduction of the family, while Gough (1999) found that self-help builders in Pereira 
established home-based enterprises as a means of earning extra income to finance the 
completion of their houses. Similarly, Tipple et al. (2002) found that home-based 
enterprises have become crucial to guarantee the livelihoods of low-income families in 
Bolivia, India, Indonesia and South Africa, especially after the introduction of structural 
adjustment programmes in these countries. So, what are the unintended economic 
outcomes that are produced in the process of maintaining and reproducing family 
relations from afar through the sending remittances? 
 
7.1.2. Remittances and housing investments: unintended economic outcomes 
The unintended economic outcomes that emanate from the sending of remittances 
among Colombians in London are related to their ‗multiplying effect‘. This is described 
here as spin-off effect that occurs at the level of the household/family and may or may 
not have immediate economic effects at the community/local economy level. That is, 
remittances not only help their direct beneficiaries in the Coffee Region but also the 
migrant‘s extended family because the former, given their higher disposable income, 
help the latter and these, in turn, help others. In contrast, in the economic literature, the 
‗multiplying effect‘ of remittances derives generally from the fact that a significant 
portion of them is spent in household consumption which has positive impacts on the 
local, regional and national economies (Durand, 2009).  
 
This household multiplying effect is illustrated by the utilisation of remittances in 
Nancy‘s family. Nancy and her brother have lived in London for more than 10 years. 
Their mother, sister and nephews live in Cali. I asked Nancy‘s sister, Ana, how the 
situation of the family had improved since her siblings migrated and she replied:  
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―The situation has definitely improved. One can see for example that my mum 
helps the people she can help with the same money that she receives from my 
siblings. She has 11 siblings and she helps them. She has benefited by their 
emigration and also other people such as my children because they are the 
only two grandchildren that she has here…if they need anything, she gives it to 
them because she now has that extra income from abroad‖.  
 
Similarly, Lina, whose son resides in London, recounted how she was able to help 
other relatives with the money she received from abroad: 
 
―With the money that my son sent me every month, I used to help my brother, 
who does not have a stable job. I used to buy food for my house and his. I also 
help other family members like my sister, who has two children, and my niece 
who is studying in Pereira; I buy food for them because they just don‘t have 
enough money‖.  
 
As the stories of these two migrant households have illustrated, the remittances 
received from London have produced other unintended economic outcomes that 
extend beyond the migrants‘ immediate family. Although migrants do not usually remit 
with the intention of aiding the reproduction of their wider family networks, these are 
nonetheless benefiting in multiple, yet often intangible, ways. These spin-off effects of 
remittances at the household level have tended to be ignored in the economic 
literature, which has concentrated on analysing their wider economic and quantitative 
impacts on growth, investment, labour supply and financial sector development 
(Fajnzylber and López, 2007; Ratha, 2003). Documenting these dynamics highlights 
the fact that there is a wider interdependence between those members of the family 
who migrate and those who stay behind but remain connected with the migrant through 
kinship, economic and social ties and allow us to capture some of the qualitative impact 
that the flow of remittances is having on migrants‘ wider social networks.  
 
In summary, migration and the sending of remittances can be seen, in the broader 
context of transnational family relationships, as part of wider livelihood strategies for 
the maintenance and reproduction of the family. This first section has shown that these 
family reproduction strategies generate other intended and unintended economic 
outcomes. On the one hand, they create avenues for the generation of additional 
sources of income that ultimately reconfigure the livelihoods of these transnational 
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migrant households in the Coffee Region by delinking (at least partially) the family‘s 
subsistence from the migrants‘ remittances. On the other hand, migrant remittances 
have spin-off effects that extend beyond the migrants‘ immediate family, which point to 
the wider interdependence of those who migrate and those who remain behind. On the 
whole, these migrant households‘ strategies to maintain and reproduce the family 
across the transnational social field highlight the conceptually narrow nature of the 
migration-development discourse. In particular, its failure to recognise the important 
and diverse economic and social dimensions of migrant households‘ livelihood 
strategies and, given its obsession with easily quantifiable general measures of 
development, their real impact on households‘ everyday living conditions and local 
development processes. 
 
So how have these households‘ economic advancement and search for guaranteeing 
their long term livelihood shaped their local environment? In particular, the next section 
will explore the changes in landscape that have taken place in the Coffee Region of 
Colombia as a result of a large influx of remittances and their increasing use to finance 
housing construction. This is important because it reflects how the changing economic 
landscape of the region, given its high rates of emigration, has impacted upon its visual 
and socioeconomic landscape. In addition, as the next section will make clear, the 
issue of changing landscapes as a result of increased migration and remittances has 
been a salient and contentious subject in the migration literature. 
 
7.2. Remittances, housing and landscape transformations in Colombia’s Coffee 
Region 
Changing landscapes as a result of increased migration and remittances have been 
observed and documented in a diverse range of communities around the world. These 
studies have vividly described the material changes in the landscapes that have taken 
place in different communities in the global south163 while placing an emphasis on the 
contested nature of the newly-built migrant houses at the community level and how 
they are shaped by local and global processes. For example, in Asia, ()Van der Horst 
(2010) found that some villages in central Anatolia, Turkey were utterly transformed 
through both migration and the construction of new houses by Turkish migrants in the 
                                                 
163
 With the exception of Katharyne Mitchell (1998) who documented the vast changes in 
landscape that occurred in Vancouver's west-side neighbourhoods as wealthy Chinese 
immigrants built ‗Monster Houses‘ and how they disrupted many established notions of home, 
community and the way of life of some local residents.  
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Netherlands. These houses were usually bigger and of a totally different style to the 
vernacular architecture and testified to the success of their owner and were regularly 
created and recreated as summerhouses or retirement retreats. In Africa, Vasile (1997) 
documented how, in an effort to display their material success, working class migrant 
families in the urban periphery of Tunis emulated the ‗villa‘ architectural housing style 
previously reserved for the suburban middle class. Vasile vividly described not only 
how these new houses seemed out of place in these marginal neighbourhoods but 
also, how they are embedded in global social and cultural process and the ways in 
which they contested the elite‘s ideal of economic and social mobility.  
 
In Latin America, Peggy Levitt (2001a) has documented the changes in the housing 
landscape taking place in the Dominican village of Miraflores, where two-thirds of 
families have relatives living in the metropolitan area of Boston in the United States. In 
particular, she vividly described the ways in which the new, mostly half-finished, homes 
differed so completely in style and scale from the other houses in the area. Christien 
Klaufus (2006) has documented the ideological conflicts over the vast physical 
changes in the built environment of Cuenca, Ecuador as a result of massive 
transnational out-migration of lower and middle class locals to the US and Europe in 
the last two decades. She concluded that the established elite‘s objections to these 
new constructions were based on notions of class, class-based geography and taste. 
Similar cases have been documented in other parts of Ecuador and Mexico. Colloredo-
Mansfeld (1994) has documented that in Ecuador‘s northern Andes, local and 
transnational textile weaver/trading families create new architectural forms to affirm 
their economic success and social position. Fletcher (1999) documented similar trends 
in a village in the state of Michoacán which relies heavily on transnational migration to 
the Los Angeles area of the United States while Pader (1993) explored housing as a 
culturally mediated phenomenon among Mexicans living in the US and migrants 
returning to the state of Jalisco, Mexico. A more recent study by a group of 
Anthropologists and Architects under the umbrella of the Spanish Agency for 
International Development entitled ‗the architecture of remittances: dreams of return, 
signs of success‘ documented the great influence of economic and social remittances 
on the family and community life and architecture of Guatemala, El Salvador and 
Honduras (AECID, 2010). All these examples point to the fact that landscapes are 
deeply embedded in social relations and are part of complex processes through which 
individuals define themselves and claim a place in the social and economic arena in 
which they function.   
 
 179 
 
As explained in chapter 3, the coffee region of Colombia occupies an important place in 
the geographies of migration of the country. The central western area of Colombia, the 
Eje Cafetero and the state of Valle del Cauca, has the highest rate of emigration in the 
country and receives around 50% of the remittances that enter the country every year. 
In addition, around 50% of Colombian migrants in London come from this geographical 
area. So, how much has the region‘s visual landscape change as a result of these 
trends?  
 
The visual changes 
Although there is no hard data on the number of houses that have been built and/or 
improved with remittances in the cities and towns of the Eje Cafetero, their increasing 
number and visibility is a fact in the common domain of migrant and non-migrant 
families alike164. Andrea, the 51-year-old woman from Pereira who has lived in London 
for 14 years, summed up the situation: 
 
―I know that the economy of Anserma165 is driven by the remittances that are 
sent from overseas…here in London there are an awful lot of people from 
Anserma…I visited Anserma 2 years ago and I found that it had changed a lot, 
quite a lot. My brother (who lives there) told me that virtually all these changes 
are due to the emigration of people from there because everybody sends 
money, every 8-15 days people (the family members) receive money; they open 
up businesses, there is a lot of construction…you know that one comes here 
and the main objective is to build a home, buy a home….so there has been a lot 
of progress in the town – it has changed a lot with emigration‖. 
 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the sorts of changes that Andrea described. It is evident that these 
new houses, presumably financed with remittances166 contrast in style and scale with 
the old houses. These houses seem to be constantly in construction, expanding 
upwards and tend to have new, freshly painted façades. One important reason for this 
is that, unlike the trends documented in other localities in Asia and Latin America, 
these houses are not built for migrants‘ summer or holiday retreats. They are usually 
                                                 
164
 As it is argued in chapters 2 and 5, one clear sign of this trend is the fact that the Colombian 
government has put all its weight behind the institutionalisation of the flows of money that fund 
these housing investments.  
165
 Anserma is a traditional coffee town in the Eje Cafetero. 
166
 Certainly, not all new/enlarged houses in the towns and cities of the Coffee Region belong to 
migrant families. However, many of the people I interviewed in different localities in the region 
pointed at me the houses they know, first hand, have been built, extended/remodelled or bought 
by migrant families in their neighbourhoods with the remittances sent from abroad.   
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inhabited by the migrants‘ relatives at origin and are often used to derive an additional 
source of income, such as the renting of newly-built additional floors.  
 
Figure 7.2: Changing landscapes in Anserma, Caldas 
Photographs by author 
 
These visual changes in the housing landscape were one of the main issues that 
residents of the Eje Cafetero highlighted when asked about recent socioeconomic 
changes in their communities. These housing improvements were invariably linked to 
an overall improvement in the quality of life of the people with relatives abroad.  
 
As Margarita, the hairdresser in Anserma, Caldas, eloquently put it:  
 
―One can see a lot of improvement in the houses. The shacks are not shacks 
anymore and there is a lot of housing restoration going on…A lot of people 
have bought houses in the new neighbourhoods outside the centre or even in 
Pereira because this area (the centre) has always been reserved for people 
with old money, the town‘s traditional families…although there are still a lot of 
wattle and daub houses because there is still a lot of poverty here in the town. 
One can see that the families that receive money from abroad live better and 
much more relaxed‖.  
 
Eugenia, a 69-year-old, resident of Zaragoza, Valle whose sisters and nephews have 
lived in London since the 1990s, also spoke about the changes she had seen in her 
community in the last few years:  
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―Well, there have certainly been changes around here because a lot people 
have left. A few things have changed, not everything. Of course, the houses 
have been improved. Primarily, the people with relatives abroad, like me, have 
improved their kitchens, the bathrooms, the façades; those are the most 
important things. The majority make these changes little by little with 
remittances…around here, people tend to fix, remodel their old houses‖. 
 
But as the stories of Margarita and Eugenia suggest, despite the fact that migrant 
families have been able to upgrade their old homes or build new houses with the 
remittances they receive, that has not necessarily meant that they have been able to 
move up the socioeconomic ladder167. So, the increasing use of remittances to finance 
housing investment has no doubt allowed migrant families to significantly improve their 
individual living conditions but this has not necessarily meant more profound changes 
in their socioeconomic standing or the structures of the localities where they reside.  
This should not be surprising given that, as explored in chapter 6, migrants‘ decisions 
to invest in housing were invariably linked with guaranteeing a space for the 
reproduction of the family back home and/or as part of a long term personal strategy to 
facilitate their eventual return, not as a conscious decision to challenge the 
socioeconomic order in their localities of origin. Nonetheless, it seems that the changes 
that have been made to some of the houses have gone beyond fulfilling the need to 
provide shelter and guaranteeing a space for the family‘s reproduction. As explored in 
chapter 6, because for many the dream of homeownership can only be materialised by 
migrating, the houses built also tend to be an expression of the material success 
attained while living and working abroad. So, the materialisation of the dream of 
homeownership among migrant families is by no means, a homogenous process. As 
figures 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate, these expressions of success are quite varied and do not 
necessarily follow a specific architectural pattern and their contrast in style and scale is 
even more striking in towns where wattle and daub houses used to dominate the 
landscape. Thus, the importance that migrants attach to these houses may not only be 
associated with their capacity to improve the material structures but also with their 
hopes and ideals, with feelings of security and continuity and as a setting for the 
expression of the self.  
 
                                                 
167
 This finding is largely in line with recent studies on the impact of remittances on poverty. 
Based on 20 years of data for Asian developing countries, Vargas-Silva (2011) found that 
although remittances have no impact on poverty ratios they do have a significant impact in 
reducing the depth of poverty (people may be less poor even if they do not cross the poverty 
threshold).   
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Figure 7.3: Wattle and daub and remittance-financed houses, Anserma, Caldas
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph by author 
 
Figure 7.4: Wattle and daub and remittance-financed houses, Zaragoza, Valle  
Photographs by author 
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In summary, high rates of emigration have produced significant changes in the housing 
landscapes in Colombia‘s coffee region. The materialisation of the dream of 
homeownership among migrant families is a heterogeneous process. The varied 
architectural styles indicate that these housing investments are a rich expression of the 
material and non-material possibilities that have been accrued by migrating. Certainly, 
investing in housing is the translation of migrants‘ efforts and sacrifices into the ability 
to produce and consume a space for the reproduction of the family, which is one of the 
main reasons behind migrating. It is a merging of the social, the material and the 
symbolic that may be producing these specific landscapes. On the face of it, these 
housing investments have produced significant improvements in the living conditions of 
migrant households even if they have not necessarily implied greater changes to their 
socioeconomic standing or local social structures, as has been documented elsewhere. 
Yet, these investments can be interpreted as one of the mechanism that migrants have 
found to maintain a presence and participate in the socioeconomic life of their places of 
origin from afar.  Although there is no hard data on the number of houses that have 
been built and/or improved with remittances in the cities and towns of the Eje Cafetero, 
what is clear is that these investments are an important ingredient in the remaking of 
the visual landscape of these localities.  
 
The final section contextualises the family reproduction strategies discussed in the 
empirical chapters of this thesis by exploring the social cost and personal sacrifices 
that underpin the sending of remittances for the maintenance and reproduction of the 
family in the transnational field. This is important because although migrants have been 
placed at the centre of the migration-development discourse, these aspects of 
migrants‘ lives have tended to be ignored in the literature.  
 
7.3. Family reproduction strategies: personal sacrifices and social cost 
As explained in chapter 6, international migration is seen by most Colombian migrants 
in London as a vehicle to realise their dreams. In general, these dreams are closely 
related with obtaining the means for the family‘s maintenance and reproduction and 
hence, greater welfare for themselves and their families. This perception is 
underpinned by a general sense of limited labour opportunities in the local market 
epitomised by the phrase ‗en Colombia no se puede progresar‘168 and also, by the 
urgency of searching and providing for a brighter and better future for themselves and 
their families.  
                                                 
168
 ‗one cannot get ahead in Colombia‘ 
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In effect, most of the migrants interviewed for this study have been able to, partially or 
wholly, materialise those dreams. The materialisation of those dreams has taken the 
form of a general (and in times, quite significant) improvement in both their own, and 
their families‘ welfare. In the process of maintaining and reproducing the family across 
the transnational social field, migrants pride themselves in having built/bought houses, 
improved the old ones and/or recovered houses previously lost during the mortgage 
crisis and guaranteeing a good level of subsistence for their family members back 
home. They are also able to provide their children with the opportunities they never 
had, help other family members in times of crisis, including facilitating the migration of 
other family members and funding the education of relatives who would otherwise not 
be able to afford it. Although the decision to migrate tends to be very personal, 
migrants usually expressed their decision to migrate in terms of the needs and welfare 
of their families, especially their children, specifically, the search for a better future for 
them. But fulfilling these needs has come at a great personal cost, especially in terms 
of downward occupational and social mobility.  
 
However, as Datta et al. (2007) have rightly pointed out, despite the fact that 
remittances have been hailed for their potential role as drivers of economic 
development in migrant-sending countries, the emotional sacrifices that migrants make 
in order to remit and the exploitative conditions under which those remittances are 
created have not been widely documented. Thus, in order to address this gap, this 
section documents the personal hardship, involved in the migration process and the 
sending of remittances, faced my migrants in London as well as the experiences and 
emotional toll that these have had on their families in the coffee region of Colombia. 
This is especially important given the difficult social, economic and political conditions 
that most of these migrants left behind but, in many parts of the country, continue to be 
felt until today.  
 
Migration, family reproduction and personal sacrifices 
In the coffee region, as in much of the rest of the country, the armed conflict, high 
levels of poverty, marginalisation and social and economic exclusion  intertwined in 
such a way that people from all socioeconomic backgrounds have been pushed to 
seek social, political and economic refuge abroad. A sense of desperation and the 
urgency of searching for a better future was commonplace among Colombians in 
London. This situation was well summarized by Ana Carolina, a 41-year-old migrant 
from Pereira who has worked as a cleaner in London for 7 years: 
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―I came here because of the situation, the difficult economic situation we had. I 
had three little girls. I did not have a proper job, I used to sell lingerie and 
cosmetics via catalogue. It was difficult to get a job because I did not finish high 
school….so we depended on my husband‘s salary and that was simply not 
enough. We were on the verge of losing our house and I felt trapped. I did not 
have any hope for the future of my children, for their education which was the 
thing that worried me the most. I wanted to get ahead, I wanted them to 
become someone, to go to university, not to stay home like me or become 
maids. But to come here, I had to leave my daughters there. That is very sad 
and very painful. We, the people who leave our children behind, we suffer 
horribly, I do not wish that kind of pain to anyone‖ 
 
And it seems that Ana Carolina has in effect, been able to completely transform her 
and her family‘s life by providing her daughters with the opportunity to get an 
education, something she did not have.  When I spoke to Ana Carolina‘s daughter, 
Judith, in Pereira, she recounted all the things that they, as a family, had been able to 
achieve since her mother migrated but also how painful it was to see her go. Judith 
was in her late teens when her mother migrated:  
 
―My mum left because she wanted to give us a better future and living here with 
my dad made that impossible. Back then, it was very, very painful and 
unsettling to realise that she was not going to be around and I still feel like there 
is something missing in my life. But my mother helps us a lot with everything. 
She helps me and my daughter, especially now that I am between jobs…she 
pays for my daughter‘s school, the transport, the food, etc. She also helps my 
grandmother and the rest of her family. If my mum had not left, god only knows 
what would have happened to us in the middle of all this poverty here in 
Colombia. The best thing that has happened is that my mum was able to take 
my sisters to London. They have their papers and they are now polishing their 
English to be able to study because there are a lot of opportunities there and 
things are easier. Ah and after I had my baby, my mum offered to pay for my 
school. I am now a nursing assistant…and she wants to buy us a house this 
year‖.   
 
The achievements that Ana Carolina‘s family have been able to attain based on her 
migration to London are indeed great. Ana Carolina has not only been able to improve 
the current living standards of her immediate family members but, by providing her 
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daughters with an education, has also been able to enhance their future prospects. 
Indeed, the higher purchasing power that remittances afford to this migrant household 
has allowed an investment in human capital that would have not been possible prior to 
migration. The story of this family highlights the socioeconomic possibilities that are 
being created by the multiple resources generated by migration but also the emotional 
sacrifices that they have had to make in order to fulfil their aspirations.  
 
These socioeconomic possibilities in Colombia are being created at the same time that 
migrants themselves are experiencing de-skilling, de-professionalisation and downward 
social mobility in London. And more often than not, these experiences have been 
accompanied by a deterioration of migrants‘ socio-human condition: high rates of 
depression, loneliness and feelings of isolation. Andrea, a 51-year-old migrant in 
London, put it bluntly:  
 
―Living here has not been easy, especially when we first came. We used to 
work from 5 in the morning until 10 at night, cleaning offices...but we were 
educating our children in Colombia and that was expensive. Here I have worked 
with doctors, lawyers and engineers, all with a cloth in their hands cleaning 
desks…one as an immigrant has to be humble because you have to make a 
living and living in London is extremely expensive, one lives as a poor person 
here…But the worst is the lack of papers, we lived through that and one feels 
devastated. Also the stress and the one thing that is very, very hard and 
touches all of us is depression. When the first December came, we felt awful 
knowing that the whole family was in Colombia and only the two of us were 
here…that was depressing…my sister and I spent entire weekends just crying, 
crying, crying‖. 
 
But Andrea‘s story is not unique. As Durant (2009:29) reminds us: „In many rich and 
developed countries, the labour situation and living conditions of migrant workers is not 
only questionable but inadmissible‟. The nature of the labour market in a global city 
such as London, where there is great demand for highly skilled professionals but also 
low-skilled service workers, means that these low-paid jobs with limited advancement 
opportunities and job security tend to be filled by documented and undocumented 
migrant workers. Two main reasons explain Colombian migrants‘ de-skilling, de-
professionalisation and subsequently downward social mobility. On the one hand, a 
significant proportion of them do not have the necessary language skills needed to 
thrive in London‘s competitive labour market. On the other hand, the professional 
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qualifications they have obtained back home are not always easily recognised (or 
equivalent) in the UK. The fact that migrants from the global south tend to face 
downward occupational and social mobility in cities in the global north, has been 
previously documented. Sørensen (2005) has documented the growing class 
diversification and labour informalisation of Colombian and Dominican migrants in 
Europe. Specifically, the fact that increasingly migrants, regardless of their class 
background, are forced to take precarious jobs in the informal labour market of the 
European societies where they settle. Similarly, Datta et al. (2007) found that almost 
half of low-paid migrant workers in London held jobs that required substantially lower 
qualifications than those they had obtained in their home countries. And as explained in 
chapter 3, the Latin American Migration in Europe Survey found that a great portion of 
Colombians in London reported having experienced downward social mobility: while 
46% belonged to the lower and lower middle income strata in Colombia, now 76% do 
so in London society (LatMES cited in Guarnizo, 2008).  
 
Nonetheless, migrants recognised that living and working under these conditions was 
the personal price they had to pay in order to send remittances for the maintenance 
and reproduction of the family and the materialisation of the dreams that pushed them 
to leave Colombia. In short, the migration experience was internalised as a sacrifice 
that had to be made by the individual, the migrant, for the welfare of all, the family. 
 
As Diana, a 51-year-old migrant who has resided in London for 20 years, summed it 
up: 
 
―The majority of us leave our country searching for a better future but to be able 
to attain that you have to work hard and you have to go through a lot of things. 
It has been hard. The first year, I used to cry every day and I wanted to go 
back. Then I set myself a target but time goes on and I saw that I could help my 
family because I started to make money and what I made here was worth twice 
or three times the amount there (in pesos). That is what made me think twice 
about going back to Colombia because I knew that it would be difficult to help 
my family living there…That is what pushed me to stay in this country‖.  
 
But although the remittances migrants send have produced significant material 
progress and considerable improvements in the quality of life and general wellbeing of 
their families, the migration of loved ones has also taken a personal toll on the family 
members left behind in the coffee region.  The case of Maricruz‘s family provides a 
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telling example. Maricruz, her brother and nephews live in London. Maricruz also has a 
sister in Spain. Her sister Dulce, who lives in Pereira, recounted the emotional toll that 
the migration of her relatives has taken on her family: 
 
―It hurts me quite a lot to see my brother‘s son. He is 12 and has been without 
his father for 8 years now. He practically does not remember his father. They 
talk via the internet but it is not the same. I long for the day they, my siblings, 
come back because my parents miss them quite a lot and they are getting older 
and weaker. My parents are in their 80s and I know that the deterioration of 
their health has been accelerated by the absence of my siblings…So, yes my 
parents live better now because of the help they get from them but what we 
have felt the most is that big void, that big gap in the family, it is very sad‖.  
 
Although these trends have been not been extensively documented, the very few 
available studies on migrant communities in Latin America point in the same direction. 
For example, a recent study on the emotional impacts of migration on origin families in 
Mexico found that the migration of close family members to the US such as spouses 
and children significantly increases depression and feelings of loneliness among family 
members remaining in Mexico (Silver, 2011). Similarly, Pribilsky (2007) has 
documented the adverse emotional effects that the migration of men from the 
Ecuadorian Andes to New York has had on the women left behind.  
 
The fact that the majority of Colombian migrants interviewed for this study are found at 
the margins of London‘s occupational and socioeconomic structure along with the 
expressed enormous personal toll that migration has bestowed upon them and their 
families, point us to question the extent to which migrants still perceive their migration 
project to have been worth it. Despite the hardships they have endured during their 
time in London, most migrants expressed that the benefits of migrating still outweigh 
the personal cost of having to live separated from their loved ones. They perceive 
British society as much more egalitarian than Colombian society, a place that provides 
opportunities for advancement regardless of a person‘s social background.  In 
particular, London is perceived as the place that has given them the opportunities for 
material and non-material gains, they would have not been able to attain in Colombia. 
 
Mariana put some of these issues into perspective. She is a 36-year-old migrant from 
Buga, Valle. Mariana and her husband came to London 10 years ago. After working as 
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a cleaner for a few years, Mariana managed to get certified as a nursery teacher.  She 
recounted her experience of living here:  
 
―The past is sad. I had to go through a lot of sad experiences to be able to get 
where I am now. Coming and living in this country has not been easy and you 
face difficulties at the personal, professional and financial levels. But this is a 
country of opportunities for everybody, the poor, the rich and the lame. There is 
a balance here and one cannot tell who is rich or poor because everyone 
relates to everyone...It is not like in Colombia where there is such a big 
imbalance between the rich and the poor and where people are separated by 
the neighbourhoods in which they live…‖ 
 
Antonio, a 44-year-old, small business owner from Pereira who migrated to London 
with his family in 1999, also put it succinctly. I asked him whether he thought it had 
been worth migrating:  
 
―Look I have to tell you that I am very grateful to this country because despite all 
the difficulties you have to face as an immigrant, at least here even old people 
find jobs and that is very important, to feel useful. There are many reasons that 
attract and keep people here in this country. Here you can have a new 
experience, you see economic improvement, physical security, economic 
security and stability and a better future for your children and your family….and 
on top of it, help your family in Colombia…how can you have all that there [in 
Colombia]?‖.   
 
As these quotations illustrate, even though most of these Colombian migrants occupy a 
marginal position in London‘s social and economic life, they perceived the UK as a 
place with opportunities for upward social mobility which are not available in Colombia, 
because of its rigid class structure and high levels of inequality. Thus, living and 
working in London (a global city) represents an improvement in migrants‘ position vis-à-
vis their equals in Colombia. These findings should not be surprising given that, as 
explained in chapter 2, migrants‘ socioeconomic and cultural terms of reference tend to 
operate simultaneously in the society of origin and destination. So, while these 
perceptions of British society may sound too optimistic, the fact is that migrants multiple 
interactions, socioeconomic practices and context-specific understandings are 
constituted within their own historical specific points of reference. Despite all the 
difficulties they have had to face, for these migrants, the economic possibilities that 
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London has to offer are no match for the harsh socioeconomic and political 
environment they left behind.  
 
In summary, international migration has allowed most Colombians in London 
interviewed for this study to, wholly or partially, improve their own and their families‘ 
welfare. But fulfilling the needs of maintaining and reproducing the family across the 
transnational social field has usually come at a personal cost to migrants in London as 
well as their extended social unit in the coffee region of Colombia. These costs have 
tended to be ignored in the literature, and are especially absent in the migration-
development discourse. In particular, this section highlighted that important 
socioeconomic possibilities, such as investing in housing and human capital, are being 
created in Colombia by the multiple resources generated by migration. But these 
possibilities are being created at the same time that migrants themselves are 
experiencing de-skilling, de-professionalisation and downward social mobility in 
London. Migrants‘ position of liminality in London‘s occupational and social structure 
has often been accompanied by high rates of depression, loneliness and feelings of 
isolation, some of which are also being felt by their loved ones back home. Because 
migrants‘ socioeconomic and cultural terms of reference tend to operate 
simultaneously in the society of origin and destination, for these migrants, living and 
working in London represents an improvement in their position vis-à-vis their equals in 
Colombia. Thus, the evidence presented here suggests that most migrant households 
perceive that the benefits of migrating outweigh the personal cost of having to live 
separated from their loved ones.  
 
7.4. Concluding remarks 
Migration and the sending of remittances can be seen, in the broader context of 
transnational family relationships, as part of wider livelihood strategies for the 
maintenance and reproduction of the household. For Colombian migrants in London 
and their families in the coffee region, these family reproduction strategies have 
generated other intended and unintended economic outcomes. On the one hand, they 
have created avenues for the generation of additional sources of income that may 
ultimately reconfigure the livelihoods of these transnational migrant households by 
partially de-linking, over time, the family‘s subsistence from the migrants‘ remittances. 
These resources are being generated within the home, by building additional rooms for 
rent, housing for housing, or setting up small businesses. They are also being 
generated outside of the home, by using the earnings from renting other property 
(previously financed with remittances) as an income supplement. On the other hand, 
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migrant remittances have spin-off effects that extend to the migrant‘s wider social 
network, which point to the wider interdependence between those who migrate and 
those who remain behind.  
 
Migrant households‘ economic advancement has shaped the environment they left 
behind. In particular, the large influx of remittances and their increasing use to finance 
housing construction have produced significant changes in the visual housing 
landscape of the Coffee Region of Colombia. These housing investments are a rich 
expression of the material and non-material possibilities that have been accrued by 
migrating and are an important ingredient in the remaking of the visual landscape of 
these localities. Although important socioeconomic possibilities are being created in 
Colombia by the multiple resources generated by migration, this has usually come at a 
personal cost to migrants in London as well as their extended social unit in the coffee 
region of Colombia. In particular, these possibilities are being created at the same time 
that migrants themselves are experiencing de-skilling, de-professionalisation and 
downward social mobility in London. While their families endure the emotional sacrifice 
of having to live separated from their loved ones in order to guarantee the reproduction 
of the family. However, because migrants‘ socioeconomic and cultural terms of 
reference tend to operate simultaneously in the society of origin and destination, for 
these migrants, living and working in London represents an improvement in their 
position vis-à-vis their equals in Colombia.  
 
The findings presented here point to the conceptually narrow nature of the migration-
development discourse and its failure to recognise the multiple economic and social 
dimensions of migrant households‘ diverse livelihood strategies and their impact on the 
development process. On the one hand, many households‘ livelihood strategies involve 
channelling remittances to the construction industry and they make an important 
contribution to migrants households‘ improved living standards and aid the local 
development process through the multiplying effects they have on local industries. 
However, these activities are not considered ‗productive‘ investments and hence, are 
not being captured by the migration-development discourse because they are not 
producing any formal linkages with the financial industry. On the other hand, although 
migrants have been placed at the centre of the migration-development discourse, 
important aspects of their lives have tended to be ignored. Specifically, because of the 
insistence on exulting migrants‘ role as consumers and producers of wealth, this 
neoliberal-inspired discourse has ignored their condition as citizens with social rights. 
Moreover, it has downplayed the social, economic,  political and historical factors that 
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pushed migrants to leave their countries of origin and the conditions in which most of 
them enter (and remain in) their societies of destination in the global north.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis has explored the multiple political, financial and social linkages that are 
generated by migrants‘ transnational practices while contextualising the connections 
between state policy, economic development, global financial flows, family livelihood 
strategies and migration experiences and aspirations. This analysis has been grounded 
in an examination of the ways in which Colombian migrants are being constructed as 
transnational financial subjects and how the construction of these subjectivities fits 
within broader discourses of development and neoliberalism.  The study is based on 
multi-sited empirical data collected at both ends of the migration network, London and 
Colombia. It has employed a multi-method approach to data collection that includes 
semi-structured interviews and participant observation as well as secondary qualitative 
and quantitative data. It has also employed a set of methodological techniques such as 
volunteering at migrant organisations and establishing links with local academic 
groups, which facilitated the research process and provided a wide range of contextual 
and practical insights not available in the formal literatures.  
 
This final chapter begins by reviewing the research questions and outlining the main 
findings of this research. This is followed by an exploration of this thesis‘ theoretical, 
empirical and methodological contributions to current debates on the link between 
migration and development. Finally, it outlines some of the policy implications that 
derive from this study and highlights the avenues for future research.  
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8.1. Summary of findings 
As outlined in chapter 1, this thesis aimed to answer the following questions:  
3) How are Colombian migrants being constructed as transnational financial 
subjects? And what role is the state playing in shaping the construction of these 
new financial subjectivities through housing?  
4) How are Colombian migrants in London and their households in the Coffee 
Region of Colombia realising their dream of homeownership? And what 
implications do their transnational housing investments have for our 
understanding of the link between migration and development? 
 
In order to answer these questions, chapter 2 situated the Colombian government‘s 
narratives around the use of remittances to finance housing investment within broader 
discourses of development and neoliberalism, in an era of growing financialisation of 
the process of capital accumulation. It also drew on recent scholarship on the 
processes of transnationalism to frame migrants‘ diverse practices along the 
geography of the migration network. It examined how these articulate with the state‘s 
efforts to institutionalise migrant households‘ economic practices in the transnational 
field. Chapter 3 provided detailed contextual information on the historical and recent 
developments in relation to Colombian migration, remittances and the socioeconomic 
and political context that underpin these developments. It also framed the Colombian 
government‘s response to recent developments in the arenas of migration and 
remittances within the wider regional and global contexts. 
 
Chapter 5 examined the ways in which the Colombian government is constructing 
migrants as financial subjects abroad and how these subjectivities have progressively 
been incorporated into the national policy discourse and practice. This was achieved by 
analysing the remittances-for-housing programmes that target Colombian migrants: ‗Mi 
casa con remesas‘ and international housing fairs. Chapters 6 explored the alternative 
strategies and experiences of accessing housing articulated by Colombian migrants in 
London and their households in the Coffee Region of Colombia. Finally, chapter 7 
explored other intended and unintended social and economic outcomes that are 
generated by remittances and their use to finance housing investments. It also 
documented the changes in landscape that have taken place in the Coffee Region of 
Colombia as a result of the changing economic geographies that have accompanied 
the high rates of emigration from the region and the personal sacrifices and social cost 
that underpin the sending of remittances.  
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The main empirical findings of this research can be grouped in three main strands. 
First, despite the numerous changes introduced since the 1970s with the aim to boost 
the construction sector and position housing finance at the centre of the sector‘s revival 
as an engine of growth, Colombia‘s housing finance market remains shallow at best. 
The rigidity of the requirements and low levels of formal employment and economic 
activity have meant that in practice, housing finance remains out of reach for the 
majority of Colombia‘s population, who belong to the lower and lower-middle income 
strata. In this scenario, the Colombian government has embraced the migration-for-
development discourse emanating from the international development and aid 
agencies. It has engaged in a dynamic campaign to redefine its relationship with its 
diaspora in an attempt to institutionalise migrants‘ transnational practices by designing 
specific programmes to channel remittances to key sectors such as housing and 
finance. To this end, the government created the ‗ColombiaNosUne‘ (Colombia unites 
us) programme in 2003. Under this programme, the government has backed a 
programme designed and financed by the Inter-American Development Bank, based 
on the use of remittances for mortgage-backed housing acquisition. But the Colombian 
government has gone a step further than many other sending states by promoting 
housing/property fairs for Colombian migrants in their main cities of destination in the 
global north: Madrid, London, New York and Miami. Despite the fact that the 
government has put all its weight behind creating and sustaining a new transnational 
socioeconomic space by rendering migrants as financial subjects abroad through 
programmes aimed to channel remittances to ‗productive investment‘, the overall 
impact of these programmes has been relatively small. Given the western-centred 
nature of these programmes, structural constraints in their design and implementation 
have prevented them from having a wider impact, especially among Colombians in 
London. 
 
Second, the majority of Colombian migrants in London interviewed for this study have 
invested in housing in Colombia after having migrated. However, none of them has 
accessed housing through the government-sponsored programmes, ‗Mi casa con 
remesas‘ and the international housing fairs or by borrowing from a bank. Thus, 
Colombian migrants in London have not embraced their newly-assigned financial 
subjectivities but are instead using alternative strategies for housing acquisition and 
financing. These housing investments are not ‗productive‘ in the sense articulated by 
the government, as new-mortgage-financed housing but instead take the form of local-
level, gradual housing upgrading or building and are financed by the monthly 
remittances sent by migrants, which generally bypass the formal banking system. 
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These alternative strategies to access housing are underpinned by migrants‘ generally 
negative perception and mistrust of the government to solve the social and economic 
problems that pushed them to live Colombia and/or improve the hard socioeconomic 
reality they are faced with in London.  For these migrants, investing in housing fulfils 
multiple roles such as fulfilling one of the goals of migrating and directly improving the 
family‘s welfare as well as providing a sense of present and future stability and 
security. In this sense, housing investments have material but also important qualitative 
effects on the everyday lives of migrant households. The fact that migrants continue to 
rely on their family members back home for the materialisation of the dream of 
homeownership and that the investment process is quite transnational in nature 
elucidates the role that these investments play in the maintenance and reproduction of 
family relations across the transnational social field. 
 
Finally, for Colombian migrants in London and their families in the Coffee Region, 
these family reproduction strategies have generated other intended and unintended 
economic outcomes. On the one hand, they have created avenues for the generation 
of additional sources of income that may ultimately reconfigure the livelihoods of these 
transnational migrant households by partially de-linking, over time, the family‘s 
subsistence from the migrants‘ remittances. On the other hand, migrant remittances 
have spin-off effects that extend to the migrant‘s wider social network. The large influx 
of remittances and their increasing use to finance housing construction have produced 
significant changes in the visual housing landscape of the Coffee Region of Colombia. 
Although important socioeconomic possibilities are being created in Colombia by the 
multiple resources generated by migration, this has usually come at a personal cost to 
migrants in London as well as their extended social unit in the coffee region of 
Colombia. These more nuanced social and economic contributions (and costs) that 
migrant households‘ diverse livelihood strategies in the transnational field have for the 
development of their households and communities are not being captured by the 
migration-development discourse.  
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8.2. Contribution to knowledge  
Given the absence of previous research on the interactions between the political, 
financial and social geographies of transnational migration in the context of housing, 
this thesis makes a number of theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions 
to knowledge.  
 
The main theoretical contribution of this research stems from its crossing of disciplinary 
boundaries to create an arena for analysis that emphasises the mutual constitution of 
the global north and south and ‗de-compartmentalises space‘ (Pollard et al., 2009). In 
particular, it has developed a cross-disciplinary conceptual framework that articulates 
the local-to-global connections of the transnational practices that flow, between the 
north and the south, through both ends of the migration network, and how they shape 
and are shaped by the wider socioeconomic and political-economic processes of 
capitalist development (chapter 2). This framework has been developed by paying 
particular attention to the role of the state in shaping and framing these practices in an 
era of growing financialisation of the process of capital accumulation (chapter 5) while 
privileging embodied accounts of migrant households‘ livelihoods (chapters 6 and 7). 
Thus, this research has challenged the boundaries between economic geography and 
development studies by answering calls to ‗bridge the divide‘ between these two sub 
disciplines (Vira and James, 2011) and  stretching economic geography‘s research to 
the confines of the global south (Murphy, 2008). 
 
The main empirically-based but theoretically significant contribution of this research 
stems from its conceptualisation of Colombian migrants as transnational financial 
subjects and its critical readings of the link between migration and development. In this 
sense, I have made three main arguments. Firstly, the Colombian government‘s efforts 
to cast migrants as transnational financial subjects and hence as agents of 
development is tightly linked to wider attempts at the institutionalisation of migrants‘ 
transnational social field. These attempts are embedded in ideologically-driven 
neoliberal discourses of citizenship that privilege the financial market as the medium for 
individuals‘ and households‘ socioeconomic reproduction and displace the 
responsibility for economic development from the state to its citizens (at home and 
abroad). Secondly, based on the primary role of the Colombian government in the 
construction of migrants‘ financial subjectivities, the nation-state continues to play a 
crucial role not only in framing the terms under which transnational practices take place 
but it is also being pushed to redefine its domain of action in an attempt to capture the 
resources of the population beyond its borders. Finally, the singling out of the housing 
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and financial sectors for migrants‘ incorporation into the polity as agents of 
development is not a coincidence, rather it is based in a belief in the neoliberal 
orthodoxy of development economics and a recognition of the potential that migrant 
households‘ links with global circuits of capital and finance have for the country‘s 
incorporation into the global capitalist system.  
 
Furthermore, as illustrated in chapters 6 and 7, the migration-for-development 
discourse and its programmes tend to be based on a set of narrow, prescriptive and 
economistic practices that exult migrants‘ role as consumers and producers of wealth. 
Conversely, they ignore their condition as citizens with social rights and the social, 
cultural, political and historical factors that pushed them to leave the country and the 
conditions in which most of them enter (and remain in) their societies of destination in 
the global north. In addition, because the migration-for-development programmes 
privilege easily quantifiable general measures of development, they fail to capture the 
multi-faceted and more nuanced contributions that migrant households‘ diverse 
livelihood strategies in the transnational field have for the development of their 
households and communities at origin. 
 
Lastly, this thesis‘ main methodological contribution is having brought back geography 
into transnational discourses by tracing Colombian migrants‘ transnational practices 
along the geography of the migration network.  Although it has been suggested that 
high rates of migration have transformed Colombia into a „transnational social 
formation‟ (Guarnizo, 2006a), there remains a dearth of research on the transnational 
practices of Colombians abroad. In addition, most research has been conducted either 
at the point of departure or destination and has, for the most part, focused on the 
established flows of migrants to the United States and more recently, on the 
transnational connections established by Colombians in Spain (cf. Bermúdez Torres, 
2006; Cock, 2008; Echeverri, 2010; García, 2008; Gimeno Collado et al., 2009; 
Guarnizo, 2006b; Guarnizo and Diaz, 1999; Portes, 2003; Puyana Villamizar et al., 
2009; Sørensen and Guarnizo, 2007). This research has followed migrant households‘ 
multifaceted links along the geography of the migration network, London and the 
Coffee Region of Colombia, particularly in terms of their experiences of accessing 
housing. This has been achieved by utilising a range of methodological techniques 
(chapter 4) that frame migrants‘ transnational practices within broader regional, 
national and global political, economic and social processes. This methodological 
approach has allowed for unpacking the complex processes that are produced and 
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reproduced by the transnational flows of people and resources that are involved in the 
process of maintaining and reproducing the family in the transnational field.  
 
8.3. Policy implications and avenues for future research  
The development model based on remittances promoted by the international financial 
institutions and embraced by the Colombian government is a response to its inability 
and/or interest in filling the economic vacuum being left by the neoliberal structural 
adjustment policies that have been implemented since the 1990s. Considering the fact 
that the implementation of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes in Colombia 
was one of the triggers for the recent large flows of emigration from the country, it is 
counter productive to think that the neoliberal-inspired migration-for-development 
programmes now being promoted would bring about the kind of development that 
years of public policy have failed to produce. There are two main reasons for this. On 
the one hand, the fundamental socioeconomic and political structure that pushed most 
migrants to leave continues to be unchanged. On the other hand, the Colombian 
migration-for-development programmes do not tackle the structural and institutional 
inadequacies that curtail the development process at the local and national levels. In 
addition, the western-centred nature of the migration-for-development programmes 
means that they often ignore the local political-economic structures and the global 
sociospatial asymmetries in which they are embedded. In this sense, emphasising the 
contribution that migrants can make to their places of origin not only obscures the more 
severe problems that underpin the lack of development in these localities but also the 
conditions under which most migrants enter and remain in their societies of destination 
in the global north.  
 
In this scenario, these migration-for-development programmes intend to transfer more 
responsibility to the individual, the ‗responsible citizen‘ who is to secure not only her/his 
own economic and social security but also contribute to public projects and the 
economic and social development of her/his community through her/his productive 
investments and enterprise. This framework creates dependency on the private 
resources of migrant families, while ignoring the personal and social costs that are 
borne by migrants and their families to produce them. The migration for development 
discourse is especially contradictory in light of the tightening of immigration rules 
brought about by the managed migration programmes recently implemented in the 
north. These programmes and rising anti-immigrant discourses in the political and 
popular debates increasingly portrait migrants as the source of trouble and a threat to 
national security.  
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Based on the evidence presented in this thesis, it is clear that the linkages between 
migration and development are context-specific, complex and dynamic. Migration has 
allowed migrant households to obtain the resources needed to become active market 
players and consumers by affording them the purchasing power to demand goods and 
services in the local market. The diverse livelihood strategies employed by these 
migrant households have produced significant improvements in their everyday living 
conditions and have served to guarantee their maintenance and reproduction over the 
transnational social field. Whether or not these strategies involve using remittances to 
invest in housing, they generally have a direct or indirect impact, albeit small, on the 
development process through the multiplying effects they have on local industries. 
Thus, these findings overshadow the current policy-makers‘ preoccupation with the use 
of remittances for ‗either‘ consumption ‗or‘ investment‘. In general, the benefits accrued 
by migration and their accompanying remittances tend to remain concentrated in 
migrant households (primarily by decreasing the depth of poverty). They often have 
limited impacts on wider development processes because they are not accompanied 
by government strategies to improve the structural socioeconomic and institutional 
conditions that curtail the development process at the local and national levels. In 
summary, although the agency of individual families is at the centre of the 
socioeconomic dynamics presented in this thesis, the current articulation of the 
migration-for-development discourse in the Colombian context tends to attribute 
migrant families an unlimited capacity to overcome the structural constraints that inhibit 
development. Therefore, migration-for-development programmes are bound to fail (or 
at least remain marginal) because there is a mismatch between the micro and the 
aggregate/macro conditions that are needed to enable development. Specifically, there 
is a disconnection between the improved livelihoods that households‘ obtain through 
migration and the macro-level structural social, economic and political developments 
that are needed to improve the general living conditions in the localities/regions of 
origin of migrant households.   
 
Thus, I propose that rather than using the orthodox/economistic notion of development 
that underpins current articulations of the link between migration and development, 
broader definitions of development need to be taken into account in order to capture 
the more nuanced contributions that migrants‘ practices in the transnational field have 
for their households and communities in the global south. Essentially, future policies 
must take a view of development that includes the creation of the social, political and 
economic conditions necessary for the development of the potential of individuals and 
households according to the context-specific needs of their localities. These policies 
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must take into account the multidimensional nature of development as well as the 
different spatial scales (individual, household, village/town/city, region and nation) in 
which development takes place. They must also consider the ways in which migration 
and development shape and are shaped by global political, economic and social 
restructuring processes. 
 
More specifically, given the semi-permanent nature of migration flows in the Colombian 
context, these policies must be complemented by a renewed integral migration policy 
that incorporates the socioeconomic realities of Colombian migrants and their families 
and more avenues for their active participation in its design and implementation. This 
participation should be based on a systematic assessment of ‗the lives that people 
have reason to value‘ (Sen, 1999) so that public policies effectively aid the creation of 
the social, economic and political opportunities that foster human and economic 
development.  
 
Thus, following Delgado-Wise and Márquez Covarrubias (2010), I suggest that future 
research must entail systematic international comparative analyses that examine the 
dialectic relationship between migration and development and place them within the 
global political-economic processes of capitalist development. In the context of 
deepening global social inequalities and poverty produced by neoliberal capitalist 
development, future scholarship must also encompass the development of a more 
interdisciplinary and holistic theoretical approach to migration and development that 
calls attention to the fact that they are part and parcel of the same process as well as to 
the deeply asymmetrical nature of social transformations. In short, future research must 
not lose sight of the mutual constitution of the political, the economic, the social and the 
cultural dimensions of global migration and development. In an ideal world, the 
conversation on the development potential of migration would not be centre stage if, as 
one of the Colombian migrants who participated in this study suggested: ‗the 
government could do something radical so that we (migrants) do not have to leave our 
country and be separated from our loved ones in order to survive‘.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Interview Schedules 
 
Interview Schedule, London 
Interviewee‘s details 
Name:  
Age: 
Gender: 
Date:  
- What would you like to emerge/get out of this interview?  
 
Migration 
1. Tell me, where are you from in Colombia? Did you live in the same town before 
you came here? Did you move around the country? 
2. Are there many people from your city here, in London? If so, are you friends 
with them? 
3. When did you arrive in the UK? And who did you come with? 
4. Do you have any family here? 
5. What are the main reasons for migrating to the UK? 
 
Educational Background 
1. Did you have the opportunity to go to school in Colombia? What did you study? 
1. Did you have to work while you were in school? 
2. Have you studied English? Where? Can you read, write, communicate in 
English? 
 
Work 
1. What did you do in Colombia?  
2. What do you do here?  
3. What type of work did you do when you first arrived? 
4. What type of work would you like to do? 
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Gender 
1. Tell me, what do you think are the main problems Colombians face in the UK? 
2. Do you think they affect women and men in different way? 
3. What sorts of things have changed for you as a woman since you came to the 
UK?  
4. How have your family arrangements changed since you came to the UK? 
5. Do you think the role of men in the family has changed since they migrated 
here? 
 
Transnational Links 
1. Do you have any family left in Colombia? If so, who? 
2. If you have family in Colombia, how do you keep in touch with them? How 
often? 
3. Do you send money back to Colombia? Approximately how much do you send 
per month? How do you send the money? To whom and for what purpose? 
How dependent do you think they are on the money you sent? 
4. Do you send any other goods to Colombia? 
5. Have you bought/remodelled a house since you came to the UK? How did you 
go about doing that? 
6. What are your sources of money? 
7. How do you think your family in Colombia perceives your migration to the UK? 
8. Do you think your family is better or worse off since you migrated here? 
 
Other issues 
1. What do you think the main changes (social, economic or cultural) taking place 
in Colombia due to migration are? 
2. Have you gone back to Colombia since you came here? How do you feel when 
you go back? Do you feel dislocated? Do you find it hard to adapt to the 
changes that have taken place there? Do people there treat you differently 
when you are there visiting? 
3. Do you participate in the activities that the Colombian consulate or embassy 
organise in London? 
4. In reality, would you like to go back to live in Colombia? 
 
 
Would you like to add something else? 
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Finally, I am going to spend 4 months in Colombia in the summer next year. I would 
like to go to your city. If I do, what should I visit? Where should I stay? Can you 
recommend any places? Do you think I could visit your family? I am interested in 
tracing families back to Colombia, in order to understand what is happening on the 
other side. This is strictly voluntary. Be assured that the information that you and your 
relatives provide me will be strictly confidential and anonymous.  
 
Thank you very much for your time and all the stories you have shared with me. This 
will be very valuable for my research. Once I finish my project I will come back here 
with a report for you to read.  
 
Interview Schedule (migrant families), Colombia 
Interviewee‟s details 
Date 
City of residence  
Neighbourhood 
Place of interview 
Name 
Gender 
Age 
- What would you like to emerge/get out of this interview? 
 
Household information / socio-demographic characteristics  
1. Do you have relatives living overseas? 
2. What is your relationship to them? 
3. In which country/city do they live? Have they lived in another country? 
4. What are the main reasons for their emigration? When did they leave? 
5. Did you participate in their decision to migrate? If so, how? How did they make 
the decision to emigrate? 
6. How do you perceive your relatives‘ decision to migrate? 
7. How many people do you have under your care? What is your relationship to 
them? Who is the head of the household (who makes the household‘s 
decisions)? Do you participate in the decision-making? 
8. What is the composition of your household?  
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History of migration  
1. Have you ever migrated? 
2. Have you ever thought about migrating? If so, where to? 
3. Have you ever visited your relatives overseas? 
 
Work / Income 
1. Do you work? Inside or outside of the home? 
2. What is your occupation? 
3. What is the occupation of the members of your household? 
4. What are your sources of your income (waged work, own business, transfers, 
remittances)? 
5. Do you administer your money through banks (have a savings or current 
account)? If not, how? 
 
Remittances 
1. Do you receive money from overseas (remittances)? Who sends you the 
money? 
2. Is the money for you or for one of the people under your care? 
3. Through which company do you receive the money? 
4. How much do you receive and how often? 
5. How long have you been receiving this money? 
6. What do you spend the money on (utilities, food, clothing/shoes, health, 
education, housing, debt)? 
7. Does your relative send the money for those uses? 
8. Does this amount vary depending on the time of the year? For example, has the 
amount of money you receive decreased in the last few months as a 
consequence of the global economic crisis (because your relative lost their job 
or something similar)? 
9. If yes, what mechanisms have you used to overcome this limitation? 
10. Do you receive any ‗in kind‘ help (clothes, jewellery, appliances, furniture)? 
11. Would you say that your livelihood depends on those remittances? What 
percentage of your income do they constitute (are they complementary or your 
only source of income)? 
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Housing 
1. Have you or your relative abroad bought a plot or a house with those 
remittances? If yes, when? What use does the plot/house have now? 
2. What motivated your (your relatives‘) investment in that plot or house (why did 
you not invest the money in something else)? 
3. If yes, what intermediary did you use to buy the house (‗Mi house with 
remittances‘ programme, relative brought through housing fairs overseas, local 
construction company)? 
4. How did (does) your relative transfer the money to buy the house? Was it sent 
gradually? Or did she/he bring the money to buy the house in one of their 
visits? 
5. Have you made any repairs, extensions or improvements to your house with the 
money you receive from overseas? When? What type? Who did the work? How 
much did you invest? Who made the decisions about the building/buying? 
6. Did you relative leave any property for you to administer? If so, what and where 
is it located? 
 
Education  
1. Do you use part of the remittances to finance education?  
2. If so, for whom? 
3. What kind of education (primary, university, semi-professional courses, short 
courses)? 
4. Did you, or your relative overseas, acquire a loan to finance these studies? 
5. Have the remittances you receive allowed you (or any of your household 
members) to access a better education or to remain studying for longer? 
 
Health / Pension  
1. Are you affiliated to the government‘s social security program? 
2. Are you affiliated to a ‗caja de compensación familiar‘ (workers‘ co-ops)? 
3. Who affiliated you? 
4. Do you have a pension? 
5. Would you say that you use the remittances as a form of pension? 
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Social Mobility 
1. What have remittances allowed you (or your household) to do? What do you 
think you can do now that you could have not done before (because of the 
remittances)? 
2. How has your welfare improved as a consequence of remittances? 
3. Have the remittances allowed you to change your socioeconomic status? 
4. In general, do you think your family situation has improved or worsen since your 
relative migrated? 
5. What changes have you seen in your community as a consequence of 
increased migration and remittances? 
6. How much do you think your community depends on remittances? 
7. What symbolic value does the migration of your relative have for you? 
8. What would you like to change/happen about your family‘s situation in the next 
five years? 
9. Would you like to add something else? 
10. Do you have a friend, neighbour o acquaintance with relatives in the UK? I 
would greatly appreciate if you put me in contact with them.  
 
Thank you very much for your time and all the stories you have shared with me. This 
will be very valuable for my research. Once I finish my project I will come back here 
with a report for you to read.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Personal Details for Research Participants  
 
London 
1 - Diana. Diana is a 51-year-old Colombian from Palmira, Valle del Cauca. She has 
lived in London for 20 years. She works as a domestic cleaner. Diana lives with her 
partner and their 8-year-old son. Diana‘s sister, Viviana, also lives in London. In 
Colombia, Diana worked as a sales person for an important department store. She 
finished high school but did not attend university.  Diana‘s mother resides in Palmira 
and her other 5 siblings reside in the south of Colombia. I interviewed Viviana in 
Palmira.  
 
2- Celia. Celia is a 62-year-old Colombian from Bogotá. She has lived in London for 14 
years. She works as a childminder. Celia is divorced and has a 21-year-old daughter 
and a 27-year-old son. Celia has two sisters and two brothers who also live in London. 
She used to have a small clothing factory in London. She had to close the factory a few 
years after the Colombian economy was liberalised, because she could not compete 
with the cheap imports from China. Celia‘s two brothers live close to Bogotá. She also 
has some cousins and uncles in Colombia.  
 
3- Mariela. Mariela is a 52-year-old Colombian from Cali. She came to London in the 
mid-1980s. She works as a domestic and commercial cleaner. Mariela is a single 
mother of three small children. She came to London with the help of her aunt, who had 
lived in the UK since the 1970s. Two of her cousins and a niece also live in London. 
She worked as a secretary in Colombia. Her sister lives in Cali and takes care of their 
disabled brother. They are the only members of Mariela‘s nuclear family left in 
Colombia 
 
4- Miriam. Miriam is a 42-year-old Colombian from Bogotá. She came to London in 
1998. She works as a childminder. She lives with her partner and four children. Her 
eldest child is 21 and her youngest is 11. Miriam‘s brothers, sisters and father live in 
London. Miriam‘s mother still resides in Bogotá. Before moving to London Miriam 
worked as a secretary.  
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5- Andrea. Andrea is a 51-year-old woman from Pereira. She has lived in London for 
14 years. She works as a domestic cleaner. She lives with her daughter, sister and two 
nephews. Andrea‘s sister, Graciela, lives in Pereira with her two nephews, Arturo and 
Javier, who are in their early thirties. Andrea and her two sisters lived in the pacific 
coast of Colombia where they had a small grocery store. They were pushed out of this 
area by the armed conflict and moved back to Pereira in search for a new life. Unable 
to find employment, they agreed as a family, that two of them would emigrate and 
Graciela would stay behind to take care of their children (5 in total) and their mother. I 
interviewed Graciela and Arturo in Pereira.  
 
6- Luis. Luis is a 50-year-old from Cartago, Valle del Cauca. He has lived in London for 
25 years. Luis co-owns a small Colombian restaurant. Luis came to the UK after failing 
to enter the university in Colombia. He came with the help of his brother who was 
already living in the country. Luis has a cooking certificate from the UK. Luis lives with 
his wife and two children. His brothers still live in Cartago.  
 
7- Cesar. Cesar is a 49-year-old from Palmira, Valle del Cauca. He has lived in London 
for 18 years. Cesar co-owns a small Colombian restaurant. He has a university degree 
in Marketing. After the business he had in Colombia failed, Cesar came to the UK to 
join his sister. He lives with his wife and children. His mother and two brothers live in 
Palmira.  
 
8- Lourdes. Lourdes is a 55-year-old from Armenia, Quindío. She has lived in London 
since 1976. Lourdes works as a childminder. She is divorced and has two grown-up 
children. Lourdes came to the UK with the help of an aunt, who recommended her to 
an employer who offered her a job as a nursing aid. Lourdes‘ siblings live in Spain. She 
only has some distant relatives left in the Coffee Region.   
 
9- Nancy. Nancy is a 47-year-old Colombian from Restrepo, Valle del Cauca. She has 
lived in London since 1997 and is employed as a domestic/commercial cleaner. She is 
a single mother and lives with her 7-year-old daughter. Nancy came to the UK to join 
her brother who had lived in London since the early 1990s. Before moving to the UK, 
Nancy worked in a factory as a clothing sales person. One of Nancy‘s sister lives in 
Spain and her mother, sister and nephews live in Cali. I interviewed Nancy‘s sister, 
Ana, in Cali.  
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10- Mariana. Mariana is a 36-year-old migrant from Buga, Valle del Cauca. Mariana 
and her husband came to London 10 years ago. They entered the UK on a fake 
Spanish passport but a few years after they arrived in the UK, they applied for political 
asylum. In Colombia, she worked as a school teacher. After working as a cleaner for a 
few years, Mariana managed to get certified as a nursery teacher.  She is divorced and 
lives with her two daughters. Mariana‘s parents and siblings live in Buga.  
 
11- Ana Aura. Ana Aura is a 45-year-old migrant from Palmira, Valle del Cauca. She 
has lived in London for 22 years. She is temporarily unemployed but works as a 
volunteer for a well-known NGO. She came to the UK to join her husband, who had 
claimed political asylum in the UK after his brother was murdered in Colombia. She is 
divorced and lives with her 23-year-old son. Ana Aura‘s siblings and father live in 
Palmira.  
 
12- Rebeca. Rebeca is a 47-year-old Colombian from Cartago, Valle del Cauca. She 
came to London in 1990. She works at a Latin American migrant organisation.  
 
13- Claudia. Claudia is a 42-year-old migrant from Pereira. She came to the UK to 
study English in 2000. She is divorced and has no children. She is unemployed. In 
Colombia, Claudia studied graphic design and worked for a big company. Claudia‘s 
family resides in Medellin.  
 
14- Ana Carolina. Ana Carolina is a 41-year-old migrant from Pereira. She has lived in 
London for 7 years. She works as a commercial cleaner. She entered the UK with a 
fake Spanish passport. She lives with her partner and three children. Ana Carolina 
brought her two youngest daughters to London a year ago, her eldest daughter, Judith, 
resides in Pereira. Her mother and siblings also reside in Pereira. Ana Carolina did not 
finish high school and worked selling lingerie and cosmetics via catalogue in Colombia. 
I interviewed Judith in Pereira.  
 
15- Alejandra. Alejandra is a 53-year-old migrant from Armenia, Quindío. She has lived 
in London since 1991.  She is employed as a domestic cleaner. She lives with her 
husband and two daughters. Alejandra‘s eldest son lives and works in Australia. In 
Colombia, Alejandra worked as a lawyer. She left Colombia after being threatened by a 
criminal gang. Her asylum case was never resolved and she became a legal resident 
through an amnesty in 1995. All of Alejandra‘s immediate family resides in London.  
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16- Daniela. Daniela is a 55-year-old Colombian from Bogotá. She has lived in London 
for 25 years. She works at a Latin American migrant organisation. 
 
17- Juana. Juana is a 35-year-old migrant from Pereira. She has lived in London for 10 
years. After working as a cleaner for a few years, Juana got certified as a childminder. 
She cares for 5 children at her home. Juana lives with her partner and two small 
children. She came to the UK in search for a better live. Juana has a high school 
degree but could not afford to go to the university. In Colombia, she worked as a sales 
person at a well-known supermarket.  
 
18- Leonel. Leonel is a 48-year-old from Bogotá. He came to London in 1999. He is the 
owner of a small grocery store in North London. Before coming to the UK, Leonel was 
studying for a vocational degree and working independently as a sales person. Leonel 
came to the UK seeking to explore other opportunities with the help of some Colombian 
friends who were established in London. He lives with his wife and two children. 
Leonel‘s mother and two siblings still reside in Bogotá. 
 
19- Antonio. Antonio is a 44-year-old from Pereira. He migrated to London with his 
family in 1999. He owns a small business in North London. Antonio used to have a 
small business in Colombia but was being extorted by a paramilitary group. He was 
granted political asylum in the UK a few years after having arrived. He lives with his 
wife and three children. His mother and siblings reside in Pereira.   
 
20- Hector. Hector is a 67-year-old migrant from Bogotá. Hector has lived in London 
since the 1970s. He is retired and lives alone in a flat in south London. He is one of the 
thousands of Colombians who came to the UK on a work permit scheme to work in the 
hospitality sector in the mid 1970s. He has no family in the UK and only some distant 
relatives left in Colombia.  
 
21- Dilia. Dilia is a 40-year-old migrant from Cali. She has lived in London for 10 years. 
She is a housemaker. Dilia has a high school degree and worked as a sales person in 
Colombia. She claimed political asylum when she arrived in the UK. She did not specify 
the reasons for her asylum claim. Dilia lives with her husband and three children. Her 
mother and other relatives live in Cali.  
 
22- Angela. Angela is a 43-year-old migrant from Cartago, Valle del Cauca. She has 
lived in London for 6 years. She works as a cleaner. Angela is divorced and lives her 
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two small children. She came to the UK to join her Colombian husband who was 
already established in London. Angela did not finish high school and worked in a 
restaurant in Colombia. Angela‘s immediate family lives in Cartago.  
 
23- Maricruz. Maricruz is a 58-year-old migrant from Anserma, Caldas. She came to 
London with her husband in 1997. They left Colombia because they were worried 
about the security situation. Maricruz works part-time as a childminder. Maricruz‘s 
husband died five years after they moved to London. She has two children in their 
twenties who help her financially. Her brother and nephews also live in London. 
Maricruz also has a sister in Spain. Her sister, parents and other siblings live in 
Pereira. I interviewed one of Maricruz‘s sisters, Dulce, in Pereira.  
 
Colombia, Key Actors  
1- Fabiola. Fabiola is a professor in the department of rural and regional development 
at the Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá. Her areas of research are forced displacement, 
gender, human rights and community development.  
 
2- Gustavo. Gustavo is a professor in the department of anthropology at the 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Bogotá. He specialises in international migration, 
territory and culture.  
 
3- Antonio. Antonio works for Fundación Esperanza, an NGO for the defence of human 
rights in the context of migration and human mobility. They specialise in human 
trafficking, forced displacement and child labour.  
 
4- Manuela. Manuela is a professor in the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences at 
the Universidad del Valle in Cali. Her main areas of research are international migration 
to Spain and sociology of the labour market.  
5- William. William is the Director of the Human Mobility Group at Alma Mater, the 
Network of Public Universities of the Coffee Region of Colombia. This group has an 
important local, national and international reach and works closely with a range of 
NGOs and other organisations to produce empirically-based research to influence 
public policy and actions that attend to the social demands generated by the migration 
phenomenon.  The group has recently collaborated in founding the first master‘s 
degree in migration studies in Colombia.  
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6- Carolina. Carolina is the representative of the Mi casa con Remesas programme in 
the state of Risaralda. She works for the state‘s Caja de Compensación Familiar, 
Comfamiliar.  
 
7- Leo. Leo is the owner of an important construction company in the Coffee Region. 
He has been in the construction business for more than 25 years and is a long-term 
member of CAMACOL, the National Association of Builders. 
 
8- Cristina. Cristina works at the state of Risaralda‘s governor‘s office. She works in the 
office for the attention of migrant workers and their families.  
 
9- Daisy. Daisy works at the offices of the municipal government of Palmira, Valle. She 
works as a development consultant. 
 
10- Sabrina. Sabrina is employed by Centre for the Attention of Migrant Families in 
Palmira, Valle.  
 
11- Cristian. Cristian is a community leader in Cuba, the biggest popular 
neighbourhood in Pereira. He has worked as a teacher and community leader for more 
than 20 years. He is in charge of the local educational development chapter.  
 
12- Jorge. Jorge is the representative of a well-known multinational remittances 
corporation in Bogotá. He has worked in the financial industry for over 25 years.  
 
13- Laura. Laura is an employee in an important construction company in the Coffee 
Region. She has worked in the business for more than 10 years. Laura specialises in 
mortgage advice for low-income housing.  
14- Javier. Javier is the representative of Bancolombia‘s commercial division for 
Colombians abroad. Bancolombia is Colombia‘s largest commercial bank. 
Bancolombia is the only bank formally associated with the Mi casa con Remesas 
programme.  
 
Colombia, Migrant Households 
1- Dulce. Dulce is a 61-year-old from Pereira. Dulce is a retired lawyer. Dulce‘s sister, 
brother and nephews live in London. Dulce has not seen her siblings in more than 10 
years because they have not been able to return to Colombia due to their legal status. 
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She is partially responsible of taking care of her elderly parents. Dulce‘s contact 
information was provided by her sister, Maricruz in London.  
 
2- Graciela. Graciela is a 57-year-old woman. Graciela lives in Pereira with her two 
nephews, Arturo and Javier, who are in their early thirties. They own a restaurant in the 
city centre of Pereira. Her sisters, Andrea and Luciana, have lived in London for 15 
years. Graciela‘s son and nephews also live in London. When Graciela‘s sisters 
migrated to London in 1994, they agreed as a family, that she would stay behind to 
take care of their children (5 in total) and their mother. Graciela‘s contact information 
was provided by her sister Andrea in London.  
 
3- Claudia. Claudia is a 45-year-old from Pereira. Claudia lives with her 12-year-old 
son. Her child‘s father has lived in London for 9 years. He emigrated to London with the 
help of some relatives after his business failed. Claudia receives remittances for the 
partial maintenance of her son. She lives from renting rooms in her house.  
4- Arturo. Arturo is a 30-year-old returned migrant. He lives with his aunt and brother in 
Pereira. Arturo and his brother lived and worked in London and studied some English 
for six years, while they waited for the Home Office‘s decision, but had to return to 
Colombia in 2007, after their case for family reunification was refused. When they 
returned, they were unable to find jobs and because of Arturo‘s passion for cooking, 
they decided to open a restaurant with the saving they had. Arturo‘s contact information 
was provided by his aunt, Andrea, in London. 
 
5- Hilda. Hilda is a 63-year-old from Pereira. She lives with her husband and one 
grandchild. Hilda‘s has a son residing in Spain and one in London. They both left after 
being unemployed for more than one year, with the help of friends who were 
established in these countries. Hilda complements her income with the remittances that 
she receives from her sons.  
 
6- Judith. Judith is a 24-year-old resident of Pereira whose mother has lived in London 
since 2001. She lives with her small daughter and her father. Judith‘s two younger 
sisters recently reunited with their mother in London. Judith could not go because she 
was over the age to qualify for family reunification. Judith works as a nursing assistant 
and relies on her mother‘s support to make ends meet.  
 
7- Lucia. Lucia is a 45-year-old who lives in Pereira. She lives with her three children 
and works as a sales assistant in a beauty shop. The father of Lucia‘s children has 
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lived in London since 2001.  Lucia receives remittances from him, but they are not 
regular and she says that it is not enough. Two of her children are about to finish high 
school and have no prospects of entering the university because they cannot afford it. 
Lucia is hoping that at least one of them would join their father in London.  
 
8- Liliana. Liliana is an 82-year-old whose son and daughter have lived in London for 
16 years. She lives with two of her daughters in a house in a middle-class 
neighbourhood in Pereira. Liliana used to live in a small town in the coffee region 
where she had a small farm. She wanted to move to the city and her son bought her 
the house where she lives. Because of her age, and the fact that her other children do 
not earn much money, Liliana relies heavily on the remittances she receives from 
London.  
 
9- Patricia. Patricia is a 36-year-old resident of Pereira. Patricia lives with her 13-year-
old daughter and her partner. The father of Patricia‘s daughter has lived in London for 7 
years. Patricia works as a hairdresser and is pregnant with her second child. Patricia 
receives some money from London for the maintenance, mainly schooling, of her child.  
 
10- Viviana. Viviana is 54 years old. She has lived in London for 16 years, working as a 
cleaner. Viviana returned to Palmira temporarily to take care of her ill mother. Viviana‘s 
23-year-old daughter also resides in London. Viviana left Colombia after separating 
from her husband. She joined her sister, Diana, who was already established in 
London. They also have two siblings living in Spain and two more in Palmira. Viviana, 
Diana and their siblings in Spain send remittances for the maintenance of their mother 
and to help other members of the family. They have all invested in housing in 
Colombia. I interviewed Diana in London and she provided the contact information for 
her family.  
 
11- María. María is a 42-year-old resident of Pereira. Her sister has lived illegally in 
London for 10 years. María lives with her husband and two children. She works as a 
school teacher and her husband is a factory worker. María‘s sister left Colombia after 
her husband lost his job during the economic crisis of 1999. They eventually separated 
and she left her 14 and 16 year olds children in the care of her parents. They reunited 
with their mother two years after she left. María‘s sister sends remittances regularly for 
the maintenance of her parents, mainly for their health expenses.  
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12- Oriana. Oriana is a 67-year-old resident of Dosquebradas, Risaralda. Oriana lives 
with her husband and one of her granddaughters. Oriana‘s daughter has been working 
as a cleaner in London since 2006. Oriana‘s daughter sends monthly remittances for 
the maintenance of the family. They complement their income with the rent they derive 
from renting rooms in the house they recently built with remittances. 
 
13- Carmen. Carmen is a 62-year-old returned migrant now living in Pereira. Carmen‘s 
daughters and son have lived in London for 15 years. They went to London to join her 
when she was still living there. Carmen‘s children support her from abroad. Carmen is 
retired, so she complements her income by renting rooms in her house. She 
remodelled the house with the financial help of her children.  
 
14- Fabiola. Fabiola is a 52-year-old resident of Pereira. She lives with her husband 
and two grown-up children. Fabiola‘s brother went to London in 1999 in the midst of the 
Colombian economic crisis. Fabiola used to take care of her brother‘s 15-year-old 
daughter but she now lives with her grandparents. Fabiola‘s brother sends money from 
London to pay for her education.  
 
15- Martha. Martha is 35 years old and lives in Pereira. Martha works as a childminder. 
She lives with her 14-year-old daughter and her partner. The father of her daughter 
moved to London with his wife in 2000. They do not communicate much but he sends 
money every month to pay for the education of their daughter.  
 
16- Eugenia. Eugenia is a 69-year-old, resident of Zaragoza, Valle del Cauca. Eugenia 
has ten siblings, five of whom have lived in London since the 1990s. They all left due to 
the lack of economic opportunities in the town where they live. Eugenia lives with her 
extended family and the household depends entirely from the remittances sent from 
London. They recently rebuilt the house where they live with the money they receive 
from London.  
 
17- Lina. Lina is a 54-year-old resident of Zaragoza, Valle del Cauca. Lina‘s sons 
reside abroad. One has resided in London for 14 years and the other has lived in Spain 
for 6. They left after being unemployed for more than a year after finishing high school. 
They had a cousin in London who helped them with the travel arrangements and initial 
settling. Lina has not seen her son who lives in London since he left, because he does 
not have legal documents.  Lina lives with her elderly mother and one of her nephews. 
With the money Lina receives from her sons, she helps other family members.  
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18- Jose Luis. Jose Luis is a 76-year-old resident of Anserma, Caldas. Jose Luis lives 
with his wife and two of their grandchildren. They are both retired. Jose Luis‘ daughter 
and son have lived in London for about 15 years. He also has two daughters in Spain. 
They left in search for better opportunities, mainly to provide for the education of their 
children. The pension that Jose Luis receives is not enough to cover the living 
expenses, so the household depends on the remittances they receive from London and 
Spain.  
  
19- Margarita. Margarita is a 40-year-old, resident of Anserma, Caldas. Margarita has a 
small hairdressing salon in her house. She lives with her husband and two children. 
Her brother has lived and worked in London for seven years. Margarita‘s bother moved 
to London with the help of some friends, as she put it, to ‗escape poverty‘. He sends 
money regularly for their mother‘s healthcare and living expenses and occasionally to 
help Margarita (when the business is slow).  
 
20- Yair. Yair is a 31-year-old returned migrant now living in Pereira. His mother 
migrated to London in 1997, due of the difficult economic situation and because they 
were about to lose their house. Yair‘s mother was employed in Pereira but the money 
she made was not enough to cover their living expenses. Yair lives with his 
grandmother, an uncle and one niece. Yair recently got a job as a technician in a 
telecommunications company but he also receives monthly remittances from his 
mother. They have paid off the mortgage of the house and have built on it to rent some 
rooms.  
 
21- Ana. Ana is 43-year-old from Cali. Ana is a homemaker and she lives with her 
husband and two children. Ana‘s brother has lived in London for 19 years and her 
sister, Nancy, has resided in London for 12. She also has a sister in Spain. They all 
send money for the maintenance of their elderly mother, who lives in the town where 
they grew up (Restrepo). About 5 years ago, Ana‘s siblings bought houses in their 
hometown and also bought a house for their mother. I interviewed Nancy in London 
and she provided her sister‘s contact information.  
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Appendix 3 
 
List of Acronyms  
 
CAMACOL  Cámara Colombiana de la Construcción: Colombia‘s national 
association of builders. 
 
CAVs  Corporaciones de Ahorro y Vivienda: Savings and Housing 
Corporations. 
 
CCFs Cajas de Compensación Familiar: regional, not-for-profit 
institutions that capture resources from private companies to 
provide social services such as health, education, housing and 
recreation to low-income employees and their families. 
 
CONPES Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social: National 
Council for Economic and Social Policy. 
 
Fonvivienda  Fondo Nacional de Vivienda: replaced INURBE in 2003 
 
ICT Instituto de Crédito Territorial: state agency responsible for 
building and financing government housing solutions. 
 
INURBE National Institute for Social Housing and Urban Reform: replaced 
ICT in the1990s.  
 
SFV Subsidio Familiar de Vivienda: one-off housing subsidy for the 
acquisition of privately supplied social housing  
 
UPAC Unidad de poder adquisitvo constante: indexation mechanism for 
savings accounts and housing loans provided by the CAVs.   
 
UVR Unidad de Valor Real Constante (Constant Real Value Unit): 
inflation-adjusted indexation mechanism for housing finance. 
 
VIS   Vivienda de Interés Social: social interest housing  
 
VIP Vivienda de Interés Prioritario: a type of VIS designed for the 
poorest segment of the population 
 
